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Foreword
The Center for International Intellectual Property Studies (CEIPI) and the International Centre 
for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) are pleased to present the fifth issue of the 
publication series on Global Perspectives and Challenges for the Intellectual Property System. This 
issue continues to develop what the publication series intends to provide: high-quality academic 
and policy-oriented papers dealing with topics that are of global importance because of their 
normative pre-eminence, economic relevance, and socioeconomic impact.
CEIPI and ICTSD decided to launch this common project convinced by the synergies existing 
between both organisations. We share a common interest in intellectual property (IP) as a tool 
for innovation, development, and the pursuit of broader societal interests, being profoundly 
engaged in knowledgeable and informed reflection and international debates touching upon how 
intellectual property can fulfil these important goals. This series of papers aims, therefore, at 
provoking consideration of contemporary issues thanks to the collaboration of recognised scholars 
and experts, giving voice to them, enriching the academic debate, and feeding policymakers with 
high-quality materials.
The series wishes to reach a broader audience, ranging from academics to public officials, including 
civil society, experts, business advisers, and the broad membership of the IP community. We also 
have in mind the actual implementation of IP—how IP works in practice—without losing sight 
of public policy objectives, including its intersection with innovation, creativity, and sustainable 
development goals.
We sincerely hope you will find this fifth issue of the series, dealing with IP and digital trade in the 
age of artificial intelligence and big data, a useful contribution to a better understanding of the 
legal complexities and social and economic opportunities arising from technologies that lay the 
groundwork or foundation for a new industrial revolution.
Christophe Geiger 
Director General and Director of the Research 
Department of the Center for International 
Intellectual Property Studies at the University 
of Strasbourg (CEIPI)
Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz 
Chief Executive, International Centre for Trade 
and Sustainable Development (ICTSD)
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The origin of this publication was the conference “Intellectual property and digitalization: challenges for 
intellectual property management,” organised in May 2017 by the Center for International Intellectual 
Property Studies (CEIPI), the Bureau of Theoretical and Applied Economics (BETA), and the International 
Institute for Intellectual Property Management (I3PM). The objective of the conference was to shed light 
on the most recent evolution in intellectual property brought by digitalisation, gathering an eclectic 
group of experts from academia, public institutions, and industry. From an academic standpoint, we 
were particularly interested in combining law, economics, and management scholars.
Such an ambition is not new at the University of Strasbourg. The CEIPI–BETA project in law and 
economics of intellectual property was launched in 2013, becoming the first joint research initiative 
of two constituent bodies of the University of Strasbourg, made up by law and economics scholars. 
Seminars, workshops, publications, and conferences have been possible since then thanks to the 
interaction of both groups of scholars and the generous support of Air Liquide and Total. This publication 
is an outcome of the CEIPI–BETA project in law and economics of intellectual property.
The interest in partnership and cooperation between our law and economics research centres mirrors 
the central place that the relationship between law and economics has acquired in current debates and 
initiatives on innovation and competition. This has been complemented by an increasing presence of 
chief economists in the most relevant intellectual property institutions, including the World Intellectual 
Property Organization, the European Patent Office (EPO), the European Union Intellectual Property 
Office, and several national institutions.
The growing relevance of the economics of intellectual property is partially explained because analysis 
by economists helps to contextualise the function that intellectual property rights fulfil. In this respect, 
economic analysis allows us to put intellectual property in relation to the achievement of socially 
desirable goals, such as employment, innovation, and creativity. It also helps to objectivise certain 
claims to broaden (or, sometimes, shorten) intellectual property protection by empirical findings, thus 
participating in what scholars increasingly refer to as necessary “evidence-based intellectual property 
protection,” adding significantly to a policy context often characterised by polarised discussions 
and confrontations of a sometimes ideological nature.1 At the same time, an economically relevant 
outcome may not always be legally acceptable. This has been illustrated clearly by economic studies 
showing both negative and positive externalities of intellectual property infringement. Thus, while 
economics guides law, law also shapes economics and embraces values that go beyond economic 
output or rationales.2 Naturally, this interface creates a very interesting space for policy discussion and 
legal reform, and informs legislators embracing data-driven policymaking.
This is the context in which the CEIPI–BETA project in the law and economics of intellectual property 
was launched, with three central objectives in mind: to stimulate cooperation between economists and 
legal scholars; to become a forum for discussion; and to develop research capacity. The areas of research 
1  See, for example, Jeremy de Beer, “Evidence-Based Intellectual Property Policymaking: An Integrated Review of Methods 
and Conclusions,” Journal of World Intellectual Property 19.5–6 (2016): 150. In the European context, see Christophe 
Geiger, “Moving Out of the Economic Crisis: What Role and Shape for Intellectual Property Rights in the European Union?” 
in Harri Kalimo and Max S. Jansson (eds), EU Economic Law in a Time of Crisis (Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: 
Edward Elgar, 2016), 148, stating that in order to be fully legitimised, “future initiatives by the European legislature will 
have to be based appropriately on serious and above all independent economic data and impact assessments that make it 
possible to measure the probable consequences of the legislative activity.”
2  See, for example, Xavier Seuba, “The Economics of Intellectual Property Enforcement,” World Intellectual Property 
Organization Journal 6.2 (2015): 133–142.
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interest identified since the beginning of the CEIPI–BETA project include two topics of relevance for this 
publication—intellectual property management, and intellectual property and digitalisation. In this 
publication, we aim to prompt discussion on a highly topical issue thanks to the chapters submitted by 
professionals with very different backgrounds. This is indeed riskier than delivering a publication with 
only legal scholars, or with only economists or industry representatives. The mix of policy, academic, 
and industrial backgrounds helps to reflect on current complexities and opportunities.
The chapters compiled here elaborate on changes in modes of innovation, production, and 
commercialisation of innovation, which are central in current discussions and relate closely to intellectual 
property law and competition. The snapshot of the current and rapidly evolving technological and 
economic situation allows authors to elaborate on legal options, economic impact, and policy choices. 
As things stand right now, there are more questions than answers, amid a generalised perception of 
being immersed in a sea-change movement and revolutionary times. The contributions we introduce 
feed the debate, identify the central aspects, and may be instrumental at drafting a research agenda.
Such reflections are crucial to propose a balanced regulative framework for the future and a “human” 
development to these advances in technology, posing broader ethical and philosophical questions. 
Needless to say, the economic implications for big data and artificial intelligence in the near future are 
immense. The marker for artificial intelligence is predicted to grow to more than US$ 47 billion in 2020. 
China has declared artificial intelligence a national priority, with huge investments made by the Chinese 
government. These investments are generating legitimate claims for protection. This is complicated by 
the fact that in “the Fourth Revolution,” to quote a recent study drafted by Chief Economist Yann 
Ménière and his team at the EPO,3 machines will also be able to act as innovators and creators. At the 
same time, the intellectual property system has its rationales and balances, and we need to be careful 
not to turn the entire system upside down too quickly, as this can have unforeseen consequences.4 
Similar issues were experienced with the extension of patent law in the field of software and business 
methods, which has provoked tensions and strong rejections in the public opinion.5
This publication contains two largely interdependent parts. Part One: From Digital Trade to 
Commercialisation and Management of Intellectual Property includes contributions by Keith E. Maskus, 
Yann Ménière and Ilja Rudyk, Sean M. O’Connor, Catalina Martínez, Peter Bittner, and Alissa Zeller.
Keith E. Maskus holds that in order to foster innovation in digital technologies and trade, it is vital to set 
up with a dynamic technology policy that encourages innovation and business experimentation. In this 
regard, fiscal supports for research and development spending are a satisfactory measure if they are 
generally available. Public support for a robust, universally accessible, and dynamic internet remains 
key to further advancement. Another important component of support is an infrastructure policy that 
emphasises universal and efficient connectivity with the platform. In this regard, ensuring seamless 
interoperability across users and content providers is key. Maskus also notes that a change may be 
needed in respect to the traditionally light regulatory approach and relatively soft penalties in the 
3  Yann Ménière, Ilja Rudyk, and Javier Valdes, Patents and the Fourth Industrial Revolution: The Inventions Behind Digital 
Transformations (Munich: European Patent Office, 2017). See also the chapter by Yann Ménière and Ilja Rudyk in this 
publication.
4  On this crucial issue, see Christophe Geiger, “The Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights, Or How Ethics 
Can Influence the Shape and Use of IP Law,” in G.B. Dinwoodie (ed.), Methods and Perspectives in Intellectual Property 
(Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2013), 153.
5  On this issue, see the chapter by Catalina Martínez in this publication.
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context of liability rules for internet service providers and social media, in order to respond to evolving 
and current complexities. International cooperation in this regard may be key in the next stages of 
digital trade regulation. The promotion of trade and innovation in digital technologies also requires 
that goods and services sold online can transit easily across national borders. Restrictions on such trade 
arise from requirements for data localisation, mandates for local processing of data, or requirements 
for government approval for data transfers. Protection of privacy, enhancement of cyber-security, and 
advancement of technology transfer are usually invoked to justify those measures, which may also entail 
disguised restrictions to trade. Maskus holds that barriers to trade in data generate substantial costs 
in efficiency and associated welfare losses. In that context, European Union (EU) efforts to harmonise 
privacy protection, commercial exploitation of data, and the elimination of barriers to erect a single 
market are of particular interest and uncertain success. More broadly, increasing international tensions 
over cyber-security and data privacy challenge conventional thinking regarding the development of 
dynamic technological markets.
Yann Ménière and Ilja Rudyk address patentability trends at the EPO regarding computer-implemented 
technologies that enable the “fourth industrial revolution” (4IR), focusing on autonomous, connected 
objects. They rely on a recent study released by the EPO, which emphasises both the potential of the 
4IR in many different sectors and its speedy development. The data analysed confirm the rise of the 
Republic of Korea and some Asian economies, but also the relevant contribution of the European 
economy to digital economy in its most sophisticated forms. Examination practices regarding 
computer-implemented technologies are briefly introduced, as well as the managerial and institutional 
reforms undertaken to cope with the rise of 4IR-related technologies, concluding that the examination 
practices, the legal framework, and the measures taken to manage new applications allow the EPO to 
“provide legally robust patent rights of the highest quality to applicants and innovators around the 
world.”
Sean M. O’Connor touches on innovation in business models and introduces the range of digital business 
models clustered around three basic concepts: the traditional sales model, the licence model (digital 
artefacts conveyed on physical media), and the delivery of digital artefacts as services. O’Connor 
advocates a flexible regulatory environment and argues that the same regulatory flexibility that legal 
regimes governing technological hubs give to exploration of commercialising new technologies should 
apply with regard to innovative business and legal models. In a related fashion, he defends heightened 
scrutiny of user contracts. In this respect, O’Connor emphasises that the gap between the marketed 
rights and the actual legal rights conveyed can be tremendous. A partial solution is heightened judicial 
scrutiny of terms of service and privacy policies when issues arise. Another proposal put forward by 
O’Connor consists of putting consumers centre-stage and promoting the standardisation of contract 
elements (but not the entire agreement) and truth-in-disclosure rules.
Patentability of software and its impact on innovation are addressed by Catalina Martínez. Drawing on 
economic analysis, her chapter underlines that patenting may not always be needed to recoup the costs 
of investing in software development. In a related fashion, she claims that it is difficult to assess what 
part of the growth in software-related patent applications responds to increased innovation and what 
part is just a consequence of higher patent propensity in the field. Importantly, Martínez puts forward 
three recommendations to patent offices, for all patents in general, and more so for software-related 
inventions. The first recommendation is to increase transparency about the legal status of patents 
and their owners. Second, Martínez recommends maintaining a high inventive step and strict non-
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obviousness test, in order to stop the grant of trivial patents. Finally, she underlines that it is necessary 
to ensure that all patent filings include sufficient information on how to implement the invention, so 
that patents are granted not to an “idea” or a “desideratum” but to inventions that can be implemented 
and help solve well-identified problems.
Peter Bittner describes how the digital transformation impacts daily life and identifies key enablers 
of the digital transformation. Technologies that rely on the existence of multiple technology layers 
communicate through the Internet of Things. These technologies boost advanced innovation, such 
as autonomous automobile systems and interconnected medical monitoring devices. The Internet 
of Things allows objects to be sensed or controlled remotely across existing network infrastructure, 
creating opportunities for integration of the physical world into computer-based systems. A central 
aspect of Bittner’s chapter are the intellectual property management challenges arising from the 
intangible nature of software and data. As Bittner explains, modern software solutions often show 
a distributed character in that different parts of the software may be executed by different devices 
operated by different parties in different countries. In this context, a critical question is who should 
own what and where. In addition to data ownership concerns, Bittner addresses how the digital 
transformation impacts old paradigms of exclusivity or freedom to operate (FTO). When looking at 
intellectual property generated for complex layered technologies, it is unusual for a new software 
solution to go to market without infringing a large number of patents in the various technology layers. 
Hence, it would seem that the primary use of intellectual property should move from excluding others 
to improving the bargaining power of rights-holders.
Alissa Zeller underlines that digitalisation has reached all sectors of the chemical industry, and that 
it is time to implement digital intellectual property strategies. In this regard, she underlines that the 
numbers relating to information technology (IT) patents filed by chemical companies are still negligible 
when compared with IT patents in industries that entered the digital world earlier. Patent protection 
strategies have differed between the chemical and the IT sectors. For chemical products, an in-depth 
FTO analysis can be done because of the defined product (chemical formula) and the limited number 
of patents per product. This is not the case for IT inventions, in particular because of the large number 
of patents and the lack of a standardised technical terminology. FTO processes in the chemical 
industry are impacted by digitalisation at both ends of the product development: at the front end, 
the selection of ideas for further development will be facilitated by big data analysis. At the back end, 
digitalisation introduces new FTO complexity. An increasing number of projects will include not only 
chemical inventions but also associated IT innovations. Accordingly, both a “classic” FTO and a risk-
based FTO—including licensing options—will be necessary. Artificial intelligence and big data are the 
digital backbone technologies of new software supporting the search specialist and patent lawyer. 
There are already tools for white space analysis, and development is under way for intelligent analysis 
of invalidity, infringement, and enforcement. Zeller raises important questions, including those relating 
to the legal relevance of computer-generated mass-patent filings covering computer-identified white 
space spots. Will such patent applications count as prior art? Will they be patentable? Who is the 
respective inventor?
Part Two: Regulating and Using Big Data in the Digital World includes contributions by Reto Hilty, 
Christophe Geiger, Giancarlo Frosio, and Oleksandr Bulayenko, Ryan Abbott, Timo Minssen and Jens 
Schovsbo, Francesco Lissoni and Gabriele Cristelli, and Claudia Jamin.
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Reto Hilty contextualises the current centrality of big data in a longer and ongoing industrial 
revolution that started in the middle of the twentieth century. Data processing, data storage, and 
data transportation were central elements in previous moments of such industrial revolution. The 
crucial difference is now found in the volume and nature of data, which have become part of the 
infrastructure of the digital economy, the so-called “data-driven economy.” There is hence particular 
reason—the public infrastructure nature of data—for public authorities to be concerned about data. 
Hilty focuses on the action undertaken by the European Commission in this domain and identifies, 
as the central question that needs to be answered, whether legislation is actually needed. As Hilty 
underlines, the data-driven economy is prospering with virtually no (specific) legislation. While he 
analyses several relevant aspects, two guiding principles can be underlined. First, a one-size-fits-all 
approach is not likely to produce positive effects at large. Second, generally, simple de-regulation 
might be the right answer to further stimulate initiatives in the data-driven economy. Prudence in the 
regulation, and in particular in the granting of exclusive rights over data, is the main recommendation 
he puts forward.
Christophe Geiger, Giancarlo Frosio, and Oleksandr Bulayenko underline that although artificial 
intelligence, neural networks, and machine learning, through the exploitation of big data streams 
made available by digital networking technology, might be set to become the most disruptive 
technologies in the years to come, they bring about a set of thorny legal challenges. These artificial 
intelligence learning processes must use inputs possibly protected by intellectual property rights 
to create wholly transformative outputs. Text and data mining (TDM) has been a fundamental 
technique to make machine learning—and artificial intelligence autonomous decision-making and 
creativity—possible by copying or crawling massive datasets. The EU has been struggling for some 
time on whether TDM techniques should be considered within the reach of copyright and other sui 
generis rights or whether they should be exempted from that reach. To the end of bringing clarity to a 
confused panorama of possible applicable exceptions and limitations to TDM activities, the European 
Commission’s proposal for a directive on copyright in the digital single market would like to introduce 
a specific exception. Of course, the new exception will facilitate research and innovation in the digital 
single market by bringing about long-sought harmonisation. Its narrow scope, however, will limit 
these substantive positive externalities to a comparatively small number of research institutions, 
while the digital single market at large will still lag behind other jurisdictions, allowing a larger cluster 
of market players to legally engage in TDM activities.
Ryan Abbott analyses how intellectual property should adapt to innovation generated by computers. 
He emphasises that computers are doing more than ever before, and their work goes far beyond 
manual labour. Not only doctors, lawyers, and scientists, but also inventors, can be partially replaced 
by computers. In this respect, Abbott’s contribution launches a challenging proposition, namely to 
recognise computers as true inventors. Abbott holds that this recognition will functionally produce 
more innovation because it will incentivise the development of creative computers. Acknowledging 
computers as inventors would reward effort upstream of the stage of invention and promote 
disclosure and commercialisation of patentable subject matter. There are two preliminary barriers for 
that purpose: the reference to the individual to describe the inventor, and the characterisation of the 
invention as a “mental act.” Traditional patent law principles militate against the granting of patents 
if these circumstances do not concur. While some computers generate output in a process akin to a 
person’s mental act, the central argument by Abbott is found elsewhere: we should care functionally 
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about whether the system generates innovation, not how innovation occurs. Ownership, however, 
should not be for the “innovator-computer.” Instead, Abbott defends that the computer’s owner should 
be the automatic assignee of anything the computer develops.
The relevance of big data is not limited to applications in the information technology sector but 
extends to other important technological fields, such as the increasingly data-driven health and 
life sciences. Timo Minssen and Jens Schovsbo introduce some of the challenges resulting from 
the intersection between big data and competition law in health and life sciences. With a focus on 
European competition law, they describe the increasing relevance of big data and the protection of 
data in health and life sciences, how these developments relate to European competition law, and 
what and where the main challenges are. Minssen and Schovsbo consider imperative that the legal 
issues raised by big data and artificial intelligence are given the highest priority by the European 
Commission, and they welcome that the Commission devotes efforts and resources to address 
competition aspects of big data and privacy in order to test whether its jurisdictional criteria are still 
adequate.
Inventors are an important class of knowledge workers, especially in sectors where research and 
development is a key innovation input. Francesco Lissoni and Gabriele Cristelli underline that 
economic research on patent inventors has co-evolved with data availability. On the one hand, 
economic research has exploited the increasing amount of data made available to social scientists 
by intellectual property authorities; on the other hand, it has also contributed greatly to steering 
the data diffusion process, both by soliciting more information and by pioneering new methods for 
treating and validating it. By doing so, economic research has raised some substantive issues on the 
quality of inventor information as reported by patent applicants, which deserve the attention of 
both intellectual property authorities and legal scholars. Lissoni and Cristelli provide an overview of 
such evolution and questions, touching on the main findings and technical issues highlighted by the 
scholarly community over the past decades.
Claudia Jamin uses the example of Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) to underline that various stakeholders 
perform different tasks in the overall setup of data flows and processes, and all those stakeholders 
share the interest in big data. Ownership of data is central in that context. According to Jamin, an 
important problem is that the legislative environment remains inconsistent and cannot provide 
resilient solutions to secure the enormous investments by companies in the new big data-based 
technologies. Jamin explores the possibilities that copyright protection gives, but the concepts 
of author and originality, as well as territorial scope of protection, do not match well with the 
production and functioning of big data. The problem arising from (lack of) originality also emerges 
when protection of big data is proposed through database protection. In the case of trade secrets, 
Jamin underlines the difficulty of preserving secrecy for multinational enterprises operating and 
serving customers around the globe. All in all, “consistent and resilient solutions of data protection 
and ownership are missing.” For Jamin, current intellectual property rights may be incidentally 
helpful, but the legal environment remains insecure for companies investing in the development of 
new technologies.
PART ONE 
From Digital Trade to 
Commercialisation and 
Management of Intellectual 
Property
 
Fostering Innovation  
in Digital Trade
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1. Introduction*
The concept of digital trade encompasses the marketing and cross-border sale of both physical and 
virtual goods on the internet. Physical goods require some delivery mechanism but can be readily 
purchased online. Digital trade has the potential to be one of the most dynamic and innovative 
platforms for creative entrepreneurs and small enterprises to develop international marketing 
networks and increase sales. One simple measure of this dynamism is that the vast majority of 
firms in the United States engaged in traditional international merchandise trade sell only to one 
or two foreign markets, with just a few of the largest enterprises accounting for over 95 percent 
of goods exports.1 In contrast, according to eBay officials who monitor such flows, the majority 
of small suppliers using their service export to 15 or more countries.2 There are many reasons for 
such differences, of course, beginning with the fact that the latter firms generally sell individualised 
commodities that may be easily shipped, rather than large volumes of bulk goods. However, this 
anecdote does suggest that digital trade offers a simple and low-cost means of entering foreign 
markets more cheaply than by traditional processes. It also points out that access to global 
e-commerce is among the most inclusive forms of international trade, for it invites participation by 
individual entrepreneurs and start-ups, in both goods and services.
Moreover, digital trade has the potential to help struggling firms become more productive and 
efficient by offering inexpensive services that can cut costs. Consider, for example, the potential for 
online translation programs, such as Google Translate, to facilitate lower-cost contracting and billing 
across countries as its precision increases. Digitally traded services are also poised in the medium 
term to transform core elements of numerous service sectors that may currently be outdated and 
inefficient, such as public services, higher education, and healthcare. Online platforms offer the 
potential for widely distributing both supplier tasks and user networks across geographical regions 
and diverse groups to previously unattainable degrees.
Finally, it goes almost without saying that beyond basic e-commerce, the world is just beginning to 
understand the breadth and depth of digital services that will be traded across borders to facilitate 
growing new industries, such as autonomous driving vehicles, smart metering technologies, wearable 
smart fabrics, and the Internet of Things. Countries and firms that are poised to build the electronic 
infrastructure for such activities and facilitate the development of e-commerce markets and digital 
trade routes will be their major beneficiaries.
In this chapter I offer some thoughts, based in part on my experience as a US government official, on 
policy frameworks that might either encourage or discourage the development of such opportunities 
and innovation. The issues are complex and offer multiple trade-offs to consider. Ultimately, however, 
I argue that countries should seek to develop supporting frameworks that facilitate entrepreneurship 
and creativity, while offering low-cost access to international digital markets, which may be mediated 
 
 
 
 
1  Andrew B. Bernard, J. Bradford Jensen, Stephen J. Redding, and Peter K. Schott, “Firms in International Trade,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 21 (2007): 105–130.
2  Author’s conversation with eBay official, March 2017.
* This chapter is based on remarks made at the CEIPI conference “Intellectual Property and Digitalization: Challenges for 
Intellectual Property Management,” University of Strasbourg, May 2017. At that time the author was the Chief Economist 
of the US State Department, an appointment that has since ended. The views expressed here are strictly those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect those of the State Department.
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by internationally integrated digital service suppliers. In this context, seamless international 
connectivity is the goal, even as there may be political and economic costs in achieving it. I also point 
out the need for additional research in order to increase our understanding of the complexities in 
building international digital markets.
2. Data and Digital Trade: Critical Inputs for Dynamic Economies
Digital trade, which may be defined as domestic commerce and international trade conducted 
over the internet, is an important contributor to economic activity. While activity from such 
commerce itself is significant, internet-based technologies also facilitate growth through 
increasing productivity and cutting transaction costs in trade. The United States International 
Trade Commission estimates that such technological improvements expanded US gross 
domestic product (GDP) by 3.4–4.8 percent in 2011.3 They also expanded real wages by 
around 4.5–5 percent and raised US employment by 2.4 million full-time equivalent jobs. US 
digitally intensive firms sold nearly US$ 1 trillion in goods and services online in 2012, while 
purchasing almost US$ 500 billion in goods and services. About a quarter of these transactions 
were performed by small and medium-sized enterprises. A recent consulting report claims 
that digital trade contributes as much to global economic growth as does traditional trade in 
merchandise.4
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has also offered some 
estimates of the size of the internet-based economy.5 Using 2011 data, the OECD reckoned 
that internet-related activities amounted to around 13 percent of business value added. The 
internet was forecast to contribute 5.3 percent of the combined GDP of members of the G20, 
and 5.7 percent of the GDP of the European Union (EU), in 2016.6 For its part, the European 
Commission sustains a monitoring project to track growth of the digital economy within the 
EU.7 It estimates that the value of the EU data economy was around €300 billion in 2016, 
expected to rise to €739 billion by 2020. Employment in the data sector was 6.16 million in 
2016, and there were some 255,000 data-oriented companies in the sector.
Note that these latter studies adopt narrow definitions of the digital economy, focusing 
strongly on the collection and use of data and internet transactions. A broader definition 
might include important content industries, such as software and digital publishing, music, 
and entertainment. These broader concepts point to increasing importance and dynamism in 
the digital area, particularly as mediated by the internet. For example, the World Intellectual 
Property Organization produces studies for its member countries of the contribution of 
3  United States International Trade Commission, Digital Trade in the US and Global Economies: Part 2, Publication No. 4485, 
August 2014.
4  Susan Lund, Digital Protectionism and Barriers to International Data Flows (Washington, DC: McKinsey Global Institute, 
2016).
5  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Measuring the Internet Economy: A Contribution to 
the Research Agenda,” OECD Digital Economy Papers No. 226 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2013).
6  David Dean, Sebastian Digrande, Dominic Field, Andreas Lundmark, James O’Day, John Pineda, and Paul Zwillenberg, The 
Internet Economy in the G-20: The $4.2 Trillion Growth Opportunity (Boston, MA: Boston Consulting Group, 2012).
7  European Commission, The European Data Market Study: Final Report (Brussels: European Commission, 2017).
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copyright-based sectors, including digital goods and services, to their respective GDPs. In 
France, for example, value added in copyright industries in 2012 amounted to over 7 percent of 
GDP and accounted for 7.3 percent of full-time employment.8
That data have economic value at the macroeconomic level is mirrored by the fact that they are 
intensely valuable for firms that generate or collect them online. This value stems largely from the 
ability of firms to monetise data through selling their characteristics to advertisers. It is estimated 
that Google’s advertising revenue per user was US$ 45 in early 2014 and US$ 9.45 for Facebook in 
the same year.9 Each of these companies earned more than 90 percent of its revenue from online 
advertising. Access to data also permits firms to tailor new products and services to meet the 
preferences of individual users, raising the value of data even more. The current trend of massive 
private investments made in constructing databases is additional evidence of the large economic 
stakes in this sector. As for the EU, it is estimated that applications built on personalised data could 
provide benefits to its firms and citizens of perhaps €1 trillion annually by 2020.10
Finally, it is important to note that the value of international trade in digital goods and services 
is growing rapidly.11 This trade, which involves digitised products and services, data, and physical 
products bought and sold via e-commerce, is growing two to three times faster than conventional 
trade between the United States and Europe. Two-way trade is large and growing: the EU takes 45 
percent of digitally delivered US service exports, while supplying 46 percent of similar US imports, 
by far the largest such shares. The Bureau of Economic Analysis of the US Commerce Department 
publishes figures on digitally enabled international services trade.12 In 2015, the United States had 
a US$ 161.5 billion trade surplus in digitally deliverable services, with US$ 70 billion of that surplus 
involving the EU. Much of this digitally enabled trade comprises knowledge-based inputs that go into 
complex production processes.
3. Building a Supportive Framework
Such figures suggest that digital industries and trade are thriving, at least among the major 
industrialised economies. However, there remain concerns about structural impediments to 
innovation and competition in this area, such as cost-raising restrictions on cross-border data flows, 
differential regulatory systems across countries, including within the EU, and caution about the 
use of private data for commercial purposes. Because the EU system of data protection and use 
emanates from differential national systems and preferences, it is more fragmented than that of the 
United States and, arguably, results in lagging European innovation in this space.
8  World Intellectual Property Organization, The Economic Contribution of Copyright Industries in France (Geneva: World 
Intellectual Property Organization, 2016).
9  Cassandra Liem and Georgios Petropoulis, “The Economic Value of Personal Data for Online Platforms, Firms and 
Consumers,” Bruegel blog post, 14 January 2016, http://bruegel.org/2016/01/the-economic-value-of-personal-data-for-
online-platforms-firms-and-consumers/.
10  Ibid.
11  Kati Suominem, “Where the Money Is: The Transatlantic Digital Market,” Center for Strategic and International Studies 
blog post, 12 October 2017, https://www.csis.org/blogs/future-digital-trade-policy-and-role-us-and-uk/where-money-
transatlantic-digital-market.
12  Jessica R. Nicholson, “New BEA Estimates of International Trade in Digitally Enabled Services,” Economics and Statistics 
Administration, US Department of Commerce, 24 May 2016, http://www.esa.doc.gov/economic-briefings/new-bea-
estimates-international-trade-digitally-enabled-services.
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Such concerns underlie the ongoing attempts to build a digital single market across EU members.13 
This is a massive and complex undertaking, spanning numerous areas of policy and regulation, 
innovation, and competition. Rather than try to address this complexity in this short chapter, a 
task that I am not qualified to perform in any event, I use this section to set out thoughts 
about which basic framework conditions seem to be most suitable for fostering innovation 
in digital technologies and trade. What seem to be the primary factors supporting creativity 
in cross-border digital trade? This discussion inevitably focuses on the recent history of such 
dynamism in the United States, with which I am most familiar. While instructive, it may not be 
fully applicable to conditions in the EU or elsewhere, where attitudes towards data regulation 
sometimes differ sharply.
A primary supporting condition is the existence of a dynamic technology policy that encourages 
innovation and business experimentation. There are solid arguments for fiscal supports for 
research and development spending, for example, whether through tax advantages or cost-
sharing, so long as that support is generally available, rather than specific to firms, and 
addresses information market failures that diminish innovation incentives.14 In this context, 
public support for a robust, universally accessible, and dynamic internet that readily adopts new 
technologies remains key to further advancement. Indeed, the internet is an excellent example 
of a platform technology that facilitates growth of both large and small applied innovations. 
This point is particularly relevant in the context of small firms and entrepreneurs seeking to 
build international brands and markets through digital trade. Such participants exemplify the 
notion of “self-discovery” in business and economic development as they experiment with 
market niches and business models.15
An important component of support is an infrastructure policy that emphasises universal and 
efficient connectivity with the platform. In this regard, infrastructure goes beyond the needed, 
and rapidly evolving, information and communication technologies to ensuring seamless 
interoperability across users and content providers. One source of relative US success in the growth 
of e-commerce and digital trade is strong competition among internet service providers, search 
engines, payments systems, and content developers, each with ready access to the technologies 
necessary for building interoperable markets. That competition has contributed to widespread use 
of the internet, despite the costs of switching among certain services. Nonetheless, the United 
States still has work to accomplish in terms of extending such services at high speeds throughout 
underserved rural areas. As will be discussed, interoperability at the international level remains an 
important objective in spurring growth in digital trade.
A third important factor relates to liability rules facing internet service providers and such social 
media as YouTube and Facebook in the display of copyrighted digital products and defamatory and 
offensive materials, as posted by users. In the evolution of its laws, the United States generally has 
13  See European Commission, “Staff Working Document on the Mid-Term Review on the Implementation of the Digital Single 
Market Strategy: A Connected Digital Single Market for All,” SWD(2017) 155 Final (Brussels: European Commission, 2017).
14  Keith E. Maskus and Kamal Saggi, Global Innovation Networks and Their Implications for the Multilateral Trading System 
(Geneva: E15 Initiative, International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, 2013).
15  Ricardo Hausmann and Dani Rodrik, “Economic Development as Self-Discovery,” Journal of Development Economics 72 
(2003): 603–633; and Dominique Foray, “Smart Specialization and the New Industrial Policy,” Policy Brief No. 8 (Brussels: 
European Commission, 2013
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opted for a light regulatory touch in this context, largely exempting these services from liability so 
long as they agree to take down infringing material with sufficient and timely notice from rights-
holders. Again, this approach helped build an online business environment emphasising innovation 
and self-determined responsibility by intermediaries. Nonetheless, increasingly complex and difficult 
challenges continue to emerge, ranging from the posting of illegal materials to the verification of 
the legitimacy of content origin.16 This situation currently dominates discussion of third-party 
manipulation of social media, exemplified by evident Russian intervention in elections abroad, 
suggesting that more interventionist regulatory systems may be coming, even in the United 
States. This is an area that seems ripe for international cooperation in the next stages of internet 
and digital trade regulation.
An additional supporting condition is the ease with which goods and services, sold online, 
can actually transit across national borders as exports. There are significant trade barriers, 
postal costs and differences in postal regulations, and other factors that raise both the fixed 
and variable costs of shipping goods, reducing the effectiveness of international e-commerce. 
Indeed, such costs can make international sales impossible for small firms and artisans. Evidence 
shows that the efficiency gains from reducing such barriers, even those as simple as postage 
costs and access to international mail for delivering packages, are large and growing.17 This 
policy complementarity between internet provision to innovators and the physical ability to ship 
orders is an issue that should be of particular priority for developing and emerging economies.
Finally, the protection of digital copyrights looms large as a factor that can facilitate or impede 
the smooth functioning of e-commerce and digital trade. Innovation and creativity, both before 
and in the process of digital trade, are complex and multifaceted processes that depend on an 
ecosystem of incentives and opportunities.18 Copyrights sustain incentives to invest in creativity 
and build markets, particularly important in digital content. They facilitate contracts in which 
various contributors to creative digital products and services can share income and ownership. 
They also facilitate licensing and distribution across international markets.
To be effective, copyright systems need to strike a delicate balance between the rights of rights-
holders and the needs of users, particularly where the latter may improve upon content to 
develop creative new applications and expressions. In this regard, the United States may be 
criticised reasonably for pursuing systems that tilt strongly towards content providers and 
rights-holders, which have raised costs for libraries and educational users, and creating strong 
rights to control access to data.19 Properly balancing incentives for creation and innovation with 
the needs for widespread access is especially difficult in digital industries, raising a fundamental 
challenge. Nonetheless, transparent and clear rights to manage content remain a primary 
incentive for further development of digital trade.
16  Adam Holland, Chris Bavitz, Jeff Hermes, Andy Sellars, Ryan Budish, Michael Lambert, and Nick Decoster, NoC Online 
Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Intermediary Liability in the United States (Cambridge, MA: Berkman Center for Internet 
and Society, 2015).
17  Christian Volpe Martincus, Out of the Border Labyrinth: An Assessment of Trade Facilitation Initiatives in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2016).
18  Keith E. Maskus, Private Rights and Public Problems: The Economics of Global Intellectual Property in the 21st Century 
(Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2012).
19  Ibid.
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4. Digital Trade Protection via Data Regulation
Improving interoperability and access while reducing the costs of trade is clearly important. Arguably 
more significant, however, is the need to reduce or eliminate costly barriers to cross-border trade in 
data and data services. Restrictions on this trade arise from, among other regulations, requirements 
for data localisation, mandates for local processing of data, or requiring government approval for 
data transfers. Such rules are generally justified as necessary for sustaining privacy and cyber-
security. Countries also enact laws that are discriminatory in their treatment of foreign data 
suppliers. Among other reasons, this strategy may be seen as a means of forcing international data 
firms to locate facilities or transfer technology to local licensees. More simply, it may be advocated 
as a way of temporarily protecting domestic data-based enterprises while they grow and seek to 
become regional or international powers in data generation and use.
These barriers to trade in data generate substantial costs in efficiency and associated welfare losses.20 
These costs are particularly significant for smaller firms, which may face higher costs of data storage 
and use with localised rather than globalised service providers. They also disrupt the seamless flow 
of information among related enterprises in production networks. At the same time, there is little 
evidence that they make data more secure in comparison with corresponding rules placed on data 
firms as a whole, permitting them to choose where their servers reside.21
Recognising such difficulties, the EU is in the process of constructing a complex set of regulations 
establishing and supporting the digital single market (DSM), among the most important structural 
policies currently in train.22 The DSM would seek to make data fully transferable within the EU, in 
essence a “fifth freedom” of movement. Evidence suggests that some parts of Europe lag behind the 
United States in internet usage and access to digital services, while EU-based data firms are smaller 
and less integrated than such massive American counterparts as Facebook, Microsoft, Amazon, and 
Google. In part, these problems are attributable to the existing fragmentation of data services across 
the region. Accordingly, establishing the DSM is a significant step in Europe’s digital future.
Regulations and directives put forward in the DSM are the EU’s prerogative, and considerable 
progress has been made in accelerating integration. The European Commission has expressed 
a desire to reduce unjustified restrictions on intra-EU data flows, which could usefully limit data 
barriers, particularly costly localisation requirements. Also promising are proposals to help build a 
more seamless data economy, facilitating data ownership and access, while encouraging portability 
and interoperability across borders. Such proposals bear considerable promise to enhance efficiency, 
reduce costs, and increase well-being within the EU. At the same time, there remain concerns about 
whether proposed rules to limit so-called “geo-blocking” of content across national markets may be 
an unwarranted limitation of copyrights in the EU.
20  Matthias Bauer, Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, Erik Van der Marel, and Bert Verschelde, “The Costs of Data Localisation: Friendly 
Fire on Economic Recovery,” ECIPE Occasional Paper 3/2014 (Brussels: European Center for International Political 
Economy, 2014).
21  Nigel Cory, Cross-Border Data Flows: Where Are the Barriers and What Do They Cost? (Washington, DC: Information 
Technology and Innovation Foundation, 2017).
22  European Commission, The European Data Market Study: Final Report (Brussels: European Commission, 2017).
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The primary point of contention remains disparate treatment of data privacy. The United States 
generally takes the view that data are generated by firms in their dealings with users, and that 
such data may be commoditised within certain limits. In practice, this approach supports the basic 
business models of data providers, though not without controversy. In contrast, Europe sees data 
as generated and owned by the individual, implying strong means are necessary to induce firms to 
protect privacy of their users and acquire from them rights to exploit such information. This vision is 
enshrined in the EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which took effect in May 2018. 
The GDPR will elevate the rights of individuals regarding protection of privacy and personal data of 
EU citizens for transactions occurring within the region. It also raises new regulations regarding the 
transfer of data outside the EU. Finally, it harmonises regulations about data privacy and portability 
across member states, which should improve transparency and certainty for both firms and citizens.
Developing the GDPR is the essential cost for erecting the DSM, in light of strong European concerns 
about data privacy. These pillars should provide a sound foundation for solidifying and growing the 
data-based economy over the next decades. Still, they raise compliance costs for data firms, making 
their implementation controversial. It is likely that US and other international firms transacting in 
data will need to reconsider their European strategies and make significant investments in compliance 
if they wish to consider serving that market.
At this point it is impossible to know whether these new regulations will successfully build a more 
integrated data market and also effectively protect the privacy and security of data. On the one 
hand, they promise to reduce some impediments to digital trade within the EU by harmonising rules 
and discouraging protectionist elements of data storage and use. On the other, they raise significant 
costs in securing and transferring data, which may diminish investment incentives on the part of both 
EU-based and international enterprises. The cautionary element here is evident: to the extent that 
stronger rules raise the costs borne by creative small firms and entrepreneurs in accessing needed 
information, they may stifle such innovation.
Thus, the EU is engaged in a bold and risky change in strategy, which may both turn the terms of 
global competition in its favour and diminish access by smaller firms. Without doubt, other major 
jurisdictions, including India, Brazil, Turkey, and other key emerging economies, will watch the 
evolution of these markets with interest as they contemplate their own evolving standards.
5. Concluding Remarks
The ability to trade goods, services, and content digitally will only grow in importance over time as 
technologies improve and countries become more integrated. Digitally facilitated trade can connect 
more people, from more disparate locations, into mutually beneficial networks, than traditional 
methods of trade. Because it raises new opportunities for smaller firms and creative interests to 
build markets and brands around the globe, digital trade exemplifies a means for making commerce 
more inclusive and perhaps could serve to reduce income inequality. Moreover, digital trade has 
the potential to transform a number of industries in ways that we are only beginning to recognise. 
For these reasons, developing appropriate policy and supportive frameworks is crucial as economies 
move forward.
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Determining appropriate policy approaches is inherently difficult in this dynamic environment, for 
technological change proceeds faster than legislative and regulatory solutions evolve. How the DSM 
is established and operates could be decisive in this context for much of the world, given the EU’s 
economic power. However, given the relative success of the United States in promoting the digital 
economy and associated international trade, lessons can be taken from its experience. In essence, 
that history points towards sustaining a dynamic technological market and an evolving physical 
and intellectual infrastructure, emphasising the ability of markets to develop business models 
and contracting methods, and striking a reasonable balance in copyright protection, with all of 
this subject to light but transparent regulatory oversight. Whether that model can persevere in an 
environment of increasing international tensions over cyber-security and data privacy remains one 
of the fundamental questions of our time.
The Fourth Industrial Revolution 
from the European Patent Office 
Perspective
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Over recent years the European Patent Office (EPO) has observed a significant rise in inventions 
incorporating features of software implementation rather than hardware implementation, and a rapid 
development of technologies such as data management and processing, wireless interconnectivity, 
and artificial intelligence. Most of these inventions are related to the Internet of Things and signal the 
considerable potential of connected and smart objects operating autonomously.
These technologies have laid the groundwork for what is frequently referred to as a “fourth industrial 
revolution” (4IR). While previous industrial revolutions have led to the automation of repetitive physical 
work, the wide deployment of autonomous objects now enables the large-scale automation of entire 
groups of tasks, including repetitive intellectual tasks previously performed by human beings.
Manufacturing industries are already planning the transition towards “smart” factories operating 
autonomously. Likewise, connected objects in transport (autonomous vehicles), energy (smart 
grids), cities, healthcare, and agriculture are about to profoundly change the way these sectors are 
organised. In a study published in 2015, the McKinsey Global Institute concludes that the different 
applications of the Internet of Things could generate economic value of US$ 1.2−3.7 trillion a year in 
factories, US$ 930 billion to US$ 1.7 trillion in cities, and US$ 170 billion to US$ 1.6 trillion in human 
health and fitness.1 In the European Union alone, the market value of the Internet of Things is 
expected to exceed €1 trillion in 2020.2
Patent offices are at the forefront of these transformations. They are witnessing the rise of a new 
breed of 4IR inventions, all computer-implemented (see Box 1) and permeating all technical fields. 
The rapid growth, strong software content, and pervasiveness of these inventions can pose both 
challenges and opportunities for patent systems as a whole. In order to be prepared, it is essential 
for patent offices, applicants, and policymakers to understand the scope, drivers, and implications 
of this technology trend.
To contribute to this understanding, the EPO has published a comprehensive study on 4IR innovation.3 
Drawing on the latest available patent information, a total of 48,069 patent applications filed at 
the EPO with a focus on autonomous, connected objects have been identified. The analysis reveals 
that the number of 4IR inventions is constantly increasing, growing seven times faster than the 
growth of all patent applications at the EPO over the three years to 2017. It also reveals that the 
4IR is the cumulative effect of several expanding information and communications technology (ICT) 
innovation fields which interact with each other and spill into other, traditionally non-ICT fields.
This chapter highlights the main lessons that can be learnt from this study. It provides a thorough 
definition of the 4IR as a combination of different technologies that enable the full exploitation 
of the potential of connected objects. It also explains how the inventions corresponding to these 
technologies have been mapped to patent data. The remaining parts of the chapter—focusing 
respectively on trends in 4IR innovation, applicants, and the geography of 4IR inventions—discuss 
the main findings that can be derived from these data.
1  McKinsey Global Institute, The Internet of Things: Mapping the Value beyond the Hype (New York: McKinsey Global Institute, 
2015).
2  Stefania Aguzzi, David Bradshaw, Martin Canning, Mike Cansfield, Philip Carter, Gabriella Cattaneo, et al., Definition of a 
Research and Innovation Policy Leveraging Cloud Computing and IoT Combination (Brussels: European Commission, 2015).
3  European Patent Office, Patents and the Fourth Industrial Revolution: The Inventions Behind Digital Transformation (Munich: 
European Patent Office, 2017).
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The EPO is well prepared for these developments, through its well-established policy on the 
patentability of computer-implemented inventions (CIIs). In recent years, the EPO has not only 
closely monitored 4IR technology trends, but also invested in the internal capacity to address the 
growing volumes and multidisciplinary nature of 4IR inventions.
1. The Nature of 4IR
By 2020 it is estimated that 26–30 billion devices in the home and workplace will be equipped with 
sensors, processors, and embedded software, all connected to the Internet of Things. The fifth 
generation (5G) of mobile networks will support their deployment, with faster transmission rates but 
also lower energy consumption and reduced network latency. The truly revolutionary nature of 4IR, 
Box 1. Computer-implemented inventions at the European Patent Office (EPO)
In Europe, Article 52 of the European Patent Convention (EPC) excludes computer programs “as such” from patent 
protection. This exclusion does not mean that all inventions involving software are excluded from patenting; what it 
does mean is that tighter scrutiny of the technical character of these inventions is required.
The patentability of computer-implemented inventions
Over the years, the case law of the EPO boards of appeal has clarified the implications of Article 52 EPC, establishing 
a stable and predictable framework for the patentability of computer-implemented inventions.
Like all other inventions, in order to be patentable, computer-implemented inventions (CIIs) must meet the 
fundamental legal requirements of novelty, inventive step, and industrial application. In addition, it must be 
established that they have a technical character that distinguishes them from computer programs “as such.” In other 
words, they must solve a technical problem in a novel and non-obvious manner.
The normal physical effects of the execution of a program, such as electrical currents, are not in themselves sufficient 
to lend a computer program technical character, and a further technical effect is needed. The further technical effect 
may result, for example, from the control of an industrial process or the working of a piece of machinery, or from the 
internal functioning of the computer itself (e.g. memory organisation, program execution control) under the influence 
of the computer program.
The EPC thus enables the EPO to grant patents for inventions in many fields of technology in which computer 
programs make a technical contribution. Besides representing the bulk of patent applications in information and 
communications technology (ICT) at the EPO, the share of CIIs in all patent applications has been rising over recent 
decades and is estimated to reach the 50 percent mark in such fields as automotive and medical technologies.
CIIs and 4IR
The EPO has a consistent, harmonised, and predictable approach to CIIs across all products and towards all applicants 
that provides an appropriate framework for delivering quality patents for 4IR inventions. Facing a growing number 
of CIIs in a wide variety of technical fields, the EPO has invested in its capacity to address the volume and the 
multidisciplinary nature of 4IR inventions.
First, staff with relevant expertise are involved in all the EPO’s fields of operation to ensure the consistent application 
of the CII content of the Guidelines for Examination in traditional fields. For this purpose, examining divisions are 
composed of three members with different technical backgrounds, including CII experts when appropriate. At the 
same time, the EPO continues to adapt its practice to the latest technology developments, such as the recent rise 
of artificial intelligence. These are addressed through annual updates of the Guidelines for Examination, which are 
communicated throughout the entire EPO operational area thanks to regular peer-to-peer knowledge transfer events, 
e-learning modules for CII, and academy course materials.
On 1 January 2018, the EPO implemented a significant reorganisation. The Office’s ICT area now comprises a sector of 
around 2,000 staff members. Besides ICT, two additional sectors have been created: Mobility and Mechatronics; and 
Healthcare, Biotechnology and Chemistry. Like ICT, these other two sectors comprise examiners experienced in CIIs 
to ensure harmonised practice in CII-related technology across all sectors.
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though, lies in the combined use of these objects in a wide range of new technologies, such as cloud 
computing and artificial intelligence, which allow interconnected objects to operate autonomously.
The variety and ubiquity of the sensors embedded in connected objects make it possible to collect 
data of virtually any type and origin and to aggregate them into “big data,” the raw material of 
4IR. Additional technologies play a critical role in supporting the exploitation of this data. Cloud 
computing enables efficient storage, processing, and management of these huge amounts of data in 
networks. Artificial intelligence can process vast amounts of data, and detect and interpret patterns 
that were previously impossible to identify, or even imagine, thereby enabling machine prediction, 
diagnostics, modelling, and risk analysis. Three-dimensional (3D) systems make the results of 
complex models humanly viewable. Together with new interfaces for displaying such information, 
they enable applications based on virtual reality in a wide range of situations, from gaming to additive 
manufacturing.
This combination of technologies further increases the importance of software—and thus of 
computer-implemented inventions—in almost all areas of technology. This feature is already 
familiar in computers and mobile devices, which consumers can update, upgrade, or equip with new 
applications without having to buy a new device. With the generalisation of the Internet of Things, 
the same pattern is set to apply to all sorts of hardware. A digital user interface for any connected 
device can be put into a tablet or smartphone application, enabling remote operation and eliminating 
the need for direct physical controls.
As a result, the focus of value creation and innovation is moving from traditional engineering 
towards the automated regulation of any type of system through the collection and analysis of 
data. Potential applications range from the remote monitoring of treatments for patients to the 
automated organisation of factories, logistics chains, and fleets of vehicles, and they are expected to 
have a major economic impact.
2. Landscaping 4IR Technologies
Drawing on its technical expertise and up-to-date patent information, the EPO has developed 
a “cartography” of the inventions underpinning these transformations. It focuses on all patent 
applications filed at the EPO that combine features of computing, data exchange, and autonomous 
decisions made by connected objects. The 4IR cartography consists of three main sectors, each of 
which is subdivided into several technology fields:
• The core technologies sector corresponds to the basic building blocks upon which 4IR 
technologies are built. It captures all 4IR inventions that directly contribute to the three 
established ICT fields: hardware, software, and connectivity.
• The second sector captures enabling technologies that complement the core technologies. It is 
subdivided into seven technology fields: analytics, user interfaces, 3D support systems, artificial 
intelligence, position determination, power supply, and security.
• The third sector, application domains, encompasses the final applications of 4IR technologies. It 
has been divided into six different domains: personal, home, vehicles, enterprise, manufacturing, 
and infrastructure.
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A total of 48,069 published and unpublished patent applications filed at the EPO before 2017 were 
identified as belonging to 4IR technologies and sorted into the respective fields. If an invention 
combined features of different 4IR fields, it was automatically assigned to all of them. The analysis 
showed that application domains, with 70.6 percent, capture the largest proportion of 4IR inventions, 
followed by 4IR inventions related to core technologies, with 51.7 percent. A smaller proportion of 
inventions (34.5 percent) are related to enabling technologies. The share of 4IR patent applications 
describing technical features of three or more 4IR fields grew from 20 percent in 1990 to 44 percent 
in 2016, revealing increasing cross-fertilisation.
3. Trends in 4IR Innovation
The number of patent applications for smart objects began to rise steeply in the mid-1990s (Figure 1). 
The growth of 4IR applications has been particularly impressive, increasing by 54 percent in the three 
years to 2017 alone. Conversely, the total number of applications at the EPO grew by 7.65 percent in 
the same period.
As a result, the share of 4IR inventions in all patent applications at the EPO has been growing sharply. 
In the period between 2009 and 2016, it more than doubled from 1.6 percent to over 3.3 percent. 
With more than 5,000 patent applications in 2015 and 2016, it is already on a par with biotechnology. 
Core technology fields and application domains have so far attracted the largest number of patent 
applications at the EPO. Although enabling technology fields are characterised by lower numbers 
of patent applications, some of them have experienced very fast growth in recent years. Average 
growth rates are particularly high for 3D systems (56 percent), artificial intelligence (43 percent), 
and user interfaces (43 percent). In the light of ongoing developments, this rapid growth is expected 
to continue in future years.
Figure 1. Fourth industrial revolution (4IR) patent applications  
at the European Patent Office (EPO), 1990–2016
Source: European Patent Office.
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4. Top 4IR Applicants
The 25 biggest 4IR applicants at the EPO in the 2011–2016 period alone account for 48 percent of 
4IR patent applications. Two observations are particularly striking when looking at Table 1. First, 
the list is dominated by large, traditionally ICT-focused companies. Eight of the top ten and all 
top five applicants have their main business operations in ICT industry sectors. Second, all of the 
top applicants are located in Europe, the Republic of Korea, China, Japan, and the United States. 
BlackBerry, a Canadian company, is the only exception.
Rank
Company 
name
Number of 
applications
Region Industry (NACE)
1 Samsung 
Group
1634 Republic of 
Korea
Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical 
products
2 LG Group 1125 Republic of 
Korea
Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical 
products
3 Sony 
Corporation
885 Japan Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical 
products
4 Nokia 
Corporation
640 Europe (EPC) Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical 
products
5 Huawei 
Technologies 
Co. Ltd.
577 China Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical 
products
6 Qualcomm, 
Inc.
552 United States Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical 
products
7 Blackberry 
Limited
520 Canada Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical 
products
8 Koninklijke 
Philips N.V.
433 Europe (EPC) Manufacture of electrical equipment
9 Intel 
Corporation
428 United States Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical 
products
10 Panasonic 
Corporation
413 Japan Manufacture of electrical equipment
11 Honeywell, 
Inc.
375 United States Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-
trailers
12 Zte 
Corporation
314 China Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical 
products
13 Fujitsu 
Limited
274 Japan Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical 
products
14 Technicolor 
SA
268 Europe (EPC) Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical 
products
15 General 
Electric 
Company
267 United States Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
16 LM Ericsson 
AB
262 Europe (EPC) Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical 
products
17 Boeing 
Company
260 United States Manufacture of other transport equipment
18 Siemens AG 256 Europe (EPC) Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
Table 1. Top 25 fourth industrial revolution (4IR) applicants  
at the European Patent Office (EPO), 2011–2016
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Samsung and LG from the Republic of Korea are the companies with the highest number of 4IR 
patent applications. These two companies alone represent more than 90 percent of all Korean 4IR 
applications at the EPO. The Chinese applicants Huawei, ZTE, and Xiaomi rank 5th, 12th, and 21st on 
the list. Together, Huawei and ZTE account for more than two-thirds of all Chinese 4IR inventions.
Japan is represented by seven companies on the list of top applicants. Apart from car manufacturer 
Toyota, ranked 25th, they are conglomerates with long-established activities in ICT. Inventive activity 
in Japan is less concentrated than in the Republic of Korea or China. The two leading applicants 
together were responsible for only 30 percent of Japanese 4IR patent applications.
The United States provides 7 and Europe 5 of the top 25 applicants, including ICT champions such as 
Qualcomm, Intel, and Google in the United States, and Nokia, Ericsson, and Technicolor in Europe, 
but also several companies that are not traditionally ICT focused, such as Philips, Boeing, Siemens, 
General Electric, and Honeywell. The latter have their main activities in medical technologies, 
machinery, consumer electronics, transport, and electrical equipment.
4IR inventive activity in these two regions seems to be even less concentrated than in Japan, with just 
16.6 percent (United States) and 15.5 percent (EPC) of 4IR inventions generated by the respective top 
two domestic applicants. At the same time, European and United States applicants are much better 
represented outside the top 25: an additional 44 European and 37 United States companies appear 
on the list of the top 150 applicants, compared with only one additional company from the Republic 
of Korea and none from China.
5. Geographical Origins of 4IR Innovation
A focus on the geographical origins of 4IR inventions thus better reflects the actual contribution of 
Europe and the United States to 4IR innovation (Figure 2). Two distinct periods can be considered. 
Before 2011, 4IR inventive activity was clearly dominated by Europe, the United States, and Japan. 
More than 88 percent of all inventions originated from inventors based in these three regions. 
Rank
Company 
name
Number of 
applications
Region Industry (NACE)
19 Google, Inc. 253 United States Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical 
products
20 NEC 
Corporation
245 Japan Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical 
products
21 Xiaomi Inc. 230 China Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical 
products
22 Apple Inc. 224 United States Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical 
products
23 Ricoh 
Company Ltd
210 Japan Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
24 Hitachi Ltd 208 Japan Manufacture of electrical equipment
25 Toyota Motor 
Corporation
193 Japan Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-
trailers
Table 1: Continued
Source: European Patent Office.
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Since 2011, the shares of the United States and Japan have decreased to 25 percent and 18 percent, 
respectively. Europe has maintained its share of 29 percent of all 4IR patent applications filed at the 
EPO, and has become the leading region. The most striking change in the years leading up to 2016, 
however, is the growth in 4IR inventions from the Republic of Korea and China. Their contributions 
jumped to 13 percent and 6 percent, respectively, of all 4IR inventions in the most recent period.
The Republic of Korea slowly started innovating in 4IR technologies in around 2000. China took 
another five years to produce a significant number of inventions. Patent applications from China and 
the Republic of Korea at the EPO have risen markedly since then, especially since 2010. Thanks to 
Samsung and LG, the Republic of Korea caught up with Japan in 2015, and may well replace it soon as 
the third largest innovation centre. China is not far behind.
In Europe, Germany and France are the most important innovation centres for 4IR technologies 
with, respectively, 8 percent and 6 percent of 4IR patent applications at the EPO between 2011 and 
2016, followed by the United Kingdom and some smaller European countries, such as the Benelux 
countries, the Nordic countries, and Switzerland. They all differ in their 4IR technology profiles. 
Germany, for example, is particularly strong in the vehicles, infrastructure, and manufacture 
application domains. France is more focused on enabling technologies such as artificial intelligence, 
security, user interfaces, and 3D systems. The United Kingdom is relatively strong in power supply 
and position determination, but also in artificial intelligence.
6. Conclusion
This first ever landscaping of 4IR technologies illustrates the value of patent information and the 
leading role of the EPO as a supplier of this information. Indeed, the precise identification of 4IR 
fields would not have been possible without the technical knowledge of EPO examiners and the 
Figure 2. Origins of fourth industrial revolution (4IR)  
inventions at the European Patent Office (EPO), 2000–2016
Source: European Patent Office.
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accuracy of the Cooperative Patent Classification scheme. While a consensus on 4IR technologies is 
still forming, this chapter highlights the fundamental trends in this sector and provides a sound basis 
on which to conduct further analyses of the development of 4IR.
Our findings confirm the high potential of 4IR in many industries, and reveal its rapid development 
in recent years. The European economy is largely contributing to this trend, and is well positioned 
to benefit from it in a wide variety of industry sectors. The EPO’s well-established examination 
practice on the patentability of CIIs provides the necessary legal framework for these developments. 
Furthermore, the EPO has taken measures to manage a growing volume of 4IR patent applications, 
so it can continue to provide legally robust patent rights of the highest quality to applicants and 
innovators around the world.
The Promises and Perils  
of Digital Business Models
Sean M. O’Connor
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1. Overview: Understanding the Spectrum
The modern digital economy has existed along a spectrum of different distribution models since 
its roots in the unbundling of software from hardware in the mid-twentieth century. This has not 
always been apparent to consumers or policymakers. For too long the default model was taken to 
be simply a digital version of sales of goods. But recently, high-profile incidents involving online 
music distribution platforms (e.g. Apple’s iTunes), software unbundling and repackaging resellers, 
and digital content resale platforms have brought a greater awareness that most digital content and 
software (including applications, or apps) is not sold but rather is conveyed on very different terms. 
The problem is that the digital artefact is not sold, and thus the consumer does not receive the set of 
rights normally attributed to a sale of goods. Further, most consumers do not even know what rights 
they do receive. It generally does not help the consumer, or even the policymaker, to turn to the 
terms of service that are usually absent-mindedly clicked through or otherwise arguably assented 
to. The language is often dense legalese that requires lawyers skilled in these kinds of contracts to 
decipher.
This chapter provides an introduction to the spectrum of digital business models for consumers and 
policymakers. While these models exist along a true spectrum—meaning an infinitely variable range 
of possibilities limited only by the creativity of vendors and their attorneys—most of them cluster 
around three basic concepts. The first is the traditional sale of goods model, which is in fact the least 
common in the digital world. But because it is the starting point for most traditional consumers 
(millennials and other digital natives possibly excepted) and one of two poles defining the range of 
ownership and use rights in acquired goods, it makes sense to start there. The second is the licence 
model, formerly the lease-licence model when digital artefacts were conveyed to users on physical 
media. This was dominant for much of the history of distribution of digital artefacts, but it is rapidly 
being displaced by models clustered around the opposite pole from sale. Thus, the third model 
constituting this pole is delivery of digital artefacts as services. For each of these, I will explain the 
basic concept and then review its pros and cons.
The chapter then advocates a flexible regulatory environment for innovative business models, 
rejecting a one-size-fits-all imposition of first sale or exhaustion, albeit with heightened scrutiny of 
consumer contracts. Valuable innovation has occurred in new business and legal models throughout 
the modern knowledge economy, including the digital segment. This has benefited consumers and 
proprietors. In this sense, it is not only technological innovations that provide value, but also creative 
product and service delivery models. Accordingly, the same regulatory flexibility that legal regimes 
governing tech hubs like Silicon Valley and Seattle give to new technologies themselves should also 
apply to innovative business and legal models. For the digital economy, the threat of overly reactive 
imposition of tight regulation, including through end-oriented judicial decision-making, presents as 
many problems as the threats to consumers from “hidden” fine-print clickwrap and browsewrap 
licence terms, as well as those to workers in the “gig economy” supercharged by disintermediation 
platforms such as Uber. But because the latter cover issues that go beyond the scope of digital 
artefact distribution business models, this chapter remains focused on regulation of the actual 
distribution models.
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2. Comparison of the Three Representative Models
2.1 Sales
Sale of a physical good, for example buying groceries at the market, seems like the most obvious and 
simple transaction to most of us. We pay money, take possession of the items, and leave the market 
with them knowing we can dispose of them pretty much as we like. We know that more expensive 
things, especially non-perishable and non-consumable things such as computers, automobiles, and 
boats (capital assets), generally involve a formal contract, or at least a receipt with some terms 
and conditions, not to mention transfer of title. Technically, title passes even for perishables and 
consumables, but it is often of no practical import for vendor or purchaser.
In the early days of analogue and digital electronic computing, around the 1940s and 1950s, machines 
were often sold in the same way as any other capital asset good. But as the market expanded to 
business purchasers who had little in-house capacity to program and use these machines, vendors 
began offering a variety of acquisition options. First, sale of the machine with an accompanying 
service contract. Second, lease of the machine with an accompanying service contract. And third, 
the machine and programming/operation delivered as a single computer processing service. These 
three models from the earliest days of the information technology industry then set the stage for the 
three representative digital artefact distribution models reviewed in this chapter.
However, the crucial distinction is that because we are considering only the digital content, operating 
systems, and applications here, we can never really talk about a traditional sale of goods. The digital 
artefact itself is not the medium that might store or run it. It is instead an intangible like other forms 
of intellectual property (IP), data, stock, or bonds. This became the core issue when computer vendors 
began unbundling software to sell or deliver separately from hardware. As some customers began 
developing in-house programming and operation talent, they did not need the vendors’ services and 
sought instead to pay only for the machines—the hardware. Other customers were finding that there 
were independent contractors willing and able to program or run machines for less than the cost of 
the service component from the computer vendor, and perhaps with a wider range of customisation. 
Further, some programmers were launching firms to offer commercial alternatives to the computer 
vendors’ software, which could be even cheaper for business customers.
Another distinction that emerged early on was between an operating system and an application. 
The former was the core software that enabled the computer to run in its most basic mode as a 
general computing machine, which could then be programmed for specific applications. It long 
remained the province of the hardware manufacturers—for the most part continuing until the young 
Microsoft secured its famous contract with the United States military to provide an unbundled 
disk operating system (DOS), and then began making a version commercially available just as the 
personal computer revolution of the 1980s occurred.1 The next big change occurred with graphical 
user interfaces (GUIs), the kind of desktop environment we are familiar with now. It displaced the 
minimalist flashing cursor on a black screen, which required the user to know and type in commands 
1  Apple of course had its own operating system for its new Macintosh personal computer (Mac), but this was part of a closed 
system going back to the bundled origins of commercial computing products. The personal computer was first called the 
“micro-computer” because it was smaller than both (mainframe) computers and mini-computers that were oriented to 
commercial business, and not the home or amateur market. Hence, Microsoft’s name: Micro(computer) + Soft(ware). In 
fact, early logos and use of the name emphasised the two parts by styling it MicroSoft.
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just to get the computer to run any programs or applications. Apple’s operating system set the 
baseline and many visual elements and layout, but again it was bundled with Apple’s hardware and so 
outside of our concerns with the development of purely digital artefacts. Thus, it was again Microsoft 
that became the most popularly known vendor for unbundled GUI operating systems, with its 
transformative Windows product in 1985. Later Linux and others would supply open source and often 
non-proprietary operating systems, setting up the fundamental ideological rift in the programmer 
and user community between proprietary and closed software and applications on the one hand, 
and non-proprietary and/or open systems on the other.2 Concomitant with the personal computer 
revolution was the demand for off-the-shelf applications for things such as word-processing, as the 
price point and obvious benefits of the personal computer were drawing in amateur users who had no 
capacity—or time—to program their own computers from the DOS command line alone. This is why 
the Mac was so revolutionary: it provided a usable machine to the amateur straight out of the box, 
with preloaded useful and entertaining applications on top of the core operating system.
Soon, home or amateur machines were coming preloaded with at least a GUI operating system, and 
possibly one or two apps. But a market continued growing for a rapidly expanding universe of apps 
offered by all manner of large and small firms. Further, with Microsoft not producing hardware, its 
DOS and Windows operating systems still had to be sold or licensed either to hardware manufacturers 
or dealers, who would then preload machines for sale to consumers, or directly to consumers who 
were up to the challenge of loading, or increasingly upgrading, their own operating systems. All of 
this meant a widespread distribution of unbundled software.
Stepping back to the emergence of unbundled software, however, a fundamental question for 
vendors and their attorneys was how to provide the intangible software as a legal matter. As a 
technical matter, it could be delivered either by having a programmer directly program a machine 
with proprietary software, or by sending physical memory media, such as tape reels in the earliest 
days, and then later floppy disks, that could then be used to upload the code to the machine in a 
few relatively easy steps. In the former, there was no transfer of a physical object. In the latter there 
was, but it was not the code itself; rather, it was a medium that could be encoded or recorded in such 
a way that the central processing unit (CPU) of the computer could read and process the encoded 
information to encode a new version or copy of it on to the machine’s permanent internal hard drive 
(which is why floppy or removable disks were distinguished from both the hard drive and the code 
itself). Attorneys at the proprietary vendors worried that sale of the intangible copy could be argued 
to be sale of the code itself, meaning that the first sale of a copy would divest the proprietor of rights 
to the original or master code. This may seem far-fetched until one recalls that in the United States, 
computer code was not expressly included in the Copyright Act until 1980, and its patentability was 
being debated along a series of court cases that in many important ways are still not fully resolved 
today.
While the matter seems as if it should simply have followed the established system for distributing 
copies of other intangibles such as music recordings, there were two other issues. First, computing 
2  An important further distinction on the “open” side is as between proprietary and non-proprietary suppliers, sometimes 
analogised as the “free beer/free speech” distinction. Importantly, these are not mutually exclusive. To fit in the “open” 
camp, one need only commit to make the software source code (human-readable version in programming languages such 
as BASIC, HTML, Java, etc.) available for the programming community to see, learn from, and even adapt into their own 
derivative programs. But the program itself can still be sold or licensed for payment, rather than given away for free.
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had long been a digital system and not an analogue one. This meant that the systems for reading and 
encoding a new copy were the flawless reproduction of binary 1s and 0s (which allows for more noise 
or error in the electrical signal or encoding so long as the voltage of the “1” state is far enough from 
that of the “0” state), and not the degrading quality of successive copies of analogue (where even 
minor errors in voltage signal when reading or copying can lead to a notable change in quality and 
fidelity). Thus, emerged the central threat of digital media for software and content proprietors: once 
a digital version is released, endless perfect copies can be generated from it. Second, the software 
had to be copied repeatedly just to upload it to a person’s machine and then, each time it was used, 
further uploaded to the active memory of the computer for processing by the CPU. By contrast, in 
the intended playback-only use of recorded music, playback devices, including vinyl record players, 
open-reel or reel-to-reel tape decks, eight-track cassette decks, and compact cassette decks, were 
only reading and not copying the source information. And again, with software not clearly covered 
by copyright—and with the further confusion of source code versus object or machine code3 —there 
was no simple solution to distributing copies with a copyright notice saying “all rights reserved” and 
thus no copying was authorised. This was then the impetus for the use of licences, over time styled 
as end-user licence agreements (EULAs), as we know them today.
Accordingly, no proprietary software (operating systems or apps) was distributed through a straight 
sales model. Only non-proprietary code and content was distributed in this manner. Even as the 
copyright status of software was clarified in the 1980s, the need for specific terms as to what copying 
was permissible just to use the code as intended meant that a straight sale of a copy of code would 
not work.4 Further, even a simple sale of the media on which the software was encoded could create 
problems for the proprietor as the first sale or exhaustion doctrine would allow the recipient to 
reconvey it in any manner to any other person. This was not a major problem in and of itself, but it 
then meant that a downstream recipient would receive full title to the physical copy without also 
being bound by the licence that had accompanied transfer to the original end user. The downstream 
recipient could still not copy the code—even for the intended use of such code—but could arguably 
run a decompiler generating a reasonable facsimile of the original’s source code. This could in turn 
then be distributed widely or publicly, destroying its secrecy, which many proprietor vendors relied 
on to keep their position and edge in the market. While it may seem improper for a software vendor 
to seek to keep secret important technical workings of a commercially and publicly available product, 
this is exactly what we allow manufacturers and distributors of physical goods to do. Thus, to the 
extent we think this is bad policy, then the remedy would need to apply across the spectrum of sold 
products.
By contrast, digital music recordings were distributed through sale of the physical media: first digital 
audio tape and then CDs. Early laser disk videos were also distributed through sale, but the market 
was small for these until the much later DVD revolution. Videocassette recorders were analogue 
3  Source code has already been described. Machine or object code is the sequence of 1s and 0s that the CPU can process 
directly without a compiler (further software to instruct a CPU, in machine code, to transform source code into the 1s and 
0s of machine code). Decompilers, unsurprisingly, can transform 1s and 0s of object code into source code.
4  Seminal cases like MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) further muddied the waters as to 
what copies could lawfully be made by a computer system in loading up or operating even properly acquired software. 
While a user with licence or title to software could have their system make the copies necessary to operate the code 
under express statutory authority, 17 U.S.C. § 117, such same necessary copies done by operation of the machine by, 
say, a computer technician hired by the user for repair purposes has been deemed infringing under the statute in some 
jurisdictions.
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systems and so the sale of copies provided much of its own practical technical limitation on expansive 
unauthorised copying as did the sale of vinyl and analogue taped music recordings. But digital music 
recordings could still be used as intended in solely a media reading mode; no copy needed to be made 
of the encoded information to play it back. Thus, the simple “all rights reserved” copyright notice 
could still be employed effectively, at least as a legal matter.5
2.1.1 Pros
Given the background provided so far, which will be relevant for all of the sections in this chapter, 
where proprietors are willing to sell copies of intangibles such as software and content, the following 
benefits may apply. First, when the consumer receives physical media with no express or clearly 
implied IP terms, they have both the physical object (e.g. disk) and its encoded software or content 
as long as the physical object lasts. The user can use it in any way they see fit, other than things 
expressly prohibited by copyright, such as copying or publicly displaying or performing. This works 
well enough for readable content, but not for code that needs to be copied to the machine to be run. 
However, provided that the circumstances would support an implied licence or statutory authority 
to the purchaser to run the program as part of its normal and intended use, then the user should be 
able to use it in a way analogous to content media.
Second, a one-time upfront payment is all that is required for the transaction. No ongoing obligation 
by either party is entailed or implied by the transaction itself. Each party has the benefit of its bargain 
and moves forward independently.
Third, the consumer can transfer, resell, or otherwise dispose of the physical media copy. In doing so, 
the consumer cannot keep a copy for their continued use. This follows most cleanly in the read-only 
content situations, as no copies have been authorised, and the first sale doctrine does not authorise 
one either. But things are a bit muddier for the implied limited use licence for sold copies of software. 
While the licence would probably run with conveyance of the media to a third party, a vendor would 
have to worry that implied terms included copying to retain on a machine after conveyance to the 
third party, even if only for archiving purposes. It is unlikely that a court would find a continued use 
licence for the original purchaser in this context, but once the archival copy was made, if that original 
purchaser sold the machine itself, then the sale should not run afoul of copyright (due to first sale 
again) and the downstream purchaser arguably can use the program.
2.1.2 Cons
While pros for both proprietors and purchasers in each of our representative models can be 
treated together as a practical matter, their respective interests diverge too much on the con side. 
Accordingly, sections will be broken out for each.
5  Even at that time record labels were so concerned about the practical risks of the first-to-market digital audio tape that 
they successfully lobbied for the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA), P.L. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237, which required 
manufacturers of digital audio tape machines to include a Serial Content Management System and pay royalties to music 
copyright owners. Some argue that these requirements made digital audio tape commercially infeasible, which is why the 
market for them failed.
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Consumers
First, when physical media fail, are lost, or are stolen, the purchaser has no rights to a replacement. 
Neither does this eventuality give the purchaser the right to have made and now use a copy.6 This 
was obvious to most consumers in the past, but the prevalence of new models such as media 
lockers, in which consumers can purchase a copy of music or a movie that is then available across 
multiple machines they own, or on-demand streaming services, has likely changed the reasonable 
expectations of many consumers. Thus, even as major content providers are rushing towards digital 
cloud and locker models themselves, younger consumers who grew up with the new models may 
be shocked and unhappy that they have no rights to access music or movies purchased through 
conventional media such as CDs or DVDs.7
Second, the pricing of the copy will reflect the full life-of-object conveyance. That is, the consumer 
cannot find an offer to pay for only the use they will make of the physical media—it is all or nothing. 
In the absence of credible alternatives, like the new licensing and streaming models, then the public 
may be forced to pay these full life-of-media prices—that is, if they want copies of music and movies 
at all. It also, of course, then means that consumers can afford to buy fewer titles, presuming they 
have a limited budget for such purchases.
Third, proprietary software was rarely distributed this way and so, for that corner of the digital 
artefact market, titles were not available at any price in the sales model. To put this another way, the 
proprietary software industry would not have developed with its robust offerings to end users but 
for the existence of the other models. It remains an open counterfactual as to whether the industry 
would have developed differently had only sales models been allowed, including whether non-
proprietary vendors would have adequately supplied the market, or whether proprietary vendors 
would have simply taken the chance that they could control unauthorised further distribution and 
copying of their products even after a first sale of the physical media encoding them.
Fourth, a simple sales model subjects the consumer to platform changes and obsolescence. Just as 
my eight-track cassette of Steely Dan would obviously not play or even fit in my then cutting-edge 
CD player of the early 1980s, digital media are not guaranteed to be forward compatible. While 
some vendors strive for a degree of backwards compatibility, this generally lasts for only a few 
versions. After that, if you have not paid for the upgrades and converted or updated your software or 
content, then the original versions may simply not work anymore in newer operating systems, apps, 
or platforms. And under the simple sale model, there is no obligation on the vendor to provide even 
a new version or two worth of compatibility. Thus, even if your physical media survive, or you retain 
authorised copies on your hard drive, there is no guarantee they will continue to be operable as you 
buy new machines or upgrade the operating system on your existing machine (and failing to upgrade 
the latter causes a host of other problems once you skip a couple of versions).
6  Other than any contractual or statutory permissions for having created an archival copy. However, this archival copy must 
have been made by or for the user from their own copy. In other words, I cannot make a copy from a friend’s archive copy 
of her own copy of the same code.
7  That said, some content providers have been trying to incentivise the migration to their approved lockers and other cloud 
services by offering free copies of such media as a free or minimal-cost add-on to the purchase of conventional physical 
media. See, for example, Brooks Barnes, “Disney Throws Open the Gates to Its Own Digital Movie Service,” New York 
Times, 26 February 2014, B2, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/26/business/media/disney-to-introduce-itunes-tie-in-
for-digital-movie-sales.html?mcubz=3&_r=0.
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But perhaps the greatest downside to the sales model for consumers is that often the transaction 
is not a sale at all. Rather, it is a licensed download or stream packaged to look like a sale. This was 
true of iTunes, before enough news stories made the public realise that the terms and conditions 
they clicked through to set up the platform in the first place established that they did not own any 
of their so-called purchases through the iTunes Store. A related problem is that, with the exception 
of external physical media, one cannot transfer a digital file resident on a hard drive of a computer 
without either making an unauthorised copy or transferring the whole machine (or at least the 
internal hard drive). Thus, a “sale” in this context is not really a sale—in the sense of a transfer of 
property title—because one of the core features of property is that it is alienable. No practical means 
to transfer the property (itself without being bundled into something else) effectively means no 
property and accordingly no real sale.
Software and content proprietors
For proprietors and vendors, the downsides of the simple sales model are also substantial. First, 
mirroring that of the consumer, vendor pricing must include full life-of-object conveyance—again all 
or nothing. But software and video games have long been developed with different layers or levels 
of features. Even music or movie content can easily have different levels or segments of value. For 
the latter, bonus features and so on are usually just lumped in with the core product as an additional 
enticement to purchasers. But multiple means of use, with very different value propositions for 
the user, for software and even video games mean that proprietors and vendors have long sought 
variable access and pricing regimes to tailor the purchase to the user (which of course benefits the 
user, too, as we will see). This is hard to do in the straight sale model and so presents a significant 
downside for software and video game firms.
Second, as outlined earlier as driving the move to other models in the first place, simple sale of physical 
media with no express licence component results in the release of the digital artefact “into the wild” 
with no limitations on decompiling and transfers (i.e. first sale applies). This was long the nightmare 
of content providers, many of whom approached the new digital environment—especially its online 
component—very cautiously. A former Microsoft executive who was present for negotiations leading to 
the United States Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 19988 recounts that Disney executives took the 
position, paraphrased, that “before we put Mickey on the information superhighway, we need to know 
he will be protected in an armoured car.” The Act thus, among many other provisions, took the anti-
circumvention ideas of the Audio Home Recording Act 19929  and expanded them, even adding criminal 
penalties. However, most of the sanctions and penalties provided applied to circumstances where 
content owners had already taken affirmative technical and legal measures. Thus, anti-circumvention 
penalties implicitly require the content owner, or its distributor, to have encoded the content into some 
sort of software or hardware security system. Otherwise there is nothing to circumvent. That said, 
even with technical and legal measures, and stiff penalties for infringement and circumvention, there 
has still been significant piracy: it remains too easy and profitable, especially for actors outside strong 
copyright jurisdictions who can nonetheless access the internet like anyone else. Accordingly, releasing 
any proprietary digital software or content through a simple sale model, relying on implied licences 
only, amplifies the potential for piracy and confusion about legal status.
8  P.L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
9  P.L. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237.
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Third, updates and patches must be shipped or pushed with no guarantee that users will apply them. 
This takes time and resources to ensure the delivery happens as smoothly and easily as possible for 
the end users. Tech support would ideally also be increased during these periods, but for firms that 
cannot afford much support in the first place, the odds of upgrade problems or failures increase 
dramatically. And if enough users have problems with the upgrades, they may abandon the software 
altogether, and also spread the word about it, potentially affecting sales and use more broadly.
2.2 Licences
Licensing of IP-covered goods can be traced all the way back to the Venetian Patent Act of 1474. For 
our purposes, the core question beginning in the mid-nineteenth century was whether the goods 
embodying IP as copies were licensed as well, or otherwise restricted for disposition as chattels, where 
the transaction with relation to the physical embodiment was characterised as a simple sale. Arising 
in United States Supreme Court cases like Bloomer v. McQuewan—which are, incidentally, far more 
complicated than they are generally made out to be, and which in fact have likely been misinterpreted 
for more than a century and a half10—the new doctrines of first sale or exhaustion (not so named for 
another 50 years) forced IP owners to consider leasing the physical objects, with an accompanying 
licence to practise the particular IP rights desired to be conveyed. Questions over whether these were 
true leases have followed such transactions. Without going into full detail, true leases require some 
termination date or meaningful reversion of title conditions, packaged into an arrangement that does 
not seem designed solely for evading first sale or exhaustion. In other words, there must be other real 
benefits to at least one of the parties that flow from the transaction being structured as a lease.
Closely related is the issue of conditional sales that seek to restrict some post-sale activities through 
express reservation of some IP rights. Some of the key cases in this area turn on the fact that only 
a notice was used—and hence there was no legally binding contract restricting any uses. Others 
find an enforceable contract, but use that to limit remedies of the IP owner to contract-based ones 
(generally monetary damages), and not IP-based ones, which can include injunctions. The United 
States Supreme Court decision in Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International Inc. more or less 
resolved that conditional sales cannot preserve patent remedies after an otherwise authorised sale,11 
but the justices ran roughshod over both the complexities and the history of the cases to achieve 
a result that seemed simple and popular, and yet has presented more questions than it answered.
Notwithstanding these cases, nothing prevents software and content proprietors from either 
conveying the digital artefacts on physical media that are leased and not sold; or transferring the 
artefacts through the internet such that no physical media or objects change hands. The first I 
have dubbed the “lease-licence,” and it has been used for a long time in a surprisingly wide range of 
industries: everything from school band music to biological materials.12 The second has become the 
10  55 U.S. 539 (1852). For a detailed discussion of this and other exhaustion cases, see Sean M. O’Connor, “Origins of Patent 
Exhaustion: Jacksonian Politics, ‘Patent Farming,’ and the Basis of the Bargain,” University of Washington School of Law 
Research Paper No. 2017-05 (Seattle, WA: University of Washington School of Law, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2920738.
11  581 U.S. __ (2017).
12  See, for example, Sean M. O’Connor, “IP Transactions as Facilitators of the Globalized Innovation Economy,” in Rochelle 
Dreyfuss, Diane L. Zimmerman, and Harry First (eds), Working Within the Boundaries of Intellectual Property (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010); and Sean M. O’Connor, “The Use of MTAs to Control Commercialization of Stem Cell 
Diagnostics and Therapeutics,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 21 (2006): 1017.
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medium of choice in large part because of speed and convenience. But it is likely then only a licence 
as no physical thing is being conveyed which would need to be leased.
2.2.1 Pros
There are many advantages to this model for both consumers and proprietors. First, consumers 
can purchase only the rights they want, and for as long as they would like them. This has generally 
reduced prices dramatically, although some understandably query whether prices will go up again 
once we have all converted over and physical media are no longer a practical or commercially feasible 
option. But so long as there are different option levels of features, then at least consumers still 
have different price points they can buy in at. And nothing prevented software or content owners 
from raising prices in the physical media world either. At least here, again, there will be some pricing 
differentials, even if the whole range seems skewed too high for the value propositions presented.
Second, the licensing—and even lease-licensing—models have generally facilitated offers of rights to 
use the software or content on multiple devices. This has been a major boon to those with different 
machines in different locations, allowing them to stay productive, or entertained, wherever they are 
without having always to bring one particular machine along. As part of this, some proprietors have 
authorised limited forms of transfer or sharing among family or even a defined friend circle. And, of 
course, so-called enterprise licences have been crucial for businesses and other organisations. For 
more than the cost of one copy, but far less than the cost of multiple copies at retail, an enterprise 
can buy a licence authorising x number of installations or users, all while working from just one set of 
physical media, as applicable. Third, as discussed, the proprietary software industry developed on a 
licence model. It might not have arisen, or perhaps not as robustly, without the lease-licence option 
in the days of physical media alone.
2.2.2 Cons
Consumers
Because there has been no sale, exhaustion or first sale do not apply and the lessee-licensee cannot 
resell or transfer freely either the digital artefact, nor any physical media conveying it. ReDigi’s efforts 
to create a platform for resale of digital content failed in the courts after the company’s lawyers 
tried to mislead the judge as to what exactly was happening with the technology.13 In their zeal to 
make it seem as analogous as possible to the conveyance of a physical thing—which could not be in 
two places at the same time and thus the logic of first sale would apply—they mischaracterised the 
technology as “lifting” a copy of the original file from one hard drive, as if it were a tangible physical 
layer, and then placing it down, intact, on the buyer’s hard drive. This conveniently also glossed over 
the crucial fact that instead multiple copies of the file were being made along the way, with nothing 
other than the company’s program resulting in erasure of the original copy on the seller’s hard drive, 
and then a new copy being encoded into the purchaser’s hard drive. The upshot is that there is no 
current legal path for a resale market absent express authorisation in the lease-licence, or licence 
alone governing the first rights acquisition. However, the case is currently on appeal at the United 
States Circuit Court for the Second Circuit, which may entertain a fair use angle even if the first sale 
one continues to fail.
13  Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., No. 12-0095 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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Another downside for consumers in the lease-licence models is the planned or conditional 
termination of rights. This is the flip side, of course, of the presumably lower price of licensed, 
rather than sold, content. But the issue is again in the leases disguised as sales, such as the iTunes 
debacle. The original 99 cents per song was promoted as a purchase of the song, and in the 
normal course of things the buyer had an unlimited term to play it. But violating other provisions 
of Apple’s EULA, or other conditions at Apple’s discretion (such as upstream licensing problems 
with the labels, which of course had to authorise Apple’s sale (licence) of the content in the first 
place), could mean that songs would unexpectedly disappear from a consumer’s library, either 
temporarily or permanently. In a bizarre reverse implication of the iTunes’ licensing system, a U2 
album then dropped with no warning into every user’s library, whether wanted or not. Further, the 
album has proven very hard to delete from each user’s iTunes library. Related to this, technological 
protection measures such as digital rights management (DRM) can be frustrating and block even 
some uses that users expected.
Software and content proprietors
The same DRM that frustrates some licensees is also a cost for software and content proprietors. 
However, without it they could likely not monitor or enforce the limits that constitute the 
particular licence purchased. And without such monitoring and enforcement, proprietors might 
have to return to a one-price, full rights system that would make few happy. At the same time, 
software and content files are still released “into the wild” in the lease-licence model. While 
licence restrictions on decompiling and so on can impose liability for unauthorised dissemination 
of code, they cannot actually prevent it. Accordingly, and even with sophisticated DRM and other 
technological protection measures, licensed files can still be pirated. Further, updates and patches 
still need to be delivered via physical media or pushed out through the internet. Licensees can be 
required by the terms and conditions of the licence to apply them, but that is still no guarantee 
this will actually happen.
2.3 Services
The “newest” trend in delivery of software and content goes back to the earliest days of the 
computing industry, as described above. Delivering hardware and software—again generally left 
undistinguished in the early days—as a service made all kinds of sense for reasons still true today. 
However, one downside for the hardware component was that a service could not be treated as 
a capital asset or expense for tax and accounting purposes. This, together with the unbundling of 
software, may have been a factor in the limited growth of the computers-as-service model, even 
though it never really disappeared. For our purposes, however, it was the opening up of enough 
reliable bandwidth in the 1990s, along with increasing access for businesses and consumers, that 
enabled what was then called software as a service (SaaS). This was in many ways based on the 
old master–slave terminal distribution for mainframe computers. Because the early computers 
were so large—the early ones took up an entire room—and yet could accommodate a number 
of simultaneous users, it became common to link a number of “dumb” or “slave” terminals (just 
a monitor and keyboard, with or without a mouse in the early days) to one “master” mainframe. 
Thus, the operating system and all apps resided solely on the master, with the slave terminals 
accessing and working them remotely, as it were. SaaS is the same idea, but now the master is the 
software or content vendor’s own servers, generally protected behind a firewall, and the slaves are 
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external customer or client computers that simply access and work the code behind the provider’s 
firewall. A popular example of this is Google Docs, which was part of the suite of offerings in large 
part designed for the first Chrome notebooks (Chromebooks), which would be inexpensive and 
risk-free for the customer’s software and content because none of it would reside on the notebook. 
All the Chromebook had to do was provide an interface to Google’s servers and all processing 
and so on would be done behind Google’s firewall. On the content side, streaming is the most 
prevalent example of content as a service.
2.3.1 Pros
Some of the benefits for consumers and proprietors are the same for service as they were for 
licences. Consumers need purchase only the rights they want. Vendors can customise offerings 
across the full range of market demand.
A key difference, though, is that updates and patches can be applied whenever the proprietor wants 
and generally without interrupting service for users. This is because the proprietor is only updating 
its own servers. Thus, it fully controls the timing and operation of this process. For example, it can 
be scheduled for a time of low user use. But even beyond this, sophisticated vendors will set up the 
updated programs or content on different server space from that which customers are using. This 
means they can fully test the new programs and content privately before they are made available 
to customers. Once satisfied with the operation of the new programs or content, the provider 
can then more or less instantaneously redirect customers from the server space containing the 
old programs or content to the new space, or port and run the new code to the existing servers. If 
all goes well, customers will have no idea that a change has occurred, until they notice that new 
features or content are now available.
A further benefit is that full code or content is not cluttering users’ hard drive space. For anyone 
who has hit the upper limit on memory space, this is no minor matter. Plus, again following the 
Chromebook model, customers could save money on their machines because they would not 
need to purchase models with so much hard drive memory space—although processing speed 
and random active memory (RAM) would still be crucial. On the flip side, this also means that 
proprietors have not released their code into the wild.
Finally, consumers can generally afford exponentially more content via subscription services than 
by purchase of individual copies of each content object. This is one of the main attractions driving 
the explosion in streaming services. I can never hope to purchase the entire music catalogues of 
the major record labels, not to mention many of the minors or independents. But by paying an 
affordable monthly amount to a popular streaming service such as Spotify, I now have access to 
essentially all of this music.
2.3.2 Cons
Consumers
As with the pros, some of the basic downsides are shared with the licence model. There is no 
ownership of physical media or the digital object and so there can be no resales/transfers without 
proprietor permission. Further, if the user stops making monthly payments, then whatever 
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streaming content, SaaS, or apps were being paid for are rendered inaccessible. Further, such 
suspension or termination is far easier and certain given that the vendor can simply deny access to 
its servers where the software or content resides.
One difference, however, is that there is generally no guarantee of what content or software 
features will be available on an ongoing basis. Not only can the providers quickly swap things in 
and out as a technological matter, but the terms and conditions covering these services usually 
authorise this, and disclaim guarantees, warrantees, and liability for any particular continuity of 
programs or content. The only recourse is for the consumer to stop paying and shift to another 
provider (if another is possible or available).
Another concern is the potential for lack of permanent records and culture. In the past, publication 
was a fraught step because it committed the speaker to a permanent record of their expression at 
that time. But in service and streaming models, expressions can be changed without a trace (unless 
someone took a screenshot or was otherwise able to secure some form of copy or record). While 
it is true that high-profile bloggers, tweeters, and other social media users may have people who 
are tracking their statements, as well as any changes, many more mundane people will not be so 
monitored. Even the United States Supreme Court has changed text in opinions available through 
online services.
Finally, streaming and SaaS models have very limited usability when a person’s machine or device 
is offline. In response to criticism, and I suppose lost customers, some providers have found ways 
to allow users to store at least some program features or content for use offline. But the more 
this is enabled, the more it cuts against some of the core benefits of streaming and service, such 
as reduced memory requirements for consumers and the relief of not placing key properties out 
into the wild.
Software and content proprietors
Downsides for proprietors flow from the value proposition of the service model for users. Near 
100 percent uptime rates and smooth updates, together with the newest features, are expected. 
Thus, proprietors have to spend the time and resources to ensure that these expectations are met. 
When they are not met, users can shift providers more easily since they are not invested in code 
and extensive installations on their machines (less so where service is a platform where a user has 
created significant content that is hard to port to a different provider’s servers/service).
On a different front, however, stream ripping services are becoming more widespread and diminish 
or eliminate one of the main advantages to proprietors of streaming. In stream ripping, a user or 
hacker can capture and aggregate the stream of data—meant to only reside ephemerally on a 
user’s computer and solely enough to display or perform the media (e.g. movies or music) plus a 
buffer for uninterrupted playback—into a single reconstituted file. Thus, the control benefits of 
streaming are circumvented because the ripper now has the equivalent of a downloaded file. While 
this likely does not affect SaaS, as the processing goes on solely behind paywalls and firewalls, it 
could have a disastrous impact on content streaming models. If they become just one more piracy-
enabling platform, then proprietors may be forced to develop still further new ways of delivering 
the value proposition of their content to end users.
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3.  The Need for Ongoing Transaction Flexibility and Heightened 
Scrutiny of User Contracts
While there are calls to override licence and service transactions and transform them into sales to 
allow first sale to apply,14 this would not benefit consumers or proprietors overall. Many users enjoy 
paying only for what they want with software/apps, as well as relatively low monthly rates for access 
to an enormous volume of content through subscription services. Plus, the benefits of seamless 
updates and more free space on hard drives is good for both consumer and proprietor.
But few users, if any, read the terms of service and privacy policies for the digital things they acquire 
through licence or access as a service. As Perzanowski and Schultz rightly point out, the gap between 
the marketed rights and the actual legal rights conveyed can be dramatic.15 A partial solution is 
heightened judicial scrutiny of terms of service and privacy policies when issues arise—especially 
where legal rights are clearly different from advertised rights. Regrettably, plain English short 
summaries of legal rights are often just as misleading.
A better solution would be the standardisation of contract elements (but not the entire agreement) 
and truth-in-disclosure rules such as instituted for loan and credit card interest rates in the United 
States. Consumers could then easily understand what their rights were. This in turn would allow 
expectations to meet reality and consumers to make informed choices about where to acquire or 
access digital artefacts from along the spectrum of different legal and business models.
14  See, for example, Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz, The End of Ownership: Personal Property in the Digital Economy 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016).
15  Ibid.
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1. Software as an Asset*
Generally defined as “a set of instructions for a computer to perform certain tasks,” software is now 
run on all kinds of different devices in addition to computers, from mobile telephones to medical 
instruments, machine tools, and cars, to give a few examples. Including the word “computer” in its 
definition may be too restrictive. But its ubiquity is only one of its recent transformations. Research 
on artificial intelligence is changing the way software code is written. Software as a service and 
cloud computing, the Internet of Things, and open source software also have a strong impact on how 
firms and users in general perceive software development and use. Likewise, in economic terms, the 
software sector is only part of the picture in talking about the value added generated by software 
development. The software industry comprises firms producing software to be sold or licensed, 
with the value generated by in-house software development across all industries rapidly growing 
and becoming more difficult to trace, as well as software being created by open source software 
communities.
The aim of this chapter is to briefly review the past two decades of developments in software 
patenting in the United States and Europe. Software patenting is a complex area that has been the 
focus of a large number of economic and legal studies in recent years; an exhaustive account of all 
changes and issues is beyond the scope of this chapter, so we will offer only a summary of some 
highlights.1
Three main messages emerge from our analysis. First, software-related inventions are permeating all 
technology areas, and patents to protect them are more frequently filed in the United States than in 
Europe. Second, both open source software and software patents are increasing and coexist in existing 
business models. Third, for software-related patents to serve their objective of fostering innovation 
and diffusing knowledge, patent offices should maintain a high bar on disclosure requirements and 
ensure that the novelty and inventive steps thresholds are strictly applied.
New ways should be found to help to ensure that the wealth of software code and algorithms that 
are already in the public domain, many of them protected by open source software licences, are used 
as prior art to prevent “trivial” patents being granted and, more importantly, eventually being used 
to block innovation and distort competition.
1  For recent reviews of issues related to software and patents and patents on computer-implemented inventions, see R. 
Bakels, R.A. Ghosh, S. Torrisi, and G. Thomas, Study of the Effects of Allowing Patent Claims for Computer-Implemented 
Inventions (Maastricht: UNU-MERIT, 2008), http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/90421535-ff72-46f3-b09e-
a4bb8e0e711b.0001.01/DOC_1; A. Strowel and S. Utku, The Trends and Current Practices in the Area of Patentability of 
Computer Implemented Inventions within the EU and the US (Brussels: European Commission, 2016), https://ec.europa.
eu/digital-single-market/en/news/report-trends-and-current-practices-area-patentability-computer-implemented-
inventions-within; C. Pentheroudakis and N. Thumm, “Innovation in the European Digital Single Market: the Role of 
Patents,” Thematic Report on the Brussels Conference, 17 March 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/eur-
scientific-and-technical-research-reports/innovation-european-digital-single-market-role-patents-thematic-report-
brussels-conference; and CIFRA, Challenging the ICT Patent Framework for Responsible Innovation: A Literature Review 
(Madrid: CIFRA, 2016), http://www.cifra-h2020.eu/results/.
* The author would like to thank Stéphane Maraut, Luis Ignacio Vicente, Eduardo Fullea, and Antonio López-Carrasco for 
very useful discussions. A first version of this chapter was presented at the CEIPI-BETA-I3PM Conference on Intellectual 
Property and Digitalization: Challenges for Intellectual Property Management in Strasbourg on 4 May 2017; presentations 
are available at http://www.canalc2.tv/video/14508. The author would also like to thank the participants and organisers 
for their comments. Funding from the regional government of Madrid (S2015/HUM-3491) and the Spanish Ministry of 
Economy, Industry and Competitiveness (CSO2016-79045-C2-1-R) is gratefully acknowledged.
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2. Pervasiveness of Software
The importance of software-related inventions outside the software sector was documented as 
soon as the early 2000s, when a report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) stated that less than 10 percent of software patents in the United States were 
granted to software companies. The same report stated that, according to survey data, between 25 
and 40 percent of total business expenditure on research and development (R&D) had a software-
like outcome, reflecting the fact that “many operations which used to be monitored by mechanical 
means are now mediated by software.”2
More recent evidence confirms the importance of software for the economy. Two studies carried out 
by the Economist Intelligence Unit and released in 2016 by the Business Software Alliance estimate 
the direct value added of the software industry for the United States in 2014 at US$ 475 billion and 
the sum of its direct and induced effect at more than US$ 1 trillion.3 The figures were equally high 
for Europe, with a direct value added of €249 billion and total value added of €910 billion—that is, 
2 percent and 7.4 percent respectively of the gross domestic product in the European Union (EU).4
The stakes are high, and the relevant actors, strategies, and business models are changing rapidly. 
Routine manual processes are automated and artificial intelligence is used to improve knowledge 
about business, markets, and clients. Data become a strategic asset for the digital transformation 
of industries, led by internet-based firms and now crucial to all sectors (banks, pharmaceutical 
companies, automotive industries, aerospace, etc.). Large firms share their software frameworks 
and libraries. Open source software code adopted by the community enters as a building block in a 
modular process of software development. The question of “who owns what” gains in importance 
but is not easy to answer, particularly as regards “data and algorithms” and when the line between 
“user and producer” is difficult to draw.
3. Intellectual Property Rights and Software Business Models
National copyright laws and the EU Software Directive 2009/24 protect computer programs as literary 
works.5 According to Article 2 of the Copyright Treaty of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), copyright “extends only to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation 
or mathematical concepts as such.”6 Thus, copyright does not protect against different expressions 
of innovative algorithms producing the same effects. Patents instead can protect the “structure” and 
“functionality” of software-related inventions. The extent to which software-related inventions can be 
patented varies across patent systems, and the United States has been traditionally more permissive 
than Europe, but it seems both jurisdictions are now reaching convergence, as we will see later.
2  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges (Paris: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004), https://www.oecd.org/sti/sci-tech/24508541.pdf.
3  BSA/The Software Alliance, The $1 Trillion Economic Impact of Software (Washington, DC: BSA, 2016), http://
softwareimpact.bsa.org/pdf/Economic_Impact_of_Software_Report.pdf.
4  BSA/The Software Alliance, Software: A €910 Billion Catalyst for the EU Economy (Washington, DC: BSA, 2016), http://
softwareimpact.bsa.org/eu/pdf/EU_Economic_Impact_of_Software_Report_en.pdf.
5  Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the Legal Protection of Computer 
Programs.
6  WIPO Copyright Treaty (adopted 1996), http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/.
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To understand how a computer program or software algorithm can be protected by a patent, 
take Google’s PageRank algorithm. Google’s PageRank or “method for node ranking in a linked 
database,”7  invented by Google’s co-founder Larry Page, is protected by a 2001 US patent filed in 
1998 by Stanford University, where the founders of Google were students at the time. That first 
patent was not extended abroad, and would probably not have passed the patentability test at the 
European Patent Office, but it has been cited by more than 1,000 other patents filed in different 
offices worldwide.8 As indicated in Figure 1, the diagrams in the description of the patent illustrate 
the structure and different steps of the program, but the patent does not provide instructions on 
what specific code shall be used to implement it. In return for the exclusivity period granted by the 
patent, however, the applicant is obliged to disclose the invention, whereas software code protected 
by copyright can be kept secret.
Copyright is used to protect software in both open and proprietary models. For example, the source 
code of Microsoft Office is kept secret, protected by copyright, and users pay a licence to use it on their 
computers. In contrast, Open Office source code is available for anyone to freely modify, extend, and 
improve, but all changes must be made available if published. Open source models rely on copyright, but 
licensing fees are waived in return for the commitment to share improvements with the community.9
7  US Patent (US 6,285,999), “Method for Node Ranking in a Linked Database,” https://patents.google.com/patent/
US6285999.
8  A quick search in patent databases shows that more than half of the patents citing the first PageRank patent have been filed 
by Google.
9  For more information on different open source software licensing models, see the Open Source Initiative at https://
opensource.org/licenses.
Figure 1. PageRank patent figure
Source: Method for Node Ranking in a Linked Database, 
https://patents.google.com/patent/US6285999.
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Open source software has experienced a spectacular growth in recent years.10 It is now supported 
not only by a large community of individual software developers but also by an increasing number of 
large traditional information technology (IT) firms. At the same time, top software companies such 
as Microsoft, which only protected its products with copyright until the 1990s, are now among the 
largest patent applicants, and even the strongest supporters of open source software are patenting, 
defensively they claim, as they argue it is increasingly hard to compete in software-related markets 
without using patents as weapons to fight back.11 
Further economic research on the interaction between software patents and open source software 
would be needed. As noted in an OECD report back in 2004, when open source software had just 
started and its future development was still unclear, “it would be worth exploring whether patent 
protection could be useful to open source software developers in creating sustainable business 
models and markets for technology, while guaranteeing the disclosure of source code.”12 Patent 
pools to cross-license and guarantee freedom to operate for open source software are examples of 
that kind of initiative already in place.
4. Identifying Software Patents
There is no single international patent classification (IPC) class for software-related inventions, and 
they are not flagged as such in patent office databases. Because of their pervasiveness, but also 
because applicants try to get around patentability constraints by drafting software-related claims at 
a level of abstraction that makes difficult to identify them, it is not easy to identify software-related 
patents in patent databases.
Three methods have been used to track the growth of software patenting in patent offices: (1) 
select software-related IPC classes; (2) search for keywords in titles, abstracts, and claims; and (3) 
ask technical experts to review a sample of patents. The diverse focus of available studies makes 
their results difficult to compare, and they all offer approximations. None is free of type I errors 
(false negatives, failure to identify all software-related patents) and type II errors (false positives, 
inclusion of non-software-related patents in the selection). Nevertheless, most evidence points at 
the increasing importance of software-related claims in patenting.
Early studies of software-related patents relied on data on US patents. Allison and Lemley in 
200013 and Allison and Tiller in 200314 identified software patents and business method patents, 
respectively, performing a detailed revision of a sample of patent documents and keyword searches 
10  D. Thakker, M. Schireson, and D. Nguyen-Huu, “Tracking the Explosive Growth of Open Source Software,” TechCrunch, 7 
April 2017, https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/07/tracking-the-explosive-growth-of-open-source-software/.
11  The largest open source software service provider, Red Hat, Inc., justifies its patenting strategy as follows: “we have been 
developing a defensive patent portfolio to deter those not interested in the success of open source software from using 
their patents to attack Red Hat and the open source community” (www.redhat.com).
12  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges (Paris: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004), https://www.oecd.org/sti/sci-tech/24508541.pdf.
13  J.R. Allison and M.A. Lemley, “Who’s Patenting What: An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution,” Vanderbilt Law 
Review 53 (2000), https://law.stanford.edu/publications/whos-patenting-what-an-empirical-exploration-of-patent-
prosecution/.
14  J.R. Allison and E.H. Tiller, “The Business Method Patent Myth,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 18.4 (2003), http://
scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1432&context=btlj.
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on bigger sets. Bessen and Hunt used keyword search to identify for the first time the rapid growth 
in software patents at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) between 1980 and 
2000.15 Graham and Mowery identified a group of software-related patent classes based on the 
patenting activity of large software vendors.16 More recent US studies have studied the relation 
between software patents and market entry, financing of start-ups, and market valuation of software 
firms17 and find evidence of “a change in IT innovation that is systematic, substantial, and increasingly 
dependent on software.”18
As regards Europe, two empirical studies using European Patent Office (EPO) patents are worth 
mentioning among those attempting to identify software patents. Rentocchini relied on the Gauss 
wiki database to find more than 30,000 EPO software patents filed in 1978–2004.19 He observed 
that software patents are owned mainly by US and Japanese firms in the electronics and IT hardware 
sectors and tend to experience a longer examination process than other patents. Second, Frietsch 
and colleagues used a keyword-based method to identify German and EPO patents from 2000 to 
2010 on computer-implemented inventions (excluding patents on software “as such”) and showed 
that since 2002 more than 35 percent of EPO filings were computer-implemented inventions (e.g. 
inventions related to information and communications technology (ICT) and embedded software).20
5. Software Patenting Trends
The distribution of patent applications filed in the past decades at the USPTO and EPO across 
technology fields21 shows that electrical engineering, which includes computer technology and IT 
methods for management, has clearly been growing in relative terms in both offices over time (Figure 
2). The trend is more pronounced at USPTO, where it has coincided with a decrease, in relative terms, 
of mechanical engineering. Patents in the field of instruments, which also include many software-
related inventions, have increased their share in the total of patents granted in both offices.
15  J. Bessen and R.M. Hunt, “An Empirical Look at Software Patents,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16.1 
(2007): 157–189.
16  S.J.H. Graham and D.C. Mowery, “Software Patents: Good or Bad News?” in R.W. Hahn (ed.), Intellectual Property Rights in 
Frontier Industries (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2005), 45–80.
17  I.M. Cockburn and M.J. MacGarvie, “Patents, Thickets and the Financing of Early-Stage Firms: Evidence from the Software 
Industry,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 18.3 (2009): 729–7273; I.A. Cockburn and M.J. MacGarvie, 
“Entry and Patenting in the Software Industry,” Management Science 57.5 (2011): 915–933; B.H. Hall and M. MacGarvie, 
“The Private Value of Software Patents,” Research Policy 39.7 (2010): 994–1009; and L.G. Branstetter, M. Drev, and N. 
Kwon, “Get with the Program: Software-Driven Innovation in Traditional Manufacturing,” NBER Working Paper No. 21752 
(Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21752.
18  A. Arora, L.G. Branstetter, and M. Drev, “Going Soft: How the Rise of Software Based Innovation Led to the Decline of 
Japan’s IT Industry and the Resurgence of Silicon Valley,” Review of Economics and Statistics 95.3 (2013): 757–775.
19  F. Rentocchini, “Sources and Characteristics of Software Patents in the European Union: Some Empirical Considerations,” 
Information Economics and Policy 23.1 (2011): 141–157.
20  R. Frietsch, P. Neuhäusler, K.-J. Mellulis, O. Rothengatter, and S. Conchi, The Economic Impacts of Computer-
Implemented Inventions at the European Patent Office, 4iP Council, June 2015, http://www.4ipcouncil.com/application/
files/1314/5277/3742/Economic_impact_of_CII_at_EPO.pdf.
21  U. Schmoch, Concept of a Technology Classification for Country Comparisons (Geneva: World Intellectual Property 
Organization, 2008), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/pdf/wipo_ipc_technology.pdf.
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Figure 2. Growth in patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) and the European Patent Office (EPO) by main World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) technology field, grant years 1980–2013
Source: EPO’s PATSTAT database, April 2016; and WIPO technology fields from U. Schmoch, Concept of a Technology 
Classification for Country Comparisons (Geneva: World Intellectual Property Organization, 2008), 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/pdf/wipo_ipc_technology.pdf.
A look at patent filing trends in both offices for a selection of firms also illustrates that the growth 
in patenting has been primarily felt in the United States, but has been followed at the EPO (Figure 
3). As mentioned earlier, Microsoft mainly relied on copyright until the 1990s, but it is now one of 
the largest patent applicants worldwide. Red Hat has filed hundreds of patents in the USPTO and 
also a few at the EPO. Likewise, Amazon, Google, LinkedIn, and Facebook, to name a few of the top 
internet-based giants, also patent mainly in the United States and increasingly at the EPO, and they 
do so with different degrees of intensity depending on their areas of activity.22 
6. The Patentability of Software-Related Inventions
The practice in the United States has been shaped over the years by case law. A crucial case was Alice, 
decided in 2014 by the United States Supreme Court. In that judgment, the court gave maximum 
importance to the non-obviousness and disclosure requirements, barring patents on “abstract 
ideas.” In Europe, as governed by the European Patent Convention (EPC) of 1973, the position has 
always been that software “as such” is not patentable subject matter and the patentability of 
computer-implemented inventions is judged on the basis of the technical features of the invention 
(non-technical features do not contribute to the inventive step): to be patentable, an invention has to 
solve a technical problem with technical means. Table 1 summarises the main milestones in software 
patentability in both jurisdictions.
22  Not all the patents filed by this selection of firms are certain to be software-related, but given their primary sectors of 
activity, we expect many if not all of them to contain software claims or to be computer-implemented inventions in the 
broad sense of the term.
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Figure 3. Patent filings at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and 
European Patent Office (EPO) by a selection of firms, 2002–2012
Microsoft (founded in 1975)
Amazon (founded in 1994)
LinkedIn (founded in 2002)
Red Hat (founded in 1993)
Google (founded in 1998)
Facebook (founded in 2004)
Source: EPO’s PATSTAT database, April 2016.
The positions of the USPTO and EPO seem to be converging, but there are still critics; as recently 
argued by legal experts in a report commissioned by the European Commission, “both the EPO and 
United States methodologies for determining subject-matter eligibility involve legal uncertainty and 
present difficulties for practitioners, applicant and patent holders.”23 The same experts argued that 
23  Strowel and S. Utku, The Trends and Current Practices in the Area of Patentability of Computer Implemented Inventions within 
the EU and the US (Brussels: European Commission, 2016), 5, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/report-
trends-and-current-practices-area-patentability-computer-implemented-inventions-within.
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the heterogeneity of computer-implemented inventions “and the various levels of abstraction in 
which they may be attempted to be patented” has been one of the main reasons why it has been so 
difficult to find a single solution for patentability in this area. 24
7. Conclusions
It is difficult to assess how much of the growth in software-related patent applications responds 
to increased innovation and how much is just a consequence of higher patent propensity in 
the field.25  Roughly one out of three patents is now software-related. Most of them are filed 
in the United States, but many are also filed at the EPO. Freedom to operate, or the ability to 
sell a product without infringing anyone’s patents, remains an important challenge. However, the 
increasing success of the open source model26 and the early years when software vendors relied 
24  Ibid., 11–12.
25  CIFRA, in its Horizon 2020 project, notes that if the increment of the number of patent applications is mostly due to a 
change in patent propensity, then the benefits in terms of increased incentives to innovate would not materialise; see 
CIFRA, Challenging the ICT Patent Framework for Responsible Innovation: A Literature Review (Madrid: CIFRA, 2016), http://
www.cifra-h2020.eu/results/.
26  K. Finley, “Open Source Won. So, Now What?” Wired, 11 August 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/08/open-source-
won-now/.
United States* Europe
1972 – US Gottschalk v. Benson (algorithms ineligible)
1978 – US Parker v. Flook (algorithms ineligible)
1981 – US Diamond v. Diehr (machine-or-transformation 
test)
1982 – CAFC created
1994 – CAFC Alappat
1994 – CAFC Lowry
1998 – CAFC State Street Bank (useful, concrete, and tangible 
result test)
2007 – US KSR v. Teleflex (stricter obviousness test)
2008 – CAFC Bilski (machine-or-transformation test)
2010 – US Bilski v. Kappos (business method patents 
ineligible)
2012 – US Mayo v. Prometheus (abstract idea cannot be 
considered new; implementation must be inventive)
2013 – CAFC Alice (plurality of opinions)
2014 – US Alice (two-step analysis: (1) if it claims an abstract 
idea is not patentable; (2) inventive implementation)
1973 – EPC Article 52(2) (schemes, rules, and methods for 
performing mental acts, playing games, or doing business, 
and programs for computers claimed “as such” are excluded 
from patentability)
Case law of EPO Boards of Appeal (technical effect beyond the 
normal physical interaction between the program and the 
computer)
National case law (UK, France, Germany, etc.) (not always 
consistent with EPO Boards of Appeal)
2002–2005 – Proposal for EC Directive on patentability of 
computer-implemented inventions (rejected)
2010 – Opinion EPO Enlarged Boards of Appeal: ((1) 
divergence is a legitimate development of case law; (2) 
status quo affirmed, based on inventive step and technical 
character of claimed subject matter)
Table 1. Software patentability
* “US” cases are those decided by the United States Supreme Court. CAFC is the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
which is the only appellate-level court with the jurisdiction to hear patent case appeals.
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only on copyright show that patenting may not always be needed to recoup the costs of investing 
in software development.
Patents were originally conceived to provide incentives to innovate, but they also serve as a means 
to codify knowledge and support technology transactions. If the invention is sufficiently disclosed, 
patents also contribute to diffusion of knowledge. But they may also have important drawbacks 
and raise concerns. On the negative side, patents can be used to abuse monopoly power and lead 
to fragmentation of property rights over intellectual assets; they can block innovation and prevent 
freedom to operate; and they can add litigation and enforcement costs to R&D and innovation costs. 
All these concerns are valid for software-related inventions, but effects are likely to vary from ICT to 
pharmaceuticals, and given the pervasiveness of software they may spread to an increasingly large 
number of sectors.
As argued by Graham and Vishnubhakat:
Among the core drivers of software patent quality, there are perhaps two overarching 
considerations: 1) the correspondence between the scope of the patent disclosure—the 
explanation of what was invented and how it works; and 2) the scope of the patent claims—the 
boundaries of the legal protection provided to the patentee. For the patent bargain to work, to 
incentivize rather than to inhibit innovation, legal protection must be commensurate with scope 
of disclosure.27
We can then conclude by making three recommendations to patent offices, for all patents in general 
and more so for software-related patents: (1) to increase transparency about the legal status of 
patents and their owners, so that patent fragmentation and opacity do not hamper the development 
of markets for technologies; (2) to maintain a high inventive step and strict non-obviousness test, 
in order to stop the grant of trivial patents; and (3) to ensure that all patent filings include sufficient 
information on how to implement the invention, so that patents are granted not to an “idea” or a 
“desideratum” but to inventions that can be implemented and help solve well-identified problems.
27  S. Graham and S. Vishnubhakat, “Of Smart Phone Wars and Software Patents,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 27.1 
(2013): 67–86, at 81.
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The digital transformation will affect all aspects of our daily lives. This includes our private lives 
and our professional lives. To name just a few examples, products and services become smart, 
processes in logistics and production become autonomous, and machine-generated data increase 
at an unprecedented rate and become more and more valuable when sense is made of them. Such 
trends lead to the development of new, often disruptive technologies paving the way for new data-
driven business models.
The key enablers for the digital transformation are complex and include cumulative technologies. 
The latter consist of multiple layers of technology building on each other (technology stack) and 
containing intricate interdependencies. Important technologies in this respect include cyber-physical 
systems (CPS), where physical and software components are deeply intertwined, each operating 
at different spatial and temporal scales. CPS exhibit multiple and distinct behavioural modalities 
and interact with each other in myriad ways that change with context. Examples of CPS include 
smart grids, autonomous automobile systems, medical monitoring devices, process control systems, 
robotics systems, and automatic pilot avionics.1 
The communication between CPS components is enabled through the Internet of Things, understood 
as the network of physical devices, vehicles, and other items embedded with electronics, software, 
sensors, actuators, and connectivity that enable these objects to collect and exchange data. The 
Internet of Things allows objects to be sensed or controlled remotely across the existing network 
infrastructure, creating opportunities for more direct integration of the physical world into 
computer-based systems, and resulting in improved efficiency, accuracy, and economic benefit, in 
addition to reduced human intervention.2 In one aspect, the Internet of Things can be seen as a huge 
data-generation engine that provides data about the state of pretty much each and every “thing” 
connected to the Internet of Things.
The intelligence of CPS and the Internet of Things all comes through respective software applications 
that can process such data in near real time and make sense of the data to take control decisions 
at the device level or to generate recommendations for users of the software. Big data analytics 
applications can correlate seemingly non-related data to make predictions of all kinds of real-
world events. These include, for instance, predicting the need to switch cycles of traffic lights, 
controlling autonomous cars, and determining shopping behaviour for a particular product in order 
to automatically refill the shelves at a retailer.
1. Owning the Profits
Companies aim to increase their footprints in digital space by trying to lead innovation in the relevant 
enabling technologies and/or digital business models. To own the profits, it is essential to own the 
intellectual property (IP) inherent to the innovations.3 Since a major part of these innovations is based 
on intelligent software solutions and data, new IP management challenges arise from the intangible 
nature of software and data. Modern software solutions often show a distributed character in that 
1  “Cyber-Physical System,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyber-physical_system.
2  “Internet of Things,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_of_things.
3  M. Blaxill and R. Eckardt, The Invisible Edge: Taking Your Strategy to the Next Level Using Intellectual Property (New York: 
Portfolio, 2009).
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different parts of the software may be executed by different devices operated by different parties in 
different countries. A critical question is, therefore, who should own what and where? An even more 
difficult question relates to the ownership of data. How can you own data that are an important 
asset for a corresponding business model? We will discuss some of the appropriation mechanisms 
that are available to gain ownership of these intangible aspects of software innovation. Further, we 
will provide a short discussion on aspects of data ownership. The most relevant IP appropriation 
mechanisms for gaining ownership in software innovations include copyright, patents, designs, and 
database protection.
2. Copyright
Computer programs (as a work of literature) were included in the copyright laws in the early 1990s. 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) made software 
protectable by copyright in 1995. It confirmed that computer programs must be protected under 
copyright and that those provisions of the Berne Convention applying to literary works should also 
be applied to them. As software became a more and more important economic good at that time, an 
ownership mechanism was needed to provide an incentive for the innovator to invest in its creation. 
Copyright protects the literal expression of a computer program—that is, the code. The protection 
extends to the source code and binary code of a software program. However, it relates to a very specific 
implementation in a particular programming language. Copyright does not provide for ownership of 
the concepts of a software program that are implemented through a specific coding. That is, copyright 
cannot protect any functional behaviour of the software (i.e. its algorithms), and nor can it protect 
the architecture or interfaces of a computer system running the innovative software solution. As a 
consequence, competitors can legally perform a functional re-engineering of a software solution 
without having actual notice of the code and create a functional clone of this software solution.4 
3. Patents
For decades, patent protection for so-called computer-implemented inventions has been available and 
most of the major patent offices grant such claims on software-related inventions when the software 
is used to solve a technical problem in a non-obvious manner. Claims for computer-implemented 
methods (i.e. algorithms) and computer program products (sets of computer-readable instructions 
that can perform the algorithm once executed by a processor) are possible in many jurisdictions. The 
key difference of a computer program product patent claim compared with a copyright claim to the 
code lies in the ability to claim the function (algorithm) of the software independently of its code 
implementation. That is, a patent claim on a computer program product provides protection for the 
functional behaviour of the software no matter how the function is finally implemented at the coding 
level. However, the hurdle to patent protection for software solutions is high because computer 
programs as such are excluded from patent protection in most countries. Therefore, a patentable 
software solution normally has to solve a technical problem with technical means to overcome this 
exclusion criterion. A further challenge in patent protection of software solutions is the distributed 
character often found in software systems. In the internet era, cloud computing and Internet of Things 
algorithms are usually performed by many different components, which may be operated by different 
4  See SAS Institute Inc. v. World Programming Ltd, 2012, Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C 406/10.
71Global Perspectives and Challenges for the Intellectual Property System  
parties even across multiple countries. Therefore, from the rights-holder’s point of view, the art of 
claiming software inventions is to slice and dice such inventions into claims that are still infringeable 
and inventive.
4. Designs
Designs may be a useful means to protect user interface-related aspects of a software innovation. 
A certain user interface layout may be protected through an industrial design and can be used to 
prevent competitors from bringing confusingly similar layout designs to the market. However, it is to 
be noted that a user interface can be changed very easily in modern software deployment because 
it may simply involve changing a few lines of code and redeploying the amended software over 
the internet. Therefore, in many cases, design protection for user interface aspects can easily be 
circumvented just by redeploying the software without great effort.
5. Database Protection
A very important question in the age of data-driven business models is that of how to own the data 
on which the business model is developed. In fact, there is no real appropriation mechanism to gain 
ownership in data. De facto ownership may be gained through keeping the data secret, which, in 
many cases, would prevent a scalable business model. Of course, contractual agreements between 
specified parties can be drafted to rule on the allowed use of data by the licensee. The so-called sui 
generis database protection in the European Union can at least provide protection of the substantial 
parts of a database built by the innovator with substantial effort. However, one has to be careful when 
aggregating data that can be associated with an individual. In this case, data privacy laws prevent any 
ownership in such data. Even when aggregating non-personal data (e.g. machine data from a board 
computer), powerful correlation algorithms working on big data may be able to correlate such data 
with an individual person, thus transforming non-personal data into personal data.
6. Managing Intellectual Property Risks
The digital transformation changes processes in companies, as well as their product and service offerings 
across all industries. This creates a new IP management situation for many companies, especially in 
traditional, risk-averse industries (e.g. chemicals and pharmaceuticals). Products suddenly become 
smart in that they are delivered with software in one way or another. New business models arise in 
the digital world involving digital services. Production and logistics processes undergo disruptive digital 
redesigns enabled by Internet of Things technologies and robotics. Even the innovation processes in 
companies change dramatically by relying more and more on computer-aided innovation, with artificial 
intelligence applications developing rapidly.
The enablers for the digital offerings are the so-called complex cumulative technologies already 
mentioned. Such technologies are based on multiple layers of technology where each new layer builds 
on a previous layer. For example, when looking at a computer with a layered view,5 at the core of the 
computer there is a hardware layer that is able to process information expressed in bits and bytes in 
the registers of a processor.
5  N. Dale and J. Lewis, Computer Science Illuminated, 5th edn (Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning, 2012).
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A programming layer allows the hardware layer to be instructed to perform certain operations. 
The programming layer can be used to provide an operating system layer (system software) to hide 
complex and unimportant details of the internal structure of the computer architecture, to present 
important information to the user in an understandable way (e.g. graphical user interface), to provide 
a secure and safe environment in which to operate, to control the overall operation of the computer 
and manage its resources, and, last but not least, to facilitate access to those resources.
On top of the operating system layer, the application software layer is built. Application programs 
are used for problem-solving in more and more areas of daily life, including traditional technical 
and non-technical areas (e.g. banking, business, entertainment) but also completely new areas. The 
application is typically controlled through user interaction, and the result is typically directly visible 
to the end user.
A communication layer in addition to the programming layers allows computers to interact with 
other computers by providing the interfaces to establish the required connectivity. With every step 
in digital technology development, typically new layers are added to the technology stack. Such 
layers may also have interdependencies that can lead to very complex system architectures.
For companies doing business in traditional industry sectors with little or no focus on information 
technology (IT) and computer technology, using new technologies imposed by the digital 
transformation leads to situations where the old paradigms of exclusivity or freedom to operate no 
longer apply. Rather, IP risk management approaches seem to be more appropriate.
In technologies where an invention, such as a new compound, substantially shapes the final product 
(e.g. a new drug) without a significant number of technology layers in between, an innovation can 
often be clearly defined in terms of its boundaries. Sometimes these technologies (e.g. chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals) are referred to as discrete technologies. A thorough patent search will have been 
done to make sure the innovation will not conflict with existing patent claims of third parties 
(freedom to operate). The risk will be low that underlying technologies owned by somebody else 
are used unwittingly. In complex cumulative technologies, this is rather the rule than the exception. 
For example, when an innovation is made in the application layer (which is frequently the case in the 
smart product context), a patent search may reveal other IP rights targeting innovations in this layer. 
However, it is practically impossible to gain insights regarding the IP situation in the lower levels of 
the technology stack. Further, even within the same layer there are typically many claims floating 
around which pursue similar goals. It is to be expected that many patents exist that show overlaps in 
the scope of protection. In such a situation there is typically a high degree of dependency between the 
patents of different players. In other words, you may have a patent on a particular invention where 
somebody else has a patent on an invention that will necessarily be used for the implementation of 
your own invention, thus providing a bar to commercial use of your own invention.
IT and software are already an abstract technology. However, at the level of patent claims an 
additional layer of abstraction is introduced, which makes it increasingly difficult to derive the real 
boundaries of protection of particular patents. This problem is also referred to as the “lack of notice 
function” in the literature.6 As a consequence, even if a company acts in good faith and has made 
6  J. Bessen and M.J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2008).
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a product clearance search before going to market with a new product, in the digital world there is 
always a high risk that other IP rights (at other layers and even at the same layer) are infringed. This 
situation means abandoning an approach that gives the illusion of freedom to operate and rather 
moving to an IP risk management approach where risk strategies are defined in respect of certain 
IP portfolios and IP players. These risk strategies provide action templates on how to behave when 
a particular IP right owned by a particular player is discovered. Dependent on the associated risk, 
the range of actions may include anything from “ignore the IP right” to “take your product off the 
market.”
7. Value Extraction and Commercialisation of “Digital 
Intellectual Property”
In traditional industries, IP was primarily used to gain exclusivity in certain aspects of an innovation. 
Such exclusivity could be used to prevent others from copying the innovation and to maintain a 
competitive advantage either by enforcing premium prices for the innovation (as nobody else was 
allowed to use it) or by generating additional revenues from licensing the innovation (for example, 
to extend market reach).
Looking at IP generated for complex layered technologies, it is quite unlikely that a new software 
solution can go to market without infringing dozens or even hundreds of patents in the various 
technology layers. In such a highly interdependent technology environment, it is vital to own the new 
aspects of the software solution that are attractive to other market players. However, the primary 
use of IP is not to exclude others from using your IP but rather to improve your power to negotiate 
access to others’ IP portfolios at affordable prices.
Marshall Phelps asserts that “the world would be a lot better off if more companies would treat their 
IP primarily as a business and financial asset and not a litigation club for beating damage awards out 
of rivals.”7 He has also argued that “We can’t even build our own computers without other people’s 
technology. The whole technology world is interdependent now and there’s no going back. There’s 
no way we’re ever going to get out of the licensing game.” He proposes using strong IP portfolios as 
a glue for collaboration between partners. Often such partners are also rivals, leading to situations 
of competition.
Another aspect of the commercialisation of digital IP is the coexistence between open source software 
(OSS) and proprietary software. OSS is software deployed under an open source copyright licence. 
More than 2,500 OSS licence types exist. Programmers using a piece of OSS code have the freedom 
to modify, change, and share the source code in accordance with the respective licence type. The 
free distribution requirement of such OSS does not allow a request for licence fees. The source code 
has to be accessible and can be modified, and these same modifications can be distributed as well.
Nowadays, almost every software solution makes use of OSS. Ever shorter development cycles 
and the increasing complexity of innovative solutions require the reuse of certain standard 
software functions that are often bundled in OSS libraries. Care must be taken when using OSS 
code in combination with proprietary software code. Some of the OSS licence types show a so-
7  M. Phelps and D. Kline, Burning the Ships: Transforming Your Company’s Culture through Intellectual Property Strategy 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2009).
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called viral character (i.e. copyleft licences, a play on the word “copyright”). This means that when 
proprietary software uses OSS under a viral licence, a so-called combined work is created that has 
to be relicensed under the same viral OSS licence. This can take a business model built on licensing 
revenues from proprietary software at risk. However, for internal use within a company where no 
further distribution of the generated software occurs, the use of OSS can be a valuable accelerator 
for digital projects at relatively low risk.
8. Conclusion
The digitalisation affecting all aspects of our life imposes tremendous challenges for companies 
in managing their IP. In particular, companies in more conservative industries need to recognise 
the need to change towards a more risk-oriented IP management approach. Building a valuable IP 
portfolio is becoming important for any company in improving its negotiation power to get access 
to others’ technologies. This is vital in a highly networked and interdependent digital world. In this 
context, it is critical to understand which IP appropriation mechanisms are suitable for which types 
of digital innovation. In a digital world, as well, you have to own the IP if you want to own the profits.
Influences of Digital Transformation 
on Freedom-to-Operate Processes 
in the Chemical Industry
Alissa Zeller
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1. Digitalisation in the Chemical Industry*
Digitalisation has reached all sectors of the chemical industry, from basic petrochemicals to crop 
protection. The value derived from digitalisation and thus the focus of individual projects differs 
along the value chain. At BASF, to give some examples, the Smart Manufacturing project builds 
on real-time analysis of data to improve plant processes and allow predictive maintenance; the 
Smart Supply Chain project employs cloud solutions to connect customers with BASF along the 
supply chain for optimised transparency; in the Smart Innovation project, big data analysis of 
published and unpublished research data increases the efficiency and effectiveness of research; 
and in the Digital Business Models project, the Internet of Things is used to create new services 
for customers.1 
All these initiatives build on and create information technology (IT) innovations. It is thus time 
for the chemical industry to implement digital intellectual property (IP) strategies. A search for 
information and communications technology patents filed by chemical companies between 2010 
and 2015 reveals only moderate activity. Reliance, Sabic, Akzo, DSM, Monsanto, BASF, and Dow 
each filed between 5 and 20 patents during that time, and Bayer and Dupont between 20 and 60 
each, with the highest number of patents in the agrochemical and pharmaceutical fields. Sinopec 
filed over 150 patent applications, with a focus on oil, gas, and mining and with China as the key 
country of protection.2 These numbers are almost negligible when compared with IT patent filing 
activities in industries that entered the digital world earlier.
2. Key Differences between Chemical Inventions and IT 
Inventions
Patent protection strategies differ fundamentally between the chemical and the IT sectors, and 
consequently so do their patent landscapes. Innovation in chemical products generally requires 
significant financial investment and time. Patents ensure exclusivity and return on the high 
investment during long product life cycles. Typically, the exclusivity is achieved through a low 
number of patents per product filed in the key markets. Portfolios per product will include, for 
example, patents directed to the chemical molecule as such, its manufacturing process, and 
specific uses and formulations. Licensing is done, if at all, on a per patent basis.
IT technologies have a relatively short life cycle in comparison with chemical products. This holds 
for both hardware and software innovations. Those innovations, however, build on many basic 
inventions and technology from previous product generations. From an IP perspective, this leads 
to a situation where thousands of patents can affect even relatively simple IT solutions. Further 
differences between chemical and IT inventions are shown in Table 1.
1  BASF, Digitalisierung, https://www.basf.com/de/company/about-us/digitalization-at-basf.html.
2  The search included International Patent Classification, Cooperative Patent Classification, and European Classification 
System codes H04L, G06F, G06Q, and G06N.
* The content of this chapter is based largely on work by the BASF Digitalization Transformation in IP team, led by German 
and European patent attorney Dr Stephan Krieger of BASF SE Ludwigshafen. Special thanks to European patent attorney 
Peter Bittner of Peter Bittner und Partner, Walldorf, Germany, for his contributions.
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These differences in patent landscapes correlate with different approaches to analysing and ensuring 
freedom to operate (FTO) regarding third-party patents. In the chemical industry, market players perform 
thorough FTO analyses to make sure they do not infringe patents of competitors or other third parties. For 
chemical products, a meaningful in-depth FTO analysis can be done because of the clearly defined product 
(chemical formula) and the limited number of patents per product. Both restrict the patent search and 
its analysis to a reasonable scope. For IT inventions, the key challenge in addition to the large number of 
patents for both a comprehensive search and its analysis is the lack of a standardised technical terminology. 
One and the same innovation can be defined in different terms. Thus, even if a potentially relevant patent 
can be identified, its scope of protection may be difficult to assess.
Consequently, the IT industry cannot and does not conduct in-depth FTO analyses for each product. The 
market players will prefer to respect third-party patents through a risk-based FTO analysis followed by 
cross-licensing of patent portfolios, including mutual balance payments.3  Since IT innovation requires 
access to basic technologies and those of earlier product generations as mentioned above, including those 
of competitors, participation in the software industry at a reasonable cost requires a substantial IT patent 
portfolio to get access to third-party technology via cross-licensing. Further patent landscape differences 
are listed in Table 2.
3  The “patent wars” between Apple, Google, Samsung, and HTC Corporation represent more of an exception in the industry.
Chemistry IT
Technology Discrete Complex cumulative
Number of inventions 
in product
Low High
Distribution level Low High
Investment per 
innovation
High Low
Product life cycle Long Short
Technical terminology Standardised Not standardised
Cross-licensing Rare Common (pools, standards)
Chemistry IT
1 patent per product 1,000 patents per product
Chemical company innovation owner Innovation often made by IT partner
Patents very relevant Patents slow; know-how protection essential
Established legal environment in many 
countries
Little case law; scope of patents difficult to assess; 
changing laws
Freedom to operate (FTO) key element of 
intellectual property and business strategy
Multilayer patent landscape; full FTO nearly 
impossible
Table 1. Overview of key differences between chemical and
 information technology (IT) inventions
Table 2. Differences in the patent landscapes of chemical and information 
technology (IT) innovations
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3. Impact of Digitalisation on Freedom-to-Operate Processes
FTO processes in the chemical industry are impacted by digitalisation at both ends of the product’s 
development. Early on, the selection of ideas for further development in the laboratory will be 
facilitated by big data analysis. Intelligent “white space analysis” will already give an indication at 
this stage as to which fields are less crowded by third-party patents than others. In consequence, less 
critical chemical patents covering the finally developed product will come up in the search later on, 
which leads to an overall reduced FTO effort. This aspect of digitalisation certainly makes FTO tasks 
easier in the chemical industry.
At the late end of development, digitalisation introduces new FTO complexity, however. An increasing 
number of projects will include not only chemical inventions but also associated IT innovations. An 
established example is a new manufacturing process that includes steering algorithms. Upcoming 
examples are new applications of chemicals supported by technical services software. Accordingly, 
in the chemical industry, three ways to conduct FTO will exist. For chemistry-only inventions, a 
“classic” FTO will be conducted. For IT inventions, a risk-based FTO, including potential licensing, will 
be done. For mixed inventions, both kinds of FTO will be necessary.
4. A Risk-Based Freedom-to-Operate Approach for IT inventions
A risk-based FTO approach may contain the following steps:
1. White space analysis during the early research and development stage.
2. Risk analysis based on the technology and the competitive situation to decide for or against an 
FTO analysis.
3. Risk-adapted FTO analysis—that is, prioritised search and analysis.
4. Risk management.
The risk analysis leading to a decision for or against conducting an FTO analysis considers legal and 
economic factors: the probability of litigation and the impact on the business (Figure 1).
For a certain Project 1, for example, the legal risk assessment will include the patentability of the 
associated IT solution. With a restricted allowance practice of respective patent offices, few third-
party patents are to be expected, and/or such patents can likely be considered invalid, reducing 
the probability that the patent owner will enforce them. Of further relevance for the legal risk 
assessment is the technology field of the project. If it is outside the field of competition between 
chemical companies, the risk of litigation may be lower, and potential conflicts may be more likely to 
result in licensing deals than end in court. Visibility of the IT innovation also has an influence on the 
litigation risk, as does the country of commercialisation.
The commercial risk assessment considers the investment to be made for a particular project, and 
the cost associated with a potentially necessary work-around in the light of third-party patents. 
Loss of profit risk assessment depends upon the absolute profit from the project, but also on the 
legal remedies for patent infringement in a country. An injunction against further commercialisation 
constitutes the greatest commercial risk, followed by expensive damage payments and attorney 
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fees. In Germany, for example, the risk of a preliminary injunction is comparatively high, whereas it is 
low in most other countries, including the United States. Damage payments will often be equivalent 
to licence fees.
Legal and economic risk assessment on an individual project basis will lead to a decision regarding 
whether or not to conduct an FTO search and analysis. In some cases, a small “test search” may 
facilitate the decision.
If the risk assessment calls for an FTO analysis, the search needs to be adapted to the complex 
cumulative nature of the IT patent landscape. A stepwise approach includes, for example, first 
getting an overview about the prior art published over 20 years back and excluding such prior art 
from the scope of the search. Second, it includes identifying the oldest patents potentially covering 
the product, or those oldest patents held by key competitors, since those presumably have the 
broadest scope and are most relevant. One may further restrict this analysis to patents held by key 
competitors, and check the validity of such cases only. The search specialist can also sort patents 
by their competitive impact, using for example the Patent Asset Index algorithm.4 As discussed, 
the terminology for IT inventions is not unified, so it is advisable to check some “quality hits” for 
relevance to the product and then maybe to refine the search. In summary, both the search and the 
legal analysis of the IT patents need to be prioritised to reduce the number of patents that are chosen 
to be analysed with full legal scrutiny.
4  Holger Ernst and Nils Omland, “The Patent Asset Index: A New Approach to Benchmark Patent Portfolios,” World Patent 
Information 33.1 (2011): 34–41.
Figure 1. Risk matrix for the decision for or against conducting  
a freedom-to-operate (FTO) analysis
PROBABILITY OF LITIGATION
- Patentability
- IP owner
- Visibility
- Country
- High investment
- High cost of change
- Profit loss
- Reputational damage
Project 1
Product 2
IMPACT ON BUSINESS
low
low
medium
medium high
high
FTO analysis
necessary
FTO analysis
to be conducted
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5. Intellectual Property Risk Management
In the event that relevant third-party patents are identified in the FTO analysis, various options are 
available to manage and mitigate the associated risk. The traditional first step is a search for prior 
art. If the patent is invalid over prior art, a corresponding opinion without further action may be 
sufficient. Alternatively, or as part of such a strategy, opposition proceedings can be initiated.
The more radical consequences where third-party patents presumed valid are not open for licensing 
are a halt to the project or technical circumvention. The former is unlikely in the IT field as the 
latter solution typically has reasonable chances. In critical cases where actions by competitors are 
expected, mitigation measures can include avoiding high-risk countries, preparing a defence for 
litigation, and careful communication about the product.
The products for which the FTO analysis was conducted will eventually be sold or licensed to 
customers. It is important to manage the risk in such contracts to limit the liability in case of IP 
litigation. Indemnification caps are a typical way to do so, but restrictions by country, patent 
family, or field are also options at hand. In critical cases the parties will agree on responsibilities 
and termination rights in the event of litigation. Of course, contracts concerning IT development by 
external IT-product service providers should include clauses on respective liabilities as well.
Cross-licensing between companies has been mentioned as a typical instrument to manage FTO 
under IT patents and to get access to third-party technologies at a stroke. It is apparent that a risk-
based FTO strategy as described will not be enough on its own to enable the chemical industry 
to also become a player in the digital field. Building strong IP assets of its own will be essential 
for in-licensing third-party technologies at a reasonable price and managing FTO at the same time. 
Filing a large number of patents (simply) to ensure FTO amounts to a paradigm shift in the chemical 
industry, and corresponding implementation may take some time.
A specific cross-licensing initiative is the License on Transfer (LOT) Network,5 a community of 
companies aimed at combating patent trolls by cross-licensing patents. “Patent troll” is a somewhat 
controversial term mostly used to define non-practising entities that acquire patents solely to 
make a business out of enforcing them. LOT was initiated by Google in 2014 and has gained over 70 
members, mostly from the IT, automotive, and finance industries, with 0.8 million patents on the 
cross-licensing list. The annual fee is zero to US$ 20,000, depending on the size of the company. The 
licence scheme provides that, if—and only if—any of the LOT members sells a patent to a patent troll, 
the other LOT members are granted an automatic royalty-free licence under this patent. The LOT 
licence does not affect the members’ rights to sue each other, or to sell the licensed patents.
In the chemical industry, so-called “defensive publication” represents an alternative strategy to 
ensure FTO. Typically, patent applications or other documents describing the prospective market 
product are published via specific websites such as IP.com. The aim is not to obtain a granted 
patent but rather to create prior art for third parties, hindering them from filing patents blocking 
the product. In the IT field, it is questionable whether defensive publication can be a strategy to 
ensure FTO. The number of patented inventions is so high—especially in the United States—and 
they address so many specific aspects that it is unlikely that publication like this would prevent more 
5  LOT Network, http://lotnet.com/.
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patent grants. This is even more the case as IT patents are normally filed within a very short time 
after the idea is generated, with a chemical company unlikely to be the first to have had that idea. In 
addition, patent applications are generally filed without a prior art search, and often proceed to grant 
without an holistic search by the patent office. Another argument against defensive publication as 
an FTO strategy is that it would reveal details about the technology used, inviting patent trolls to 
collect patents for later attacks.
The use of OSS would significantly decrease the risk of patent infringement, at least regarding the 
software components of a product. This can be a complementary strategy in areas where a company 
does not have an interest in building an IP position of its own—that is, for “internal use only” scenarios 
or where exploitation through licensing of the software component is not part of the business model.
6. Outlook
This chapter has described how the chemical industry assimilates FTO analysis rules for IT 
innovations. Other industries have already taken corresponding steps, including the pharmaceutical 
and automotive sectors. While this development has focused on the way to employ traditional 
search and analysis methods for a risk-based FTO assessment, the next big change will come from 
new search and analysis methods themselves. Artificial intelligence and big data are the digital 
backbone technologies of new software supporting the search specialist and patent lawyer. The 
first tools are already emerging on the market for white space analysis, and development is under 
way for intelligent analysis of invalidity, infringement, case law, and even legal risk. Reliable tools of 
this sort may be available for the chemical industry somewhat later than for other industries—the 
chemical language has hundreds of millions of words in each individual language, which is a design 
challenge for artificial intelligence software—but it is prudent to think about the legal implications 
now. Questions to be answered include: What is the legal relevance of computer-generated mass 
patent filings covering computer-identified white space areas?6 Will such patent applications count 
as prior art, and will they be patentable? Who is the corresponding inventor?7 To what extent can an 
FTO conducted by artificial intelligence tools be a legal work product? As a first step, we can try to 
answer these questions by interpreting the law. The fundamental technological changes ahead of us, 
however, can be expected to give rise to a call for legislative changes.
6  “Algorithmic patenting” has been used to create short descriptions or claims by combining elements of published 
documents employing permutations and linguistic manipulations. The aim to date has mostly been to create prior art 
through defensive publication—that is, to prevent either competitors or patent trolls from obtaining patents on the 
environment of certain subject-matter. Filing a large number of patents for claims like these that are not necessarily viable 
does not have a very favourable cost–benefit ratio at present. Once the algorithms become smart enough to suggest non-
incremental inventions, this will change. For further background, see for example “Cloem,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Cloem; “All the Claims,” http://alltheclaims.com/; and “All Prior Art,” http://allpriorart.com/.
7  See, for example, Ryan Abbott, “Autonomous Machines and Their Inventions,” Mitteilungen der deutschen Patentanwälte 
(2017): 429–437.
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1. Introduction
“Big data” is just one of several ways to describe the fact that we are currently witnessing a new 
“industrial” area, characterised by business models that are based on huge volumes of data. Other 
common expressions nowadays—such as “Industry 4.0,” “Digital Economy,” “Internet of Things,” 
“Internet of Everything,” “Industrial Internet,” and “Data-Driven Economy”—try to address further, 
additional elements, but “data” are always the main focus of the discussion.
Those data in a sense constitute the third dimension within an ongoing industrial revolution 
beginning in the middle of the twentieth century. The first dimension encompassed the underlying 
information technology as such, most importantly computer technology, allowing electronic data 
processing as well as data storage. The second dimension was characterised by the connection of 
computers and the transportation of data; it initiated the era of the internet. In the third dimension, 
the (digital) content moves to the centre; data as such are the focus. Of course, the evolution of this 
third dimension happened gradually, since “data” always took centre stage in this ongoing digital 
revolution. What makes the difference, however, and characterises the third dimension, is the 
volume of data (“big data”) as well as the nature of the data involved—we will come back to that.
Not surprisingly, the value of such data is esteemed as extremely high, and corresponding images have 
been conjured up, in particular data as the “mineral oil” of the digital economy. Others immediately 
objected to that comparison; mineral oil—or at least access to sources of oil—may be monopolised. 
Instead, data were described as the “oxygen” of the digital economy. In fact, oxygen is the 
indispensable resource for any life and, as a matter of principle, freely accessible. Data have also been 
seen by the European Commission as “a catalyst for economic growth, innovation and digitisation 
across all economic sectors,” particularly for small and medium-sized businesses (and start-ups) 
and for society as a whole.1 Alternatively, data might be grasped as (part of) the infrastructure of 
the digital economy: the “data-driven” economy. Following that logic has a particular significance 
because it leads us to the insight that “data” possibly are not just a private matter; at least public 
infrastructure obviously needs to be a concern of public authorities.
2. Expectations
In fact, public authorities are tempted to “regulate” the digital economy. In particular, the European 
Commission seeks regulatory measures; its major intention is to enhance the growth potential of the 
emerging data economy. In the end, the world is to become smarter—the sooner, the better.
Visions focus on “smart cities,” for example optimising the use of scarce resources (such as energy); 
“smart traffic” measuring road capacities, channelling flows of traffic, pooling travellers; “smart 
factories,” in particular robot-controlled production lines, need-based supply of commodities, 
optimising distribution channels, and so on; or “smart homes,” for example heating systems, fridges 
automatically purchasing missing food and beverages, surveillance systems, and the like. Regarding 
“smart products,” the prime example is cars, in countless aspects, above all automated driving, 
traffic management systems, maintenance signalling, and dynamic insurance models. But also 
“smart wearables” are discussed, for instance communicating with each other or the environment, or 
1  See European Commission, “A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe,” COM(2015) 192 final, 14.
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“smart agriculture,” focusing on animal husbandry, soil management, in particular fertilisation, and 
other things. A great potential is also anticipated from “smart medicine,” for example personalised 
drugs or therapies, with surveillance systems for effects and (unwanted) side effects, or measures to 
prevent infectious diseases.
This digital revolution is happening globally, and it is indeed not unjustified for the European 
Commission to worry about the leadership of the European (digital) economy. The European 
Commission clearly expressed this concern in “A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe”2 and 
its “Free flow of data” initiative.3 One important milestone had already been set in 2014, with the 
European Commission communication “Towards a Thriving Data-Driven Economy,”4 which was 
followed by an impact assessment.5 A communication of the European Commission, “Building a 
European Data Economy,” followed on 10 January 2017,6 accompanied by a wide public consultation.7 
On 13 September 2017 the European Commission also launched its Proposal for a Regulation on a 
framework for the free flow of non-personal data in the European Union.8 
Whether leadership of European (digital) industries can be achieved with (European) leadership 
in legal regulation, however, is another question. Regulation—ultimately legal intervention into 
market activities—is never an aim in itself but is justified only on condition that positive impacts can 
reasonably be expected—in this case, above all a stimulation of the data-driven economy.
It is, however, remarkable that the data-driven economy is already prospering today, with virtually 
no (specific) legislation. It seems that the best incentive for an entrepreneur—namely the prospect of 
profits—works in the digital environment just as well as in the analogue world. It seems the industries 
concerned learned quickly (and are still learning) how to deal with the phenomenon of “big data,” 
and in particular how to “commercialise” (the value of) data. In view of that, it is legitimate to ask 
to what extent, if at all, state regulation might indeed (further) stimulate and sustain that naturally 
occurring process of adaptation from the traditional industries to the digital industrial age.
3. Need for Regulation ... ?
The European Commission seems to have one major and one less clearly expressed concern. The 
major concern is also—directly—addressed in the title of this chapter: who “owns” the data? Asking 
2  European Commission, “A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe,” COM(2015) 192 final.
3  Ibid., 15.
4  European Commission, “Towards a Thriving Data-Driven Economy,” COM(2014) 442 final.
5  European Commission, European Free Flow of Data Initiative within the Digital Single Market (Brussels: European 
Commission, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_cnect_001_free_flow_data_en.pdf.
6  European Commission, “Building a European Data Economy,” COM(2017) 9 final.
7  European Commission, “Public Consultation on Building the European Data Economy” (Brussels: European Commission, 
2017), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/public-consultation-building-european-data-economy. See 
also European Commission, “Summary Report of the Public Consultation on Building a European Data Economy” (Brussels: 
European Commission, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/summary-report-public-consultation-
building-european-data-economy); and European Commission, “Synopsis Report Consultation on the ‘Building a European 
Data Economy’ Initiative” (Brussels: European Commission, 2017), http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/
image/document/2017-36/synopsis_report_-_data_economy_A0EFA8E0-AED3-1E29-C8DE049035581517_46646.pdf.
8  European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Framework for the 
Free Flow of Non-personal Data in the European Union,” COM(2017) 495.
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the question that way, however, is already suggestive, because the primary question should be: can (or 
should) data be “owned” at all?
The second concern is—indirectly—addressed in the title of the chapter; it is the word “use” of data—or, 
one might rather say, “access” to data. The relevance of these two issues should not be underestimated. 
We might now be facing a landmark decision of similar significance to the one of more than 100 years 
ago, related to the question of whether “innovation” should be subject to “ownership.” The question 
was: do we need patent law? The concerns and arguments expressed at that time—for or against patent 
law—were remarkably similar to our discussion on ownership of, and also on access to, data.
Certain problems with patent law that we are observing today (more than ever before) advise us to be 
cautious with regard to the creation of “data ownership.” The establishment of legal exclusivity might 
produce unwanted, dysfunctional effects; instead of fostering the digital economy, certain business 
models might even be impeded.
We should also not ignore the fact that the discussion on “ownership” of data is to a great extent 
limited to Europe. This should be a reason for scepticism: is it really wise for Europe to take regulatory 
“leadership” in that respect? Why is legal protection not a concern of our main rival, the United 
States? Is it possible that Europeans are afraid of US power in the digital economy? The majority of 
the dominating drivers of the digital economy are indeed US companies (the Googles, Facebooks, 
WhatsApps, Amazons, and many others). And it is certainly true that those companies would not be as 
successful as they are if they did not have access to “big data”, or, more precisely, to our data ...
But is, then, “ownership” of our data the right answer to the challenge the European digital economy is 
facing vis-à-vis the US digital economy? It might be premature to provide conclusive answers to such 
questions today. And this short overview does not allow us to go into detail. But we can at least hint at 
some considerations.
3.1 Ownership
Already the term “ownership” raises numerous questions. This becomes visible with the attempt 
to find alternative terms; they may exist—property, possession, exclusivity, control, sovereignty, 
responsibility—but they all (legally) mean something different, in particular in relation to data.
The European Commission, in its communication of January 2017,9 seems to use the term with 
two different meanings: (1) a right in rem, leading to “property” in data, meaning an exclusive right 
characterised by an erga omnes effect. Such a right typically is transferrable, and licences to third parties 
can be granted, contractually allowing them the usage of data; beyond that, it necessarily involves 
measures of enforcement against any third party using data without authorisation, including the right 
to claim damages for unauthorised uses. (2) A purely defensive right for the de facto holder of data, 
characterised by a right to sue third parties in case of illicit misappropriation of data. This approach 
resembles “possession” rather than “ownership;” it is comparable to the possession of (as such not 
protected) know-how, and the concept of legal protection may be similar to the one applied in Directive 
2016/943 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against 
their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure.
9  European Commission, “Building a European Data Economy,” COM(2017) 9 final.
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These two approaches are meant as ways forward de lege ferenda. This triggers the question 
concerning legal protection de lege lata. An answer to the question of legal protection as it exists 
requires more profound analyses and fundamental research; at present, however, three remarks 
should be made in that context.
First, protection of data with an erga omnes effect (in terms of “property”) already exists to a certain 
extent. Directive 96/9 on the legal protection of databases stipulates a protection “sui generis” 
against the “extraction” of “parts”; such parts can be understood as “data.” However, even without 
going into detail, Directive 96/9 is unlikely to be helpful in our context, in particular because it does 
not focus on data as such. Nevertheless, it may teach us another important lesson. The Directive 
was enacted based on purely theoretical assumptions; chief among these was the belief that legal 
protection is required to stimulate investments in the establishment of databases. An evaluation 
of 2005, however, revealed that if an effect of the “sui generis” right was measurable at all, it was 
negative rather than positive.10 The lesson we can learn from this is that mistakes in legislation on 
intellectual property can happen—but they should not be repeated.
Second, as to a defensive approach, data—de lege lata—do already play a tremendous role in 
European law; however, this is limited to “personal data,” in terms of “data protection” as an element 
of the personality right. Most importantly the General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR), 
applicable from 25 May 2018, plays a fundamental role (see also Section 4 of this chapter), but it is 
doubtful whether it provides an adequate legal framework beyond individual interests in the data-
driven economy.
Third, the above-mentioned Directive 2016/943 on trade secrets protection deserves more attention 
as regards the question of whether data in terms of “information” are already (de lege lata) protected, 
at least to a certain degree, based on a defensive-rights approach. This question also requires deeper 
legal analysis, but this is not the place for it.
However, the second and third layers of protection de lege lata reveal one thing very clearly: context 
matters. The term “data” by no means provides a clear conception of the subject matter of (possibly 
required) legal protection. Data may be of a very diverse nature, and the nature of data decisively 
impacts the question of “ownership.” Very roughly speaking, we may distinguish three categories of 
data:
• Data can be of a purely technical or factual nature, such as machine data (e.g. engine temperature), 
meteorological data, market and stock exchange data, and so on. In certain cases, in particular 
if data provide “information” or “know-how,” then it is not difficult to imagine an application of 
Directive 2016/943 on trade secrets protection; at the same time, we should bear in mind that 
this Directive was not drafted with a view to protection of data as such.
• The term “personal data” used in the GDPR possibly does not describe the meaning of the 
second category very clearly; the French term “données à caractère personnel” might be more 
expressive, whereas the German term “personenbezogene Daten” explains even more precisely 
that these data involve a “reference” or “connection” to individual people. Examples of “personal 
10  European Commission, First Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the Legal Protection of Databases (Brussels: European 
Commission, 2005), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.pdf; currently 
this Directive is under review again.
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data” are similarly uncountable as the ways in which they can be used (and abused); just think 
of health data (irrespective of whether such data relate to the pharmaceutical sector, lifestyle 
products, insurance matters, or other areas), consumer behaviour (internet searches, use of 
credit cards, purchasing behaviour influenced by advertising), conduct on social networks 
(thus expressing political preferences, spreading propaganda, and so forth), and individual 
movements (measured by mobile telephones, used in traffic applications, and many other 
contexts).
• The third category somehow stands between the first two, and it seems hard to find an 
appropriate term in English for the German term “personenbeziehbar.” This basically means 
that data as such are not related and are not directly “attributed” to an individual person, but 
the relation to a person can (more or less) easily be produced. This third category is particularly 
important; a majority of applications are based on such data. Also, in this context the GDPR 
plays an important role—but it might be a dangerous one (see Section 4 of this chapter).
One example is most instructive in explaining why this category of data plays a paramount role: it 
involves navigation apps showing the flow of traffic. The colour green is used for flowing traffic, 
orange for slow-moving traffic, and red to signal a traffic jam. This information is not collected 
based on hundreds of helicopters or drones flying over the country, sending pictures to traffic 
control centres. Instead, this information is generated by correlative movements of the mobile 
telephones of the car drivers passing through the same positions; Apple, Android, and all other 
applications are based on similar technologies. It goes without saying that individual drivers could 
be identified; their data could for instance be connected with data produced by the car itself, or 
advertisements could be sent to them, for example for nearby restaurants when there is a traffic 
jam. But this is not the intended purpose of such apps; the identity of the driving person does not 
matter for the functioning of the navigation app.
Depending on the category we are talking about, data can be subject to fundamentally different 
conditions, whether in terms of collection, processing, function, or downstream uses of data; in 
particular, the interests of potential stakeholders differ tremendously. In view of that, providing 
an answer to the question of data “ownership” is not easy—even if we agreed on the need of legal 
protection. For instance, in the case of the traffic app, who should be the “owner?” Should it be 
the car producer, the supplier of the sensor or control unit, the app producer, the service provider, 
the car driver—or even perhaps another party? Or would such a complex setting entail a kind of 
“co-ownership?” What would “ownership” mean, say, in the context of traffic information apps? 
Would anybody have an interest in prohibiting the use of such data? Apart from that, if ownership 
is to have the purpose of the monetisation of data, who should pay whom for what in connection 
with such data, and how much?
3.2 Access
In fact, the value of certain data is obvious, but it is not necessarily (or only) individual data that 
may have a value. In the case of traffic data, for instance, only a smart combination of (big) data 
matters; at the same time, it is obvious that access to such data is of crucial importance. In particular, 
independent suppliers of a service or product—those players who may not directly seize data from 
drivers’ mobile telephones—depend on access to relevant data.
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But individual data—such as health data—may also be of interest beyond the patient concerned 
(the one who “produces” the data), or beyond a supplier of a health service who is in the position of 
picking up such individual data directly from the patient. Imagine, for instance, that a patient is under 
direct medical treatment by a pharmaceutical company (in fact, individualised, direct treatment will 
be the future of healthcare, according to this industry). At the same time, this patient may be in need 
of some other medical treatment—possibly in an emergency—from an independent medical doctor. 
This other doctor clearly needs to have adequate information regarding the initial, ongoing treatment 
in order to judiciously combine different drugs and avoid side effects. Or imagine a farmer in relation 
to a supplier of specialised farm machinery that collects data (under the supplier’s control) on the 
soil quality on the farm. If the farmer needs fertiliser sold by an independent company, information 
on the farm’s soil is necessary to identify the appropriate product.
In short, access to data may be an issue of major relevance, irrespective of the question of 
“ownership” in terms of legal protection, simply because in most cases practical circumstances 
exclude third parties from the information contained in such data when it is under the factual control 
of other players. But we are miles away from uniform, comparable situations. Therefore, even if legal 
intervention to provide access should be considered, it is hardly imaginable that a one-size-fits-all 
approach could be found.
One fundamental question in that context is, of course, whether antitrust law can play a guiding role 
as to provision of access. This question deserves serious attention; a position paper of the Max Planck 
Institute for Innovation and Competition of 16 August 2016, however, concludes that antitrust law 
in most cases is not tailored in a way to address the issue of access to data. Rather, if at all, sector-
specific regulations might be required.11 
4. ... or Need for Deregulation?
Legal rules on “ownership” and “access”—if such rules do in fact provide a sustainable environment 
and create incentives for the (European) digital economy—are not the only way forward, however. 
Public authorities could also consider alternative regulatory or supportive measures. In fact, the issue 
of “big data” is not that new, as it has (at least indirectly) been addressed in earlier legislation of the 
European Union, although in a rather specific field. Directive 2003/98 on the reuse of public sector 
information focuses on data under the control of public authorities such as meteorological data, 
traffic data, topography measurement data, and so on. It goes without saying that such data may be 
of the highest relevance for countless apps, and in particular for new players in the related markets. 
This Directive, however, in the first instance addresses antitrust concerns; all private entities are to 
have access under equal conditions.
But states could do more—just think of tax regulation, simplified public administration (e.g. for 
start-ups), school and university education, and much more. Generally speaking, and from a wider 
perspective, simple de-regulation might be the right answer to further stimulate initiatives in the 
data-driven economy. In fact, listening to the industries involved, legally protected “ownership” 
seems not to be a concern; they largely rely on the factual possibilities allowing them to keep their 
data exclusive (as earlier empirical analyses confirmed). Beyond that, industries are rather reluctant 
11  For details, see “Data Ownership and Access to Data,” www.ip.mpg.de/en/link/positionpaper-data-2016-08-16.html.
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about the establishment of access claims—maybe because they are aware that there is no one-way 
system; the claimant in one case might be the defendant in another, being directed to provide access 
to competitors.
If (certain) industries express any concerns related to the digital economy, it is that the GDPR might 
threaten (at least some) existing and, above all, new business models. This issue should be a primary 
concern for the European Commission. This is not the place to discuss details, but at least some 
incomplete reflections might shed some light on this issue.
What may be the most important concern is the term “identifiable natural person” in the definition 
of Article 4(1) of the GDPR 2016/679:
...“personal data” means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person 
(“data subject”); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in 
particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an 
online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person [emphasis added].
The emphasised words are of particular relevance in view of a recent ruling of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union,12 relating to the previous Directive 95/46 Article 2(a), which, however, was 
similarly adopted in the GDPR:
... must be interpreted as meaning that a dynamic IP address registered by an online media 
services provider when a person accesses a website that the provider makes accessible to the 
public constitutes personal data within the meaning of that provision, in relation to that provider, 
where the latter has the legal means which enable it to identify the data subject with additional 
data which the internet service provider has about that person [emphasis added].
Other provisions might be incompatible with most business models of “big data,” for instance the 
provision on “data minimisation:” “[Personal data shall be] adequate, relevant and limited to what 
is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed.”13 Beyond that, very far-
reaching information duties,14 a right to rectification,15 or a right to erasure16 might prevent potential 
developers from investing resources in new business models.
Of course, GDPR 2016/679 has a reasonable background, and the concern is not that personal data 
might in any way become the subject of abusive behaviour. However, the threat potential, with 
administrative fines of up to €20 million or up to 4 percent of total worldwide annual turnover 
(whichever is higher), might stifle a number of possible and useful new applications. The Republican 
Party in the United States has gone in the other direction. A regulation of the Federal Communications 
Commission—established in October 2016 under former President Obama—was repealed in 2017. 
This allows cable companies and wireless providers to sell (and monetise) client data on online 
12  C-582/14, 19 October 2016—Breyer, para. 31 to 49.
13  Article 5 para. 1(c) GDPR.
14  See Article 15 GDPR: Right of access by the data subject.
15  Article 16 GDPR.
16  The so-called “right to be forgotten” in Article 17 GDPR.
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activities (such as browsing history, shopping habits, and other information). It is obvious that this is 
not what Europe should do; but a greater sense of proportion seems recommendable. One way could 
be to incentivise the transformation of personal data into pseudonymous data and to clearly exempt 
corresponding business models from the GDPR.
5. Conclusions
If there are serious doubts about the need for legal protection of “ownership” in terms of “property” 
(ultimately leading to a new IP right), this does not necessarily exclude purely defensive approaches. 
In certain, rather particular cases, specific protection against misappropriation of de facto excluded, 
but possibly not sufficiently protected data might enhance or facilitate data transactions.
But a one-size-fits-all approach, whether addressing protection or access concerns, is unlikely to 
produce positive effects overall. This is due, above all, to the scale of the dynamics of the digital 
economy. State regulation will always lag behind the development of new business models, and 
ultimately enhance the risk of producing undesirable, dysfunctional effects.
An approach worth considering, in contrast, might be the definition of certain policy targets for the 
industries concerned, while leaving them to decide how to achieve these targets. In fact, “(regulating) 
self-regulation” might be the most promising legislative tool for the digital economy—at least at our 
current stage of knowledge.
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1. Introduction
New data are created by the quintillions of bytes every day.1 This explosion of data makes possible 
fast-developing machine learning and artificial intelligence technology. These technologies thrive 
on repurposing and processing big data streams. In the big data era, orienting within this magma of 
online data has become an extremely complex but crucial task, leading to complex issues in terms 
of regulation of this new environment.2 According to the European Commission, the European data 
economy—also frequently referred to as the “fourth industrial revolution”3—is a great opportunity 
for growth as “Big Data considerably improves decision-making capabilities and, ultimately 
organizational performances.”4 Text and data mining (TDM) thus serves as an essential tool to 
navigate the endless sea of online information in search of this invaluable treasure that big data 
might hold for the European economy.5 Some studies have estimated that it could create value in 
excess of hundreds of billions of euros for Europe if data can be used more effectively.6 
The European Union (EU) would like to promote measures to unlock TDM potentialities. The Proposal 
for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (DSM Draft Directive) aims to improve access 
to protected works across borders within the digital single market (DSM) to boost research and 
innovation.7 In particular, the proposal would like to introduce a new mandatory limitation for TDM.8 
In this chapter we assess this proposal against the international and European copyright framework 
and evaluate room for possible improvement. We conclude by inviting EU policymakers to significantly 
broaden the scope of the limitation in order not to prevent European DSM players from engaging 
safely in ground-breaking technological innovation, such as machine learning, neural networks, and 
artificial intelligence, through the exploitation of big data’s riches.
2. Is There Conflict between Intellectual Property Protection 
and Text and Data Mining?
TDM refers to a research technique to collect information from large amounts of digital data through 
automated software tools.9 It involves copying substantial quantities of materials to extract the data 
1  See Jeff Schultz, “How Much Data Is Created on the Internet Each Day?,” DZone, 16 October 2017, https://dzone.com/
articles/how-much-data-is-created-on-the-internet-each-day.
2  On this important topic, see Reto Hilty’s chapter in this publication.
3  See, for example, Yann Ménière and Ilja Rudyk’s chapter in this publication.
4  European Commission, The European Data Market Study: Final Report (Brussels: European Commission, 2017), 5.
5  Xindong Wu, Xingquan Zhu, Gong-Qing Wu, and Wei Ding, “Data Mining With Big Data,” IEEE Transactions on Knowledge 
and Data Engineering 26 (2014): 97.
6  James Manyika, Michael Chui, Brad Brown, Jacques Bughin, Richard Dobbs, Charles Roxburgh, and Angela Hung Byers, Big 
Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and Productivity (San Francisco, CA: McKinsey Global Institute, 2011).
7  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital 
Single Market, COM(2016)593 final, 2016/0280, 14 September 2016.
8  Ibid., Arts 3–6 and 7–9. For a detailed analysis, see Christophe Geiger, Giancarlo Frosio, and Oleksandr Bulayenko, “The 
Exception for Text and Data Mining (TDM) in the Proposed Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market: Legal 
Aspects,” Research Paper No. 2018-02 (Strasbourg: Center for International Intellectual Property Studies, 2018), http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2018/604941/IPOL_IDA(2018)604941_EN.pdf.
9  For a reference to possible multiple TDM and data analysis techniques, see, for example, Jiawei Han, Micheline Kamber, and 
Jian Pei, Data Mining: Concept and Techniques, 3rd edn (Waltham, MA: Morgan Kaufmann, 2011).
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and recombining them to identify patterns in the final output.10 Obviously, there might be conflict 
between intellectual property protection and TDM techniques.
One of the fundamental principles of copyright law is that data are as such not protected; copyright 
protects only the creative expression or form, rather than the information incorporated in the 
protected work.11 Thus, TDM should in principle not be covered by any exclusive intellectual property 
rights (IPR), both copyright and other sui generis rights. However, at some point, during the chain of 
activities enabling TDM research, technically some IPR-relevant actions might be necessary. Therefore, 
in the absence of a specific permission, TDM can lead to an infringement. In particular, TDM can involve 
some activities encroaching on the exclusive copyright and database rights provided by Directive 
2001/29/EC and Directive 1996/9/EC. In this respect, the TDM process might become relevant for 
intellectual property, depending on the use of the existing sources, technical tools, and the extent of 
the mining process.
TDM usually involves some copying, which even in the case of limited excerpts might infringe the right 
of reproduction.12 TDM activities can concern text or data, both of which can be covered by intellectual 
property protection, both copyright and database sui generis rights, or they can be outside the scope 
of protection (e.g. lacking originality or being in the public domain). Only TDM tools involving minimal 
copying of a few words or crawling through data and processing each item separately could be operated 
without running into a potential liability for copyright infringement. This follows from the fact that 
“[t]ext and data mining may also be carried out in relation to mere facts or data which are not protected 
by copyright and in such instances no authorisation would be required.”13 Works and other subject 
matter not protected by copyright or sui generis rights can be mined freely.14 
Instead, any reproductions resulting in the creation of a copy of a protected work along the chain of TDM 
activities might trigger copyright infringement. In this respect, pre-processing to standardize materials 
into machine-readable formats might trigger infringement of the right of reproduction.15  Likewise, the 
uploading of the pre-processed material on a platform—which might or might not occur, depending 
on whether the TDM technique makes use of TDM software crawling data to be analysed directly 
from the source16—might also violate the right of reproduction. Mining (the stage of the TDM process 
10  See, for example, Diane McDonald and Ursula Kelly, The Value and Benefit of Text Mining to UK Further and Higher Education: 
Digital Infrastructure (London: JISC, 2012), http://bit.ly/jisc-textm; and Jean-Paul Triaille, Jérôme de Meeûs d’Argenteuil, 
and Amélie de Francquen, Study of the Legal Framework of Text and Data Mining (TDM) (Brussels: European Commission, 
2014), 28.
11  For a fundamental reflection on this principle, see the seminal work by P.B. Hugenholtz, Auteursrecht op Informatie 
(Deventer: Kluwer, 1989).
12  See Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:465, §§ 54–55, finding that an excerpt as short as 11 words might be protected.
13  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital 
Single Market, COM(2016)593 final, 2016/0280, 14 September 2016, Recital 8.
14  With regard to mining public-sector information, the ongoing review of Directive 2013/37/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 June 2013 amending Directive 2003/98/EC on the reuse of public-sector information might clarify 
how to facilitate in practice TDM of public-sector records.
15  See Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain 
Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2000 OJ (L 167) 10–19, Art. 2.
16  Jean-Paul Triaille, Jérôme de Meeûs d’Argenteuil, and Amélie de Francquen, Study of the Legal Framework of Text and Data 
Mining (TDM) (Brussels: European Commission, 2014), 28.
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where data are finally extracted) can also infringe upon the right of reproduction, depending on the 
mining software deployed and the character of the extraction. For example, there are extraction 
techniques that would reproduce parts of the work so minimal as to fall below the threshold of 
copyright infringement.17 
Again, TDM might involve the reproduction, translation, adaptation, arrangement, and any other 
alteration of a database protected by copyright, which means the original selection and arrangement 
of the database’s content.18 For example, pre-processing for extraction might cleanse from a database 
portions and data that are irrelevant for data analysis. In this respect, pre-processing might violate 
both the right of reproduction and the right to make adaptations and arrangements.19 
Moreover, TDM might infringe sui generis database rights, in particular the extraction, and to a minor 
extent the reuse, of substantial parts of a database. In this context, even if extraction does occur 
without reproduction of the original materials, extraction itself would infringe upon the exclusive 
rights provided to the database owner.20 In this regard, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) has provided that the transfer of data from one medium to another and its integration into 
the new medium constitutes an act of extraction.21 
Finally, it is to be noted that the TDM output should not infringe any exclusive rights, as it merely 
reports on the results of the TDM quantitative analysis, typically not including parts or extracts 
of the mined materials. 22 It is worth highlighting, however, that contemporary research practices, 
striving for verifiability of research results, require the ability of researchers to store TDM source 
materials and to communicate them at least to their peers. From a legal perspective, this conduct 
could most likely trigger infringement of the right of communication to the public.
3. Can Existing Limitations be Applied to Text and Data Mining?
In EU law, exceptions and limitations are usually implemented by member states under a voluntary 
scheme, with very few exceptions provided as mandatory. The application of exceptions and 
limitations in EU law—and elsewhere—does occur according to the general principles set out in 
international law by the “three-step test.” According to this test, exceptions and limitations would 
be permitted (1) in certain special cases, (2) which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
17  Ibid., 31.
18  See Directive 1996/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of 
Databases, 1996 OJ (L 77) 20, Art. 5(a–b). See also Irini Stamatoudi, “Text and Data Mining,” in Irini Stamatoudi (ed.), New 
Developments in EU and International Copyright Law (Leiden: Kluwer Law International, 2016), 264–265.
19  See Directive 1996/9/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of 
Databases, 1996 OJ (L 77) 20, Art. 5(b). Actually, although Directive 2001/29/EC does not harmonise the right to make 
adaptations and arrangements, its application has been claimed in EU law as an expression of the more general right of 
reproduction; see Maria Lillà Montagnani and Giorgio Aime, “Il text and data mining e il diritto d’autore,” Annali Italiani di 
Diritto d’Autore 26 (2018), fn. 15.
20  See Directive 1996/9/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of 
Databases, 1996 OJ (L 77) 20, Art. 7.
21  Ibid., Arts 2(a), 7(1), and 7(2)(b). See also Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-203/02, British Horseracing Board 
Ltd and Others v. William Hill Organization Ltd, 2004.
22  See Irini Stamatoudi (ed.), New Developments in EU and International Copyright Law (Leiden: Kluwer Law International, 
2016), 262; and Maria Lillà Montagnani and Giorgio Aime, “Il text and data mining e il diritto d’autore,” Annali Italiani di 
Diritto d’Autore 26 (2018), fn. 20.
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work or other subject matter, and (3) which do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the rights-holder.23 The three-step test has been increasingly interpreted in an expansive manner, 
especially in order to accommodate public interest.24 A balanced approach to the implementation of 
the three-step test would especially support such application of exceptions and limitations to TDM 
to foster “public interest, notably in scientific progress ... and economic development.”25 
In Europe, several exceptions within the mandatory and voluntary list provided by Directive 
2001/29/EC have been selected as possible candidates to screen TDM from intellectual property 
infringement. Elsewhere, such as in the United States and Canada, opening clauses or fair use models 
have been deployed to the same effect.26 Under current EU copyright law, TDM might be covered by 
exceptions and limitations available, but their application is uncertain.
3.1 Temporary Acts of Reproduction
The mandatory exception for temporary acts of reproduction might apply to limited TDM 
techniques.27 Recital 10 of the DSM Draft Directive clarifies that this exception still applies, but 
its application would be limited to TDM techniques that involve only the making of temporary 
reproductions transient or incidental28 to an integral and essential part of a technological process 
that enables a lawful use with no independent economic significance.29 
Doubts have been repeatedly cast on whether all these requirements are fulfilled by reproductions 
done for TDM purposes, especially where these reproductions are transient and have no independent 
economic relevance.30 Application of temporary reproduction exception remains limited to residual 
cases for the large number of specific requirements that must be fulfilled, apparently in a cumulative 
23   See Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain 
Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2000 OJ (L 167) 10–19, Art. 5(5).
24   See Bernt Hugenholtz and Ruth Okediji, Conceiving an International Instrument on Limitations and Exceptions to Copyright, 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-43 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam Law School, 2012), 3; Christophe Geiger, Jonathan 
Griffiths, and Reto Hilty, “Towards a Balanced Interpretation of the ‘Three-Step Test’ in Copyright Law,” European 
Intellectual Property Review 4 (2008): 489–496; Christophe Geiger, “Implementing an International Instrument for 
Interpreting Copyright Limitations and Exceptions,” International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 40.6 
(2009): 627–642; and Christophe Geiger, Daniel Gervais, and Martin Senftleben, “The Three Step Test Revisited: How to 
Use the Test’s Flexibility in National Copyright Law,” American University International Law Review 29.3 (2014): 581.
25  See, most recently, Joao Pedro Quintais, “Rethinking Normal Exploitation: Enabling Online Limitations in EU Copyright 
Law,” AMI 6 (2017): 197–205.
26  See, for example, Giancarlo Frosio, COMMUNIA Final Report on the Digital Public Domain (Brussels: European Commission, 
COMMUNIA Network, and NEXA Center, 2011), 65–68; Authors Guild v. Google, 804 F.3d 202 (2nd Circ. 2015); Authors 
Guild v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2nd Cir. 2014); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1880); and Michael Geist, “Fairness 
Found: How Canada Quietly Shifted from Fair Dealing to Fair Use,” in Michael Geist (ed.), The Copyright Pentalogy (Ottawa: 
University of Ottawa Press, 2013), 157–186.
27  See Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain 
Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2000 OJ (L 167) 10–19, Art. 5(1). See also Carine 
Bernault, “Les nouvelles exceptions au droit d’auteur,” Juris art etc. 47 (2017): 22.
28  See Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-360-13 Public Relations Consultants Association, 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1195, 
§§ 43 and 50.
29  See European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market, COM(2016)593 final, 2016/0280, 14 September 2016, Recital 10.
30  See Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-5/08, Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:465, § 64. See also Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-360/13, Public Relations Consultants 
Association, 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1195, §§ 40 and 48.
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manner according to the CJEU.31 Also, the CJEU has reaffirmed that, being an exception, Article 5(1) 
of Directive 2001/29/EC must be interpreted restrictively.32 
3.2 Research Exception
In some member states, depending on whether or not it is implemented, the research exception 
may cover some TDM-relevant acts infringing upon intellectual property rights.33 However, the 
use of this exception is marred by legal uncertainty regarding its scope and application to TDM in 
different member states.34 In any case, the existing EU law limits the national research exceptions 
to non-commercial purposes and to the “sole purpose of illustration for teaching or scientific 
research.”35 All TDM projects that do not qualify as scientific research and have a commercial 
purpose, both direct or indirect economic or commercial advance,36 will be excluded from the 
outset from the application of the exception.
As per the copyright in a database, the same research exemption would also be available.37 
This scenario would refer to the case where a TDM process reproduces the whole or substantial 
parts of a database, thus possibly infringing copyright in its original arrangement. All limitations 
mentioned regarding the research exception in Directive 2001/29/EC would apply to this case, 
as well as the possibility of claiming an exemption from the obligation of citing the source.38 A 
research exception is also provided for the sui generis database right.39 This exception would apply 
to a lawful user of a database for extracting or reusing a substantial part of the database’s contents 
for non-commercial scientific research purposes, as long as the source is indicated.40 However, this 
exception has seen multiple and diverging national implementations that might have provided for 
additional requirements.
31  See Court of Justice of the European Union, C-302/10 Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2012, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:16, § 26.
32  Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-5/08, Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:465, § 56.
33  See Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain 
Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2000 OJ (L 167) 10–19, Art. 5(3)(a). See also Carine 
Bernault, “Les nouvelles exceptions au droit d’auteur,” Juris art etc. 47 (2017): 22.
34  Irini Stamatoudi (ed.), New Developments in EU and International Copyright Law (Leiden: Kluwer Law International, 2016), 
272–273.
35  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain 
Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2000 OJ (L 167) 10–19, Art. 5(3)(a).
36  Irini Stamatoudi (ed.), New Developments in EU and International Copyright Law (Leiden: Kluwer Law International, 2016), 
273.
37  Directive 1996/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 
1996 OJ (L 77) 20, Art. 6(2)(b).
38  Irini Stamatoudi (ed.), New Developments in EU and International Copyright Law (Leiden: Kluwer Law International, 2016), 
275.
39  Directive 1996/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 
1996 OJ (L 77) 20, Art. 9(b).
40 Ibid.
 102 Intellectual Property and Digital Trade in the Age of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data
3.3 Private Use Exception
Article 5(2)b of Directive 2001/29/EC could also be claimed as an exception applying to reproductions 
done for TDM purposes.41 The private copy exception might potentially cover some uses by individual 
researchers,42 in particular in member states that do not have a research exemption, thus allowing 
reproductions done for research purposes. However, the wording of the exception poses multiple 
challenges to its application to TDM. First, no direct or indirect commercial uses will be covered, 
leaving out most TDM research, which even if done by research organisations can have at least an 
indirect commercial end. Second, researchers might have to face the argument that the use for 
TDM might not be private if the use is not strictly for their own purpose—for example, if the results 
are used by a collective group of researchers or by their institution. Again, the application of this 
exception implies fair remuneration to be given. This remuneration must be calculated on the basis 
of the criterion of the harm caused to rights-holders,43 which would need to be demonstrated in the 
context of TDM. Finally, the exception is implemented voluntarily by member states, thus exposing 
researchers to inconsistent national implementation, limited legal certainty, and high transaction 
costs.
3.4 Normal Use of a Database
A potential candidate for serving as a limitation for TDM is the so-called “normal use of a database.”44 
This provides that a lawful user can perform any reproductions of the database without additional 
authorization from the rights-holder, if those reproductions are necessary for accessing the contents 
of a database and making normal use of them.45 Application of this limitation to TDM would be 
possible only as long as the mining constitutes normal use of the database. In the absence of a super-
national uniform interpretation, the notion of “normal use” might receive multiple interpretations 
according to the member states in which it is applied, therefore limiting researchers’ legal certainty.
3.5 Extraction of Insubstantial Parts of a Database
The right of the lawful user to extract or reuse without the authorization of the rights-holder 
insubstantial parts from a database protected by sui generis right might also narrowly apply to 
TDM.46 According to this provision, extraction or reuse might be done for any purpose whatsoever.47 
The notion of insubstantiality of a part must be evaluated through quantitative and qualitative 
criteria.48 The CJEU has clarified that this assessment must consider the investment in the creation of 
41  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain 
Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2000 OJ (L 167) 10–19, Art. 5(2)b.
42  Christophe Caron, “République numérique rime avec exceptions et limitations au droit d’auteur,” Communication 
Commerce Électronique 11.89 (2016): 30.
43  Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-467/08 Padawan v. SGAE, 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2010:620.
44 Reto M. Hilty and Heiko Richter, “Text and Data Mining,” in Reto M. Hilty and Valentina Moscon (eds), Modernisation of the 
EU Copyright Rules (Munich: Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, 2017), 28–30.
45  Directive 1996/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 
1996 OJ (L 77) 20, Art. 6(1).
46  Ibid., Art. 8(1).
47  Ibid.
48 Ibid.
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the database and the prejudice that the extraction or reuse causes to that investment.49 Put simply, 
harming the investment implies the infringement of the sui generis database right.50 Apparently, if 
TDM does not harm that investment, and as such it should not, then Article 8(1) of Directive 1996/9/
EC might serve to avoid liability for extractions from a database for TDM purposes. The repeated and 
systematic extraction of insubstantial parts would still be lawful as long as it does not reconstitute 
the whole or substantial parts of the database, therefore damaging the investment of the rights-
holder.51 Again, however, the reach of this provision will be limited as it applies only to lawful users, 
running TDM on databases, using specific TDM techniques crawling the database rather than making 
a copy of it, and can be contractually overridden.52 
In sum, existing exceptions and limitations might not offer a stable legal framework to engage in TDM 
research projects safely and invest considerable resources. In addition, the voluntary implementation 
of most of these exceptions makes it even less predictable whether existing exceptions and limitations 
can be applied to TDM projects, especially those of a cross-border nature.
4. Text and Data Mining in the DSM Draft Directive Proposal: Is 
It Enough?
TDM limitations have long been under consideration in Europe.53 In May 2015, the European 
Commission issued its Digital Single Market Strategy, in which it plans to provide “greater legal 
certainty for the cross-border use of content for specific purposes (e.g. research, education, text 
and data mining, etc.) through harmonised exceptions.”54 Following up on this plan, the DSM Draft 
Directive provides a TDM mandatory exception to the right of reproduction of copyright-protected 
subject matters and the sui generis database extraction right.55 In addition, the TDM exception 
would apply to the new right over digital uses of press publication that the DSM Draft Directive has 
proposed.56 
49  Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-203/02, British Horseracing Board Ltd and Others v. William Hill Organization 
Ltd, 2004, § 73.
50  See Irini Stamatoudi (ed.), New Developments in EU and International Copyright Law (Leiden: Kluwer Law International, 
2016), 279; and Estelle Derclaye, “The Database Directive,” in Irini Stamatoudi and Paul Torremans (eds), EU Copyright Law 
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2014), 111.
51  See CJEU, Case C-203/02, British Horseracing Board Ltd and Others v. William Hill Organization Ltd, 2004, § 73.
52  Cf. Irini Stamatoudi (ed.), New Developments in EU and International Copyright Law (Leiden: Kluwer Law International, 
2016), 280.
53  See, for example, Thomas Margoni and Giulia Dore, “Why We Need a Text and Data Mining Exception (But It Is Not 
Enough),” 2016, https://zenodo.org/record/248048#.WXdf2oiGNEY; and Christian Handke, Lucie Guibault, and Joan-
Josep Vallbé, “Is Europe Falling Behind in Data Mining? Copyright’s Impact on Data Mining in Academic Research,” in 
Brigit Schmidt and Milena Dobreva (eds), New Avenues for Electronic Publishing in the Age of Infinite Collections and Citizen 
Science: Scale, Openness and Trust (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2015), 120–130.
54  European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, COM(2015)192 final, 6 May 
2015, § 2.4.
55  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital 
Single Market, COM(2016)593 final, 2016/0280, 14 September 2016, Art. 3(1).
56  Ibid., Art. 11(1).
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Several limitations would apply to the TDM exception. First, beneficiaries of TDM exceptions are 
limited to research organisations, meaning “any organisation the primary goal of which is to conduct 
scientific research or to conduct scientific research and provide educational services.”57 Second, the 
exception allows only purpose-specific lawful access for TDM, namely “for the purpose of scientific 
research.”58 Third, the exception applies only to works or other subject matter to which research 
organisations “have lawful access.” A further limitation is provided by Article 3(3) and Recital 12 
allowing rights-holders to introduce measures to protect the “security and integrity” of their 
networks and databases where works are hosted; however, such measures shall not go beyond what 
is necessary to achieve that objective.59 
Within these important limitations, the TDM exception endorses a broad scope that includes both 
commercial and non-commercial uses, given that no exclusion of commercial uses is provided in the 
proposal.60 In addition—and very importantly—the exception cannot be overridden by contract.61 
Also, according to Article 6 of the DSM Draft Directive, the three-step test would apply to the new 
TDM exceptions. Finally, anti-circumvention provisions of technological protection measures would 
also apply to all new exceptions.62 
4.1 Reform Assessment: What Are the Benefits?
The introduction of Article 3 of the DSM Draft Directive meets important policy goals. In particular, 
it is set to provide a normalised level playing field for researchers across Europe to legally carry 
out TDM projects. The major positive impacts of the proposal lie in its focus on harmonisation of 
member states’ laws, through a mandatory solution. In particular, the inconsistency of existing TDM 
exceptions so far adopted by member states illustrates how fragmented the legal landscape will 
rapidly become if no EU-wide action is undertaken.63 
In addition, voluntary implementation of exceptions and limitations at the national level can be 
rated highly among the critical issues for researchers in performing TDM research in Europe. Indeed, 
the voluntary nature of the exceptions that might apply to TDM further affects cross-border 
collaborations, as researchers would be unaware—or face high transaction costs for clearance—of 
whether TDM would be lawful across all EU jurisdictions involved in the research collaboration and 
according to which standards. A recent CEIPI study listed exceptions and limitations to copyright as 
57  Ibid., Art. 2(1).
58  Ibid., Art. 3(1).
59  Ibid., Art. 3(3).
60  See also European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in 
the Digital Single Market, COM(2016)593 final, 2016/0280, 14 September 2016, 8, noting that “Option 3 allowed uses 
for commercial scientific research purpose but limited the benefit of the exception to some beneficiaries. Option 4 went 
further as it did not restrict beneficiaries. Option 3 was deemed to be the most proportionate one.”
61  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital 
Single Market, COM(2016)593 final, 2016/0280, 14 September 2016, Art. 3(2).
62  Ibid., Art. 6.
63  See, for example, Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, § 29A (United Kingdom); Art. 38 of the Law No. 2016-1231 
for a Digital Republic added paragraph 10 to Art. L122-5 and paragraph 5 to Art. L342-3 of the Intellectual Property Code 
(Code de la propriété intellectuelle) (France); Estonian Copyright Act, Art. 19(3); and German Copyright Act, Art. 60d. See 
also Copyright Act, Sec. 5, Art. 47-7 (Japan).
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one of the areas of major divergence in national copyright law.64 From this follows “the importance 
of declaring that limitations and exceptions justified by the public interest be mandatory.”65 This 
conclusion applies here with specific emphasis to the TDM exception, but the mandatory nature 
should be extended to all limitations and exceptions of the EU acquis in order to achieve true 
harmonisation.66 A unified and mandatory approach is especially crucial in the “digital environment 
as the internet involves uses that, most of the time, affect several copyright legislations, leading to 
major insecurity regarding what is allowed.”67 In this respect, a TDM exception should serve to bridge 
the gap with other jurisdictions, such as the United States, where apparently TDM would be beyond 
the reach of copyright-holders’ exclusive rights.68 
Again, harmonisation will be supported by an expansive scope of the limitation, covering both 
commercial and non-commercial uses, and the unenforceability of contrary contractual provisions.69 
This inclusion would be critical in order not to devoid the exception of any practical utility. As 
mentioned, publishers can contractually rule out mining in their licences, and transaction costs 
to obtain permission to mine content from multiple publishers might de facto make TDM projects 
unsustainable. Certainly, the proposal deserves praise for protecting TDM research from contractual 
enclosure.
4.2 Reform Assessment: What are the Shortcomings?
There still remain negative impacts of the proposal as currently drafted that need to be assessed. 
They range from the scope of the exception that is constrained by multiple limitations to the 
coexistence of the exception with technological protection measures.
4.2.1 Limited Scope: Research Organizations
Much discussion regarding this proposal concerns whether the TDM exception’s beneficiaries should 
not be limited to “research organisations.” To qualify for the exception, research organisations 
must operate on a not-for-profit basis or by reinvesting all the profits in their scientific research, 
64  Christophe Geiger and Franciska Schönherr, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) of Consumers in Relation to Copyright, 
Summary Report (Alicante: European Union Intellectual Property Office, 2017), 6–8, https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/
web/observatory/observatory-publications.
65  Stéphanie Carre, Christophe Geiger, Jean Lapousterle, Franck Macrez, Adrien Bouvel, Théo Hassler, et al., Response of the 
CEIPI to the Public Consultation of the European Commission on the Review of the European Union Copyright Rules, CEIPI 
Research Paper No. 2014-01 (Strasbourg: Center for International Intellectual Property Studies, 2014), 6, ssrn.com/
abstract=2971029.
66  Cf. Christophe Geiger and Franciska Schönherr, “Limitations to Copyright in the Digital Age,” in Andrej Savin and Jan 
Trzaskowski (eds), Research Handbook on EU Internet Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2014), 127.
67  Christophe Geiger, Oleksandr Bulayenko, Théo Hassler, Elena Izyumenko, Franciska Schönherr, and Xavier Seuba, Reaction 
of CEIPI to the Resolution on the Implementation of Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonisation of Copyright in the Information 
Society Adopted by the European Parliament on the 9th July 2015, CEIPI Research Paper No. 2015-01 (Strasbourg: Center for 
International Intellectual Property Studies, 2015), 17, ssrn.com/papers=2970507.
68  Ibid., 24. See also European Commission, Standardisation in the Area of Innovation and Technological Development, Notably 
in the Field of Text and Data Mining: Report from the Expert Group (Brussels: European Commission, 2014), 3, 7, 12–13, 43, 
and 65.
69  Provisions protecting some exceptions from contractual override are already present in Directive 1996/9/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 OJ (L 77) 20, Arts 
6(1) and 15; and in the Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the Legal 
Protection of Computer Programs, 2009 OJ (L 111) 16–22, Arts 5(2) and 8.
 106 Intellectual Property and Digital Trade in the Age of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data
or pursuant to a public interest mission.70 According to Recital 11, a public interest mission might 
be “reflected through public funding or through provisions in national laws or public contracts.”71 
The DSM Draft Directive further limits the scope of the exception that does not apply to research 
institutions controlled by commercial undertakings.72 
From a broader and more fundamental perspective, limiting beneficiaries would undermine 
a widespread assumption that the “right to read should be the right to mine.”73 From a practical 
market-based perspective, this policy choice might cripple opportunities for start-ups and individual 
researchers in this area.74 Indeed, the policy choice of excluding from the reach of the exception 
unaffiliated individuals and researchers—operating under the same terms as those organised in a 
qualifying research organisation—might fall short in terms of adequacy and proportionality. Actually, 
the existing United Kingdom exception for text and data analysis includes also individual researchers 
as beneficiaries and any person with lawful access to a work.75 
Also, it is worth noting that the narrow application of the limitation to research organisation does 
not fully provide the European DSM with the legal framework to fill the gap with other jurisdictions 
adopting opening clauses or fair use models to allow a broader number of research players to perform 
TDM research and promote related innovation. Given the global nature of the modern economy, 
the impact assessment should have examined the impact of the proposed exception on the EU’s 
competitive advantage against other top innovative economies enabling all undertakings to carry 
out TDM under fair use/fair dealing models (e.g. United States, Canada, Israel).76 
4.2.2 Limited Scope: Scientific Research Purposes
Limiting the TDM exception to “scientific research” only might curtail the efficacy of the reform and 
create practical complications. The impact assessment does not provide any rationale for making 
lawful access purpose-specific. This approach disregards a large number of possible applications of 
70  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital 
Single Market, COM(2016)593 final, 2016/0280, 14 September 2016, Art. 2(1)(a–b).
71  Ibid., Recital 11.
72  Ibid., Art. 2(1).
73  Peter Murray-Rust, Jennifer Molloy, and Diane Cabell, “Open Content Mining,” in Samuel A. Moore (ed.), Issues in Open 
Research Data (London: Ubiquity Press, 2014), 28.
74  See, for example, the Conference of European Schools for Advanced Engineering Education and Research, the European 
University Association, the League of European Research Universities, and the Association of European Research Libraries, 
“Future-proofing European Research Excellence: A Statement from European Research Organisations on Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market,” 10 January 2017, 1–2, https://www.leru.org/publications/future-proofing-european-research-
excellence. For a criticism, see Benjamin Raue, “Free Flow of Data? The Friction Between the Commission’s European 
Data Economy Initiative and the Proposed Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market,” International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law 379 (2018): 382; and Thomas Margoni and Martin Kretschmer, The Text and Data 
Mining Exception in the Proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market: Why It Is not What EU Copyright 
Law Needs, 25 April 2018, https://www.create.ac.uk/blog/2018/04/25/why-tdm-exception-copyright-directive-digital-
single-market-not-what-eu-copyright-needs stating that “a commercial enterprise will not be able to benefit from the 
exception. Nor a University acting for any other purpose than research (e.g. commercial). Other purposes commonly 
accepted as fundamental in democratic societies are also excluded, such as journalism, criticisms or review.”
75  See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, § 29A (United Kingdom).
76  See Christophe Geiger, Oleksandr Bulayenko, Théo Hassler, Elena Izyumenko, Franciska Schönherr, and Xavier Seuba, 
Reaction of CEIPI to the Resolution on the Implementation of Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonisation of Copyright in the 
Information Society Adopted by the European Parliament on the 9th July 2015, CEIPI Research Paper No. 2015-01 (Strasbourg: 
Center for International Intellectual Property Studies, 2015), 24, ssrn.com/papers=2970507.
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TDM that might now be construed—being excluded from the reach of the exception—as within the 
exclusive rights of the copyright-holders.
Moreover, this purpose-specific approach might raise subtle issues of applicability of the new 
limitation within research organisations enjoying lawful access to a database. For example, if a public 
university has lawful access to a database under a “for educational purpose” licence, would it need 
to pay an additional licensing fee for a “scientific research” purpose? If this is the case, then would 
this obligation contradict the prohibition of contractually overriding the TDM exception?77 Given the 
scope of the new limitation—and the “no-contractual-override” provision—the answer is probably 
not. Still, research institutions might find these possible legal uncertainties a limitation to the 
deployment of TDM research due to the potential liability that might arise and related transaction 
costs that should be considered before running TDM research projects. Since the exception is already 
limited to research organisations, dropping restrictions to purpose-specific uses of lawfully accessed 
databases might avoid unwanted results.
4.2.3 Limited Scope: Lawful Access
Applying the exception only to works to which the research organisations have “lawful access” would 
de facto subject TDM research to private ordering.78 According to the European Copyright Society, 
“the exception can effectively be denied to certain users by a rights-holder who refuses to grant 
‘lawful access’ to works or who grants such access on a conditional basis only.”79 
In addition, subjecting TDM to lawful access will make TDM research projects harder to run by raising 
related costs. Possibly, publishers might price TDM into their subscription fees if only those with 
lawful access can perform TDM research. Subjecting TDM research to market access discriminates 
research according to research organisations’ market power. Only a few research organisations will 
be able to acquire licences for all databases that are relevant for a TDM research project.80 This will 
make comprehensive TDM projects impossible to perform for the majority of research organisations, 
especially those from the member states with more limited access to funding. In turn, this will widen 
the gap between richer and poorer research institutions and, most likely, increase the scientific and 
innovation divide between developed and less developed European countries.
4.2.4 Coexistence with Technological Protection Measures
The introduction of measures to protect the security and integrity of networks and databases might 
allow rights-holders to block access for researchers trying to conduct TDM.81 However, Recital 12 
spells out clearly that “those measures should not exceed what is necessary to pursue the objective of 
77  See European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market, COM(2016)593 final, 2016/0280, 14 September 2016, Art. 3(2).
78  But see European Commission, Standardisation in the Area of Innovation and Technological Development, Notably in the Field 
of Text and Data Mining: Report from the Expert Group (Brussels: European Commission, 2014), 55 and 58, justifying the 
“lawful access” requirement as shielding private actors from an obligation to open up their data to third parties.
79  European Copyright Society, General Opinion on the EU Copyright Reform Package (European Copyright Society, 2017), 4.
80 Ibid.
81  See the Conference of European Schools for Advanced Engineering Education and Research, the European University 
Association, the League of European Research Universities, and the Association of European Research Libraries, “Future-
proofing European Research Excellence: A Statement from European Research Organisations on Copyright in the Digital 
Single Market,” 10 January 2017, 2, https://www.leru.org/publications/future-proofing-european-research-excellence.
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ensuring the security and integrity of the system and should not undermine the effective application 
of the exception.”82 For the avoidance of doubt, the same wording should be included in Article 3(3) 
also, rather than referring only to a limitation to measures exceeding their objective.
It is worth noting that the application of anti-circumvention provisions might trample over users’ 
privileged uses. The effects of technological protection measures on exceptions and limitations 
have been highlighted by abundant literature.83 Technological protection measures might limit or 
prevent access to works altogether for purposes that are not restricted by authors’ rights or for uses 
that are actually privileged. Rights-holders’ obligations to make available the means to benefit from 
exception and limitations do not themselves limit liability for circumvention.84 Also, inconsistent 
implementations across national jurisdictions of measures to guarantee the application of exceptions 
and limitations against technological protection measures’ anti-circumvention provisions might 
effectively curtail harmonised enjoyment of the new mandatory exceptions, thus limiting DSM 
effectiveness.
4.3 Reform Assessment: Is There Room for Improvement?
Specific ameliorations of the TDM limitations currently drafted should be considered carefully.
First, some definitional clarifications would be needed: (1) for the avoidance of doubt, Recital 8 
of the Draft Directive should mention that also works and other subject matter not protected by 
copyright or neighbouring rights can be freely mined. (2) The proposed reform does not define the 
notion of “lawful access.”85 However, the existing exception Article 5(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC that 
might cover some TDM techniques involving temporary reproduction refers to “lawful use,” which 
has been defined by the Directive and unambiguously interpreted by the CJEU.86 If “lawful access” 
is intended to mean what “lawful use” means, then the reform should maintain the term already 
adopted in EU law in a provision already covering some TDM techniques. (3) The notion of “normal 
use” of a database might receive multiple interpretations according to the member states in which 
it is applied. Therefore, harmonisation should be pursued by including TDM in the EU law notion of 
“normal use.”
82  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital 
Single Market, COM(2016)593 final, 2016/0280, 14 September 2016, Recital 12.
83  See, for example, Giancarlo Frosio, COMMUNIA Final Report on the Digital Public Domain (Brussels: European Commission, 
COMMUNIA Network, and NEXA Center, 2011), 99–103 and 135–141.
84 See Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain 
Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2000 OJ (L 167) 10–19, Art. 6(4).
85  See European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market, COM(2016)593 final, 2016/0280, 14 September 2016, Recital 9 and Art. 3(1).
86  See Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain 
Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2000 OJ (L 167) 10–19, Recital 33 (noting that “[a] 
use should be considered lawful where it is authorised by the rightholder or not restricted by law”). See also Court of 
Justice of the European Union, Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, Football Association Premier League and Others, 2011, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:631, § 168; and Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-302/10, Order, Infopaq International, 2012, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:16, § 42.
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Second, the scope of the exception should be expanded:87 (1) the TDM exception should not be 
limited to research organisations but should be extended to all those enjoying lawful access to 
underlying mined materials—as the right to read should be the right to mine—especially in order 
not to cripple research from start-ups and independent researchers. (2) In any event, the possibility 
of extending the exception to some other defined categories of beneficiaries, such as journalists, 
should at least be assessed. (3) In case of TDM for commercial uses carried out by some entities 
(e.g. other than research organisations or individual researchers, public authorities, and journalists), 
fair remuneration could be considered, provided that harm can be demonstrated on the basis of 
relevant empirical data. (4) Since the exception is already limited to research organisations, dropping 
restrictions to purpose-specific uses of lawfully accessed databases might avoid unwanted results. 
(5) In light of the increasing research focus on quality and verifiability, a TDM exception should 
enable storing and communication of research files created for TDM.
Third, as technological enclosure might cripple TDM research, the proposal should make clear 
that the exception would also be protected from override by technological protection measures. 
In this regard, the same wording included in Recital 12 of the DSM Draft Directive should also be 
included in Article 3(3) by stating plainly that security and integrity measures should not “undermine 
the effective application of the exception,” rather than referring only to a limitation to measures 
exceeding their objective. In addition, a provision limiting contractual and technological override 
should be extended to any exceptions potentially covering TDM, including for example the TDM 
techniques covered by Article 5(1), Directive 2001/29/EC. Finally, protection against contractual and 
technological override should also always be extended to TDM of materials not protected by IPRs, 
including those made available in a database.
5. Conclusions
While artificial intelligence might be set to become the most disruptive technology in the years 
to come, it does bring about a set of thorny legal challenges. In particular, neural network and 
machine learning technologies have been growing at an unimaginable pace thanks to the availability 
of big data streams in the internet and other digital networks. These artificial intelligence learning 
processes must use inputs possibly protected by IPRs to create wholly transformative outputs. TDM 
has been a fundamental technique to make machine learning possible by copying or crawling massive 
datasets and empowering artificial intelligence autonomous decision-making and creativity.
87  Several scholars have argued for such an expansion of the scope of the limitation. See, for example, with further references, 
Nicolas Jondet, “L’exception pour le data mining dans le projet de directive sur le droit d’auteur: pourquoi l’Union 
européenne doit aller plus loin que les législations des Etats membres,” Propriétés intellectuelles 67 (2018), in particular pp. 
33–34. Interestingly, in the latest proposal by the Presidency of the Council of the EU, 17 May 2018, Interinstitutional File 
2016/0280 (COD), an optional limitation, additional to the one on TDM by research organizations, has been introduced 
with the following drafting: “Article 3a, Optional exception or limitation for text and data mining ... 1. Without prejudice to 
Article 3 of this Directive Member States may provide for an exception or a limitation to the rights provided for in Article 
2 of Directive 2001/29/EC, Articles 5(a) and 7(1) of Directive 96/9/EC and Article 11(1) of this Directive for temporary 
reproductions and extractions of lawfully accessible works and other subject-matter that form a part of the process of 
text and data mining. 2. The exception or limitation provided for in paragraph 1 shall apply provided that the use of works 
and other subject matter referred to therein has not been expressly reserved by their rightholders including by technical 
means.” If this is a positive move, then the optional character of the limitation will create disparities in the digital single 
market with regard to TDM activities. Moreover, it conditions the effectivity of the exception to the goodwill of rights-
holders, thus weakening its potential applications.
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The EU has been struggling for some time over whether TDM techniques should be considered 
within the reach of copyright and other sui generis rights or whether they should be exempted from 
that reach. In order to bring clarity in a confused panorama of possible applicable exceptions and 
limitations to TDM activities, the DSM Directive Proposal would like to introduce a specific exception. 
The new exception will facilitate research and innovation in the DSM by bringing about long-sought 
harmonisation. Its narrow scope, however, will limit these substantive positive externalities to a 
comparatively small number of research institutions, while the DSM at large will still lag behind 
other jurisdictions, allowing a larger cluster of market players to engage legally in TDM activities. 
This might result in a critical weakness for the DSM while racing to reach a dominant position in the 
market for artificial intelligence technology. Being unable to make full use of the immense riches 
made available by big data streams in digital networks for artificial intelligence, machine learning, 
and neural network applications will put Europe in a disadvantaged position from which it might be 
hard to recover in the future.
To the end of exploring all solutions that could boost EU technological innovation and competitiveness 
against other jurisdictions, this reform should be an opportunity to reflect on the future design of 
an “opening clause” to be added to the list of exempted uses. The introduction of an open norm—or 
general exception—similar to US fair use has long been considered in EU legal scholarship and policy 
debate.88 An “opening clause” should address uses that are not yet covered by existing exceptions 
and limitations but are justified by important public interest rationales and fundamental rights, such 
as freedom of expression and the right to information. In this regard, CEIPI, for example, has already 
endorsed a policy option that would guarantee legal certainty through a list of further harmonised 
or unified exceptions and limitations, but combining it with a certain dose of flexibility, in order to 
ensure the EU legal framework’s capacity to adapt to a rapidly changing environment. This limited 
“opening” of the list of exceptions and limitations could possibly be based on the three-step test.89 
Among endless applications, an opening clause would make TDM research possible according to the 
three-step test and the impact of the use on the legitimate interest of the users, being limited by any 
prejudice on the potential market of the rights-holder, if any exists. In light of a balanced approach to 
the three-step test, an opening clause might allow rights-holders fair compensation if any prejudice 
88 See European Commission, Standardisation in the Area of Innovation and Technological Development, Notably in the Field 
of Text and Data Mining: Report from the Expert Group (Brussels: European Commission, 2014), 57; Martin Senftleben, 
“The Perfect Match: Civil Law Judges and Open-Ended Fair Use Provisions,” American University International Law Review, 
33 (2017): 231–286; P. Bernt Hugenholtz, “Flexible Copyright: Can EU Authors’ Rights Accommodate Fair Use?” in Irini 
Stamatoudi (ed.), New Developments in EU and International Copyright Law (Leiden: Kluwer Law International, 2016), 
417–433; Martin Senftleben, “Comparative Approaches to Fair Use: An Important Impulse for Reforms in EU Copyright 
Law,” in Graeme Dinwoodie (ed.), Methods and Perspectives in Intellectual Property (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2014); 
Antony Dnes, “Should the UK Move to a Fair-Use Copyright Exception,” International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law 44.4 (2013): 418–444; Rob Van der Noll, Stef van Gompel, Lucie Guibault, Jarst Weda, Joost Poort, 
Ilan Akker, and Kelly Breemen, Flexible Copyright: The Law and Economics of Introducing an Open Norm in the Netherlands 
(Amsterdam: SEO Amsterdam Economics, 2012); and Christophe Geiger, “Flexibilising Copyright: Remedies to the 
Privatisation of Information by Copyright Law,” International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 39.2 
(2008): 178–197.
89  See Christophe Geiger, Oleksandr Bulayenko, Théo Hassler, Elena Izyumenko, Franciska Schönherr, and Xavier Seuba, 
Reaction of CEIPI to the Resolution on the Implementation of Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonisation of Copyright in the 
Information Society Adopted by the European Parliament on the 9th July 2015, CEIPI Research Paper No. 2015-01 (Strasbourg: 
Center for International Intellectual Property Studies, 2015), 20–21, ssrn.com/papers=2970507; and Christophe Geiger, 
“Copyright as an Access Right, Securing Cultural Participation through the Protection of Creators’ Interests,” in Rebecca 
Giblin and Kimberlee G. Weatherall (eds), What if We Could Reimagine Copyright? (Acton: Australian National University 
Press, 2016), 73.
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to rights-holders’ interest or conflict with the normal exploitation of the work might occur. In this 
regard, TDM research and innovation would profit substantially from such an opening clause. It would, 
on the one hand, close loopholes for TDM activities that do not affect rights-holders’ investments or 
market returns. On the other hand, it would provide European researchers and businesses with a level 
playing field to compete with researchers and businesses from other jurisdictions.

Inventive Machines: Rethinking 
Invention and Patentability
Ryan Abbott
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Computers are doing more than ever before.1 They are doing it cheaper, faster, and often better 
than their human counterparts, and on an unprecedented scale. Take, for example, Amazon’s Kiva 
robots, which help retrieve and package items. Amazon now has 45,000 of these robots working 
together with 230,000 human employees. I suspect it will not be long until there are 230,000 next-
generation Kiva robots working together with 45,000 human employees. Or, perhaps, 5,000 next-
generation robots and no human employees.
Robots are doing more than manual labour—they are working as doctors, lawyers, and scientists. 
They are also getting pretty good at playing games. IBM’s supercomputer Deep Blue beat world 
chess champion Garry Kasparov in 1997, IBM’s next-generation supercomputer Watson won a 
game of Jeopardy! in 2011, and last year Google’s supercomputer DeepMind’s AlphaGo program 
beat a master Go player, Lee Se-dol. Of course, playing games is just a way for these computers to 
demonstrate their capabilities. Watson, for instance, is now developing cancer treatment protocols 
for patients at Memorial Sloan Kettering Center. IBM also has Watson developing new food recipes 
and doing some tremendous things involving a food truck.
You can now go to IBM’s website and work with Chef Watson to create new recipes. Watson is less 
restricted by preconceptions about combining foods and flavours than human chefs. That allows 
Watson to generate recipes that people have not really thought about before. Put another way, 
Watson is coming up with new, inventive, and industrially applicable compositions. For those of us in 
patent law, that raises the question of whether Watson’s ideas are patentable, and if so, who would 
qualify as an inventor for such patents?
It has been at least 20 years since the first autonomous machine invention was patented. The first 
such invention I am aware of was created by the “Creativity Machine,” which used a neural network 
architecture. It essentially consisted of a series of networked on-and-off switches connected in a 
neural network, which generated new output when perturbed. The first network was connected to a 
second network, which evaluated the output for usefulness. The Creativity Machine was given a goal 
1  This article, and the associated presentation, is based on the author’s research on computer generated works. See, for 
example, Ryan Abbott, “Hal the Inventor: Big Data and Its Use by Artificial Intelligence,” in Cassidy R. Sugimoto, et al. 
(eds), Big Data Is Not a Monolith (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2016); Ryan Abbott, “I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative 
Computers and the Future of Patent Law,” Boston College Law Review 57.4 (2016); Ryan Abbott, “Artificial Intelligence, 
Big Data and Intellectual Property: Protecting Computer-Generated Works in the United Kingdom,” in Tanya Aplin (ed.), 
Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Digital Technologies (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, forthcoming); 
Ryan Abbott, “Everything is Obvious,” 66 UCLA Law Review, forthcoming. These works are all available at http://ssrn.
com/author=1702576. Readers interested in this subject may also be interested in early works by Pamela Samuelson, 
Arthur Miller, and Ralph Clifford, “Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works,” University of Pittsburgh 
Law Review 1185 (1986); 1199–1200; Arthur R. Miller, “Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and 
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?” Harvard Law Review 106 (1993): 1043; and Ralph D. 
Clifford, “Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up?” 
Tulane Law Review 71 (1997): 1675–1703. A most incomplete list of more recent scholarship includes: Lisa Vertinsky and 
Todd M. Rice, “Thinking about Thinking Machines: Implications of Machine Inventors for Law,” Boston University Journal of 
Science and Technology Law 8.2 (2002); Robert Plotkin, The Genie in the Machine (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2009); C.R. Davies, “An Evolutionary Step in Intellectual Property Rights: Artificial Intelligence and Intellectual 
Property,” Computer Law and Security Review, 27.6 (2011); Annemarie Bridy, “Coding Creativity: Copyright and the 
Artificially Intelligent Author,” Stanford Technology Law Review 5 (2012); J. McCutcheon, “Curing the Authorless Void: 
Protecting Computer-Generated Works Following ICETV and Phone Directories,” Melbourne University Law Review, 37.1 
(2013); Ben Hattenbach and Joshua Glucoft, “Patents in an Era of Infinite Monkeys and Artificial Intelligence,” Stanford 
Technology Law Review 19 (2015); Jean-Marc Deltorn, “Deep Creations: Intellectual Property and the Automata,” Frontiers 
in Digital Humanities, 2017, https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fdigh.2017.00003/full; Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid 
and Xiaoqiong Liu, “When Artificial Intelligence Systems Produce Inventions: the 3A Era and an Alternative Model for 
Patent Law,” Cardozo Law Review, forthcoming; and W. Michael Schuster, “A Coasean Analysis of Ownership of Patents for 
Inventions Created by Artificial Intelligence,” Washington and Lee Law Review, forthcoming.
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to complete, and from that it independently produced a result. A process like this could be used in a 
variety of industries to, say, discover a new polymer or to design a faster semiconductor.
The Creativity Machine, if it were a human being, would be an inventor in these circumstances. 
Inventorship does not go to the person who instructs someone else to solve a problem. If I tell my 
research scientist that I would like her to design a better battery and she does, that does not make me 
an inventor of her battery. The research scientist would be the inventor. In the case of the Creativity 
Machine, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) granted a patent for the machine’s 
invention, but did so in the name of the machine’s owner. That was an easy decision for the Patent 
Office as the application had not disclosed the machine’s involvement.
The Creativity Machine may have been the first autonomous machine inventor, but it certainly was 
not the last. More patents were created autonomously by machines in the 2000s—for example, by 
the “Invention Machine,” which relied on genetic programming. Inventions autonomously created by 
the Invention Machine were also issued patents by the USPTO, again under circumstances in which, 
if the machine had been a person, the machine would have been the inventor.
Of course, right now there may be few machines independently inventing. Most machines are involved 
in the inventive process as simple tools that help people to “reduce to practice” an invention. If I 
design an experiment and have my PhD students carry it out without change, and the experiment’s 
results are patentable, I, and not my students, am probably the inventor for those results. Similarly, 
most computers are just executing tasks given by people. But at least some of the time, the computer 
occupies the role of the inventor. I suspect you are not hearing more about autonomous machine 
inventions because of concerns about patentability. Can a machine be an inventor? Should a machine 
be an inventor? These are open questions, and they are important theoretical and practical questions 
because computers are de facto inventing, and inventors have ownership rights in patents. Failure to 
list inventors can make patents invalid or unenforceable.
I have looked at this primarily from a US law perspective and found no statute that discusses computer 
inventorship, there is no case law directly on the issue, and there is no relevant patent office policy. 
However, there are some barriers to computer inventorship. For instance, the 1952 Patent Act uses 
the term “individual” to describe potential inventors, something that was done to prevent corporate 
inventorship. There is also quite a bit of judicial language characterising invention as a “mental act.”
While there is no patent office policy on computational inventions or computer-generated works, 
there is a copyright office policy on computer authorship. That policy dates to 1984 and states that 
works “authored” by a computer cannot qualify for copyright protection. In England and Wales, 
the rule is different under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988: if a work is computer-
generated, the author is the person who makes the arrangements for the creation of the work.
The United States Copyright Office cites the 1886 case of Burrow-Giles v. Sarony in support of its 
current policy. In that case, a photographer, Napoleon Sarony, sued the Burrow-Giles Lithographic 
Company for copyright infringement of a famous photograph of Oscar Wilde. The company 
alleged that the photographer could not be the photograph’s author because a photograph is just a 
mechanical reproduction of a natural phenomenon. The Court held that any form of writing by which 
a mental idea is given visible expression is eligible for copyright protection.
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The case thus explicitly dealt with whether the use of a machine would negate human authorship, 
and implicitly with whether a camera could be considered an author. If it seems unwise to rely 
on dicta from the Gilded Age to formulate policies on machine authorship—well, that is what is 
happening. This policy was relevant to a recent case in the Ninth Circuit in California involving the 
famous “Monkey Selfies.” In that case, a crested macaque in Indonesia took pictures of itself using 
equipment belonging to a nature photographer, David Slater. Mr Slater promptly claimed copyright 
in the photographs. Eventually, the United States Copyright Office clarified that because only a 
person could be an author, that copyright could not subsist in the Monkey Selfies. People for the 
Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) sued Mr Slater in the United States Federal Court for copyright 
infringement on behalf of the macaque, alleging that the primate should be the copyright owner of 
its own photographs. The case ultimately settled, with Mr Slater agreeing to donate 25% of future 
revenue from his use of the photograph to charities dedicated to protecting crested macaques in 
Indonesia.
If we analogise this copyright case law to the patent context, then maybe a computer cannot be an 
inventor and its discoveries enter in the public domain. Computers do not need incentives to invent, 
and permitting computer inventorship might chill human invention.
However, there is a way around computer involvement that works in the patent but not the copyright 
context. Inventorship can also be based on recognition of inventive subject matter. Thus, a person 
may be an inventor by virtue of recognising that a computer has invented something patentable. 
This is almost certainly how the problem is being dealt with today in practice—just as it was for 
the earliest computational inventions. It avoids having to disclose an inventive computer to the 
USPTO and potentially throwing a wrench into a patent application. For patent attorneys, there is no 
incentive right now to disclose inventive activity by computers, and plenty of incentive not to make 
that disclosure.
The system of invention by recognition seems reasonable if you are the first scientist to notice that 
penicillin is inhibiting bacterial growth, but perhaps not if you are taking the credit for the work of 
another inventive entity—even if that entity is a computer. In the latter case, the system is rewarding 
people even if they are not doing anything inventive themselves. A computer might clearly identify 
its own results as being patentable. For that matter, it might even format its results as a patent 
application. Claiming credit for the work of a machine also devalues human invention, because it 
equates the contributions of people using inventive machines and human inventors who have 
legitimately engaged in inventive activity.
Taking credit for a machine’s work also has the potential to create logistical problems when the 
first person to notice a computer’s results is not the computer’s owner or the person who gave 
the computer a goal to complete. This may incentivise computer owners to restrict access to their 
machines so that they can control ownership of inventive output.
More ambitiously, I argue that we should recognise computers as inventors. This will functionally 
produce more invention because it will incentivise the development of creative computers. That is 
because allowing computer owners to patent the output of their machines makes those machines 
more valuable. The constitutional rational for granting patent inventions in the United States 
is based on an incentive theory. We want patents because of the free-rider problem and because 
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patents are thought to generate additional research and discovery. Even though computers do not 
care about incentives, people who design computers do. Acknowledging computers as inventors 
would reward effort upstream of the stage of invention, and it could also promote disclosure and 
commercialisation of patentable subject matter. It would also validate inventor moral rights, 
because it will distinguish between human inventors who contribute conceptually to an invention 
and persons filing applications based on the autonomous output of machines.
What about the potential barriers we discussed—that invention must be a mental act and that an 
inventor must be an individual? Well, there are computers that generate output in a process akin to a 
person’s mental act—for instance, computers that utilise neural networks. There are also computers 
that generate output in totally different ways, like those that use expert-based systems. Should it 
matter how a computer is designed and how it functions?
I would argue no. We should care functionally about whether the system generates innovation, not 
how innovation occurs. Congress came to that same conclusion in 1952 when it abolished the “flash 
of genius” test. That was an old requirement that required that the inventive spark come to a person 
in an “aha” moment rather than as the result of methodical, laborious research. The nature of the 
test was never entirely clear; it involved judges subjectively reasoning about what an applicant might 
have been thinking. Congress eventually decided it was not a good test, and that we should not care 
about what goes on in someone’s head, just whether what they create is inventive and beneficial for 
society.
Similarly, the requirement that individuals should be inventors should not interfere with computer 
inventorship. That language is from the 1950s—long before the issue of computational invention was 
relevant. It should be interpreted according to dynamic principles of statutory interpretation in light 
of the purpose of the original Act, which was to prevent corporate inventorship.
If a computer could be an inventor, who would own its patent? I am not arguing that a computer 
should own a patent. Computers are owned as property and do not have legal rights. I would argue 
that the computer’s owner should be the automatic assignee of anything the computer develops. 
Where multiple parties are involved, such as software developers, computer owners, and users, 
they could work out issues of ownership by contract, starting with the default position that the 
computer owner is the assignee. This would be the most consistent with the way we treat personal 
and intellectual property right now.
Computational invention has exciting implications beyond inventorship. I think creative computers 
are going to change the entire patent paradigm in the next 10–20 years.
Even more interesting than thinking about how computers and people are competing right now in 
inventive activity is that computers are very soon going to overwhelm people in inventive activity. 
Take biotechnology research on antibodies as an example. There are lots of patents on antibody 
structures. However, there are only so many ways you can string proteins together to make an 
antibody, and it is not that difficult to imagine a sufficiently powerful computer sequencing every 
conceivable antibody and publishing those results online. Assuming this would be an anticipatory 
disclosure, it would prevent anyone from patenting the structure of those antibodies. The computer 
could not patent the antibody structures itself because it would not know their utility, which is 
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another requirement for patentability. But an inventive machine would have just wiped out an entire 
field of human research.
As computers grow increasingly faster, cheaper, and more sophisticated, they are going to play an 
ever-greater role in the inventive process. It will become standard for creative computers to automate 
invention. Someone in the chemical sciences who used to discover new chemical compounds through 
deductive reasoning and trial and error with teams of human researchers will instead use artificial 
intelligence to find new compounds. Right now, the hypothetical “person having ordinary skill in the 
art,” or PHOSITA, is the benchmark we use to judge inventiveness. If the skilled person uses inventive 
machines, or is an inventive machine, then the benchmark is very high. It is hard to conceive of an 
invention that would not be obvious to a sufficiently sophisticated computer. That would essentially 
mean the end of inventive activity. Everything will be obvious.

Big Data in the Health and Life 
Sciences: What Are the Challenges 
for European Competition Law and 
Where Can They Be Found?
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Our goal is to create a European Open Science Cloud to make science more efficient and productive 
and let millions of researchers share and analyse research data in a trusted environment across 
technologies, disciplines and borders.
—Carlos Moedas, European Union Commissioner for Research, Science and Innovation
In a recent lead article, The Economist highlighted the increasing power and relevance of the new 
data economy and proclaimed: “The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data.”1 Since 
data can fuel scientific progress and artificial intelligence (AI), many attempts are being made to 
stimulate the sharing of data to enhance research and development of new products and services in 
various technological areas, such as the health and life sciences. But it has also become evident that 
many data generators are not necessarily willing to share their data. They may refuse to open up 
their data vaults for many different reasons, ranging from their previous investments in data quality, 
lack of trust, or the protection of sensitive personal and commercial data. Like other valuable assets, 
data can be protected by intellectual property rights (IPRs) in some shape or form, often involving a 
combination of lengthy contracts, trade secrets/the law of confidence, copyright, and/or database 
rights.2 Hence, data are often the subject of litigation, which in addition to these rights may also 
involve personal data integrity rights and competition law. In that regard, it has been claimed that 
more regulations are needed to keep the data-generating internet giants at bay and that the new 
data economy demands a novel approach to antitrust and competition rules.3 
This chapter addresses selected competition law aspects of big data in the health and life sciences. 
Focusing on European Union (EU) competition law, it offers some brief and very general insights into 
the multiple challenges resulting from the intersection between the big data narrative and European 
competition law. The aim of the chapter is not to deliver a comprehensive account of emerging case 
law or describe new practices and approaches of competition authorities in more detail. These will be 
the focus of a more comprehensive follow-up paper. Here, we intend rather to provide a general and 
abstract overview of the most fundamental questions that will have to be considered and addressed 
by European competition law. To this end, we will start out with a short description of the increasing 
relevance of big data and the protection of data in the health and life sciences. Next we describe how 
these developments relate to European competition law and why EU authorities, and in particular 
the European Commission, are increasingly taking notice of big data. This is followed by a brief 
analysis of what the main challenges are and where they can be found, which allows us to draw some 
initial conclusions.
1  The Economist, “The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data,” 6 May 2017, https://www.economist.
com/news/leaders/21721656-data-economy-demands-new-approach-antitrust-rules-worlds-most-valuable-resource.
2  Rosie Burbidge, “Medical Data in a Twist—Technomed v Bluecrest,” IPKat blog, 28 September 2017, http://ipkitten.blogspot.
dk/2017/09/medical-data-in-twist-technomed-v.html, commenting on the recent High Court decision in Technomed 
v. Bluecrest [2017] EWHC 2142 about the rights in databases and the potential intellectual property dangers, including 
copyright infringement, that can become relevant when a business relationship terminates.
3  Ibid.
* The authors’ work has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 
research and innovation programme (grant agreement number 682110), as well as from the Novo Nordisk Foundation 
under the Collaborative Research Programme in Biomedical Innovation Law (grant agreement number NNF17SA027784).
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1. Challenges at the Intersection of Big Data, Intellectual 
Property Rights, and Competition Law in the Health and Life 
Sciences4
Multiple factors indicate that “big data” will play a crucial role in the evolution of healthcare and 
the life sciences. The ongoing paradigm shift is fuelled by rapid technical advances that have 
greatly enhanced the collection and analysis of information from multiple sources. In addition, 
US and European authorities and public entities have in recent years developed public platforms 
and infrastructures that provide access to vast volumes of healthcare knowledge, including clinical 
trials and selected patient data. Meanwhile, private actors, such as pharmaceutical companies, 
healthcare providers, laboratories, and insurance companies, have stored many years of research and 
development (R&D) data in databases and digitalised their patient records. This trend is accompanied 
by recent initiatives and legislation that are increasing the transparency of various forms of data, 
such as those from clinical trials.
As a result, researchers, companies, patients, and healthcare providers can now gain access to an 
enormous volume of personal and biological data. This information can be regarded as “big data”—
that is, not only because of its greater volume, but also for its increased variety, velocity, and veracity.5 
Researchers can mine these data to identify the most effective treatments for particular conditions, 
to find second and further medical uses, to detect patterns related to drug side effects or hospital 
readmissions, and to gain other important information that can help patients and reduce costs. 
Although the data collections may be immense, and the quality of the data is often very variable—
depending on different database structures and technical characteristics—rapid technological 
advances and advanced algorithms have improved the ability of scientists to effectively analyse 
and use such data. It is expected that these developments will push the trend towards precision 
medicine and help us to address pressing problems such as divergences in healthcare quality and ever 
increasing healthcare costs.6 
In light of these developments and rapid technical advances, significantly facilitating the collection 
and analysis of information and knowledge from multiple sources, both protection of and access to 
the data have become ever more critical to the innovation narrative.7 The vast prospects of big data 
and the gradual shift to more “personalised,” “open,” and “transparent” innovation models highlight 
the significance of effective and well-calibrated regulation, governance, and use of biological and 
personal data. At the same time, the ultimate goal of widespread data-sharing, and the risky and 
costly translation of big data science into safe and efficient “real world” applications, raise multiple 
4  Some formulations in this section stem from Timo Minssen’s welcome talk at the conference “Legal Dimensions of Big 
Data in the Health and Life Sciences: From Intellectual Property Rights and Global Pandemics to Privacy and Ethics,” 
May 2016, http://blogs.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2016/05/24/legal-dimensions-of-big-data-in-the-health-life-sciences-
from-intellectual-property-rights-and-global-pandemics-to-privacy-ethics/.
5  W. Raghupathi and V. Raghupathi, “Big Data Analytics in Healthcare: Promise and Potential,” Health Information Science 
and Systems 2.3 (2014).
6  Ibid.
7  See, for example, Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, “Product Introduction with Network Externalities,” Journal of Industrial 
Economics 40.1 (1992): 55–83; Mark A. Lemley and Ziv Shafir, “Who Chooses Open-Source Software?” University of 
Chicago Law Review 78.1 (2011): 139–164; and Michael A. Carrier, Innovation for the 21st Century: Harnessing the Power of 
Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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legal challenges in such areas as public–private research collaborations, data integrity, privacy, and 
ethics. In addition, we will have to tackle pressing issues at the interface of intellectual property law, 
competition law, R&D incentives, and commercialisation.
As will be discussed, we will have to ask ourselves and decision-makers if the current legal frameworks 
need to be recalibrated in specific areas to unlock the full potential of big data in the health and 
life sciences on an ethically and legally safe and economically sustainable basis. Does our current 
toolbox contain sufficiently flexible mechanisms, or will we have to think in radically different ways 
and break new ground?
The intersection between the big data narrative and IPRs, for example, presents a particularly 
significant challenge when questions of ownership rights to data arise and where ownership is 
challenged by potential users seeking access to the data. Data analytics or data mining will often 
involve the copying of, or references to, information or databases, which might be protected by 
various forms of IPRs in relevant jurisdictions. Where data are not owned or licensed, the user will 
need to rely on an exception to IPR infringement to use data. This has given rise to fierce controversies 
between data “owners,” data researchers, and entities that provide enabling technologies, large 
research infrastructures, and standardisation platforms. These tensions at the interface of big data 
and IPRs involve complex considerations relating to innovation economics, ownership, exceptions to 
IPRs, ethics, licensing, and competition law.8 
In that context, we regard it as problematic that there seems to be so much confusion about the 
availability, nature, and legal effects of a great variety of often overlapping rights and remedies 
among multiple stakeholders in big data science. As indicated, a great variety of different IPRs and 
sui generis rights may apply to various aspects of big data applications. Clearly some rights, such as 
European database rights and trade secrets, are becoming increasingly important for the commercial 
protection of big data, whereas other rights that have traditionally played a major role in innovation 
policy debates, such as patent rights, may not always be applicable and useful for the protection 
of specific data uses.9 At the same time, the full effect and function of some of these IPRs—for 
example, as data aggregators—for the big data innovation framework are not entirely clear and 
demand further study. The (un)availability of these IPRs and sui generis rights might result in both a 
lack of well-calibrated incentives and underinvestment in some areas, and a blocking effect on open 
innovation and anti-commons scenarios in other areas. In addition, their interplay with recent data 
transparency initiatives and the potential impact on open innovation scenarios or public–private 
partnerships need to be elucidated. It can thus be assumed that nuanced approaches and IPR user 
modalities will have to be considered for different technological applications, and that these need to 
be discussed and addressed on a case-by-case basis.10 
Be that as it may, in the following we will focus on yet another important challenge relating to big 
data and IPRs, the interface of big data and European competition law.
8  Ibid.
9  See T. Minssen and J. Pierce, “Big Data and Intellectual Property Rights in the Health and Life Sciences,” in G. Cohen, H. 
Fernandez Lynch, E. Vayena, and U. Gasser (eds), Big Data, Health Law, and Bioethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2018), 311–323.
10  Ibid.
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2. The Interface between Big Data and European Competition 
Law
Competition law (antitrust) agencies in both the United States and the European Union are 
taking note of big data, and there is an increasing trend to examine closely its collection, use, 
and accessibility for anticompetitive effects.11 Defining the role of competition law in this 
highly dynamic area is, however, both controversial and complicated. The controversies are 
to some extent related to the discussions about the general role of competition law and the 
extent to which regulators should intervene in market developments. Historically, the European 
and US agencies have been well known for their different approaches to the assessment of 
anticompetitive behaviour (“interventionist” versus “non-interventionist”).12 
Apart from these recognised concerns, applying competition law in “the digital economy” is 
particularly complex. Whereas some see its fast-moving, technology-driven nature as calling for 
competition law intervention to discipline markets and control the market power of the digital 
giants, others think that the costs of applying competition law’s norms to such markets is likely 
to do more harm than good.13 
But what is the potential for the applicability of EU competition law in cases involving big data, 
and what will be the general difficulties in applying the traditional competition law norms in this 
particular field?14
3. What Are the Challenges and Where Do They Arise
Competition law may affect the market for big data and the behaviour of its holders in different 
ways. In the following, we will focus on the rule that prevents the misuse of a dominant position (i.e. 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 102), and that may serve to facilitate 
data sharing if access is restricted because of misuse of a dominant position, and on the provision 
that regulates the conditions for the sharing of data via licensing agreements (i.e. Article 101).15 
11  See also Margrethe Vestager, “Big Data and Competition” (Brussels: European Commission, 2016), http://ec.europa.
eu/commission/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/big-data-and-competition_en on data as an asset and access to 
data for innovation; Federal Trade Commission, “Big Data: A Tool for Inclusion or Exclusion?” (Washington, DC: Federal 
Trade Commission, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-
understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf emphasising the link between big data, medicine and healthcare; and G. 
Sivinski, A. Okuliar, and L. Kjolbye, “Is Big Data a Big Deal? A Competition Law Approach to Big Data,” European Competition 
Journal 13.2–3 (2017): 119–227.
12  See, for example, J. Schovsbo, “Fire and Water Make Steam: Redefining the Role of Competition Law in TRIPS,” in A. Kur and 
M. Levin (eds), Intellectual Property Rights in a Fair World Trade System (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011), 308–358.
13  For an overview see, for example, A. Capobianco and A. Nyeso, “Challenges for Competition Law Enforcement and Policy 
in the Digital Economy,” Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 9.1 (2018): 19–27. These authors also point out 
that at the Hearing on the Digital Economy of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in 2012, a 
broad consensus emerged that competition law had an important role to play in the digital economy (in particular as the 
markets mature); see http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/The-Digital-Economy-2012.pdf.
14  The trend for competition rules to intervene in the rights of data owners is also occurring at the level of European member 
states. For example, in the “Cegedim” Decision no. 14-D-06 (7 August 2014), the French competition authority found that 
the refusal of access to data to those using rival software was unjustified.
15  We focus on the central competition law rules in TFEU Articles 101 and 102. It should be noted, however, that the special 
competition rules regarding mergers have also been applied in cases involving big data. In the merger leading to Thomson 
Reuters, Case COMP/M.4726, Thomson Corporation/Reuters Group, of 19 February 2008, regulators in the EU and the 
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TFEU Article 102 bans the misuse of a dominant position by one or more undertakings. Unlike in the 
United States, for example, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has ruled that this 
provision may be used for the granting of compulsory licences (even) to information protected by 
IPR. Article 102 does not ban “misuse” in the abstract; it is only the misuse of “a dominant position” 
that is covered by the prohibition. A “dominant position” is characterised by the ability of a firm or 
group of firms to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers, 
and ultimately its consumers.16 In order to determine whether or not a company holds a “dominant 
position,” the “relevant market” must first be established. The starting point for defining this is an 
assessment of the range of products that are viewed as substitutes by the consumer. Normally, the 
assessment involves the expected effects of a “small but significant and non-transitory increase in 
price” (the SSNIP test) on demand substitution.17 Having then established a “dominant” position, the 
next hurdle for a third party wanting access to the data and relying on the granting of a compulsory 
licence under Article 102 is to prove that a “misuse” has taken place. For information protected by 
IPR, the CJEU developed what is known as the “indispensability” test18 as the baseline for compulsory 
licensing. According to this rule, “misuse” may be found to exist provided that the following cumulative 
conditions have been satisfied: (1) the refusal is preventing the emergence of a new product for which 
there is a potential consumer demand; (2) the refusal is unjustified; and (3) it is such as to exclude 
any competition on a secondary market. The requirement of a “new product” is normally stated to 
constitute an “extra requirement” vis-à-vis other types of rights involved in cases of misuse and to make 
it clear that compulsory licensing only applies to holders of IPRs in “exceptional circumstances.”19 More 
concretely, the new product (“innovation”) criterion would seem to rule out access in order to simply 
compete on the product market with the incumbent rights-holder. For non-proprietary information, 
the threshold for intervention is lower and therefore access may (in principle) be granted with the aim 
of entering into direct competition with the holder of the information.
Applying these principles in a case where a third party requires access to data involves a number 
of complicated assessments, including how to define the “relevant market” and distinguishing 
between the (legal) use of and the (illegal) misuse of market power.20 It is also far from clear 
United States had concerns stemming from big data. Both took the position that the need for a company to collect vast 
amounts of financial data to effectively compete with the merged firm in the market for data terminals created a significant 
barrier to entry. To address this concern, both authorities approved the merger on the condition that the merged firm 
would make copies of its database available for purchase by existing and new potential competitors; see http://ec.europa.
eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4726_20080219_20600_en.pdf. For a discussion, see G. Sivinski, A. Okuliar, 
and L. Kjolbye, “Is Big Data a Big Deal? A Competition Law Approach to Big Data,” European Competition Journal 13.2–3 
(2017): 119–227.
16  Commission Notice (EC) on the Definition of Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community Competition Law, [1997] OJ 
C 372, p. 5, point 10 with reference to Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission [1979] ECR 1979-461.
17  Ibid., point 15.
18  The “indispensability” test is derived from Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE & ITP v. Commission 
[1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:98 and Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG [2004] 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:257, para. 38. See also Decision COMP/AT.39612 “Perindopril (Servier)” of 9 July 2014.
19  Generally, see J. Schovsbo, “Fire and Water Make Steam: Redefining the Role of Competition Law in TRIPS,” in A. Kur 
and M. Levin (eds), Intellectual Property Rights in a Fair World Trade System (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011), 308–
358. The exceptional circumstances test was confirmed by Case 170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp. and ZTE 
Deutschland GmbH [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:477, paras 46–47.
20  To a large extent these complications are common to most markets in the digital economy; see A. Capobianco and A. 
Nyeso, “Challenges for Competition Law Enforcement and Policy in the Digital Economy,” Journal of European Competition 
Law and Practice 9.1 (2018): 19–27.
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whether and how competition authorities would apply the “exceptional circumstances” test—
and in particular the “new product” criterion—to “big data” that are not protected by IPRs or 
that involve (parts) that are considered to be trade secrets.
For health data it is further unclear to what extent the protection of personal data would prevent 
the issue of compulsory licences per se. The intersection between competition law and data 
protection rules has become an ever more important factor in cases related to big data.21 Data 
protection rules, such as the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)22 or international 
data transfer agreements, such as the Privacy Shield agreement23 between the United States 
and Europe, often restrict the ability of public and private commercial research to generate, 
store, use, and transfer data. In particular, the GDPR codifies regulatory requirements that 
will surely have a considerable impact on the Commission’s assessment of (anti-)competitive 
practices. This includes new types of considerations already anticipated by the Commission in 
the assessment of the case law already mentioned, such as increasingly relevant evaluations of 
data portability and the prospective future behaviour of merged entities.24 Arguably, the CJEU 
decided in Asnef-Equifax and Administración del Estado25 that privacy considerations as such 
should not be the focus of competition law. Yet, and in accordance with the CJEU’s findings, it 
is clear that data protection rules must be considered carefully for the purposes of establishing 
the relevant counterfactual, to the same extent as any other regulatory requirement would be 
considered by the Commission.26 
Additional problems also apply to the competition law assessment of licensing agreements. 
Normally the licensing of technology is said to promote competition by:
• allowing innovators to earn returns to cover at least part of their research and development 
costs;
• leading to a dissemination of technologies, which may create value by reducing the 
production costs of the licensee or by enabling the licensee to produce new or improved 
products;
• combining the licensor’s technology with the assets and technologies of the licensee;
21  In 2016, Commissioner Vestager gave three different speeches addressing the competition aspects of big data and 
privacy: Margrethe Vestager, “Big Data and Competition” (Brussels: European Commission, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/
commission/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/big-data-and-competition_en; Margrethe Vestager, “Making Data 
Work for Us,” speech to data ethics event on Data as Power, Copenhagen, 9 September 2016; and Margrethe Vestager, 
“Competition in a Big Data World,” speech at DLD 16, Munich, 17 January 2016.
22  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural 
Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 
95/46/EC [2016] L119/1 (General Data Protection Regulation/GDPR). The Regulation applies from 25 May 2018; see Article 
99.
23  See the European Commission on the EU–US Privacy Shield: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/
data-transfers-outside-eu/eu-us-privacy-shield_en; note that many details of this agreement are still very controversial.
24  M. Kadar and M. Bogdan, “‘Big Data’ and EU Merger Control: A Case Review,” Journal of European Competition Law and 
Practice 8.8 (2017): 479–491, at 486, referring to Article 20 of the GDPR.
25  See Case C-238/05 Asnef-Equifax and Administración del Estado [2006] ECR I-11145, para. 63.
26  M. Kadar and M. Bogdan, “‘Big Data’ and EU Merger Control: A Case Review,” Journal of European Competition Law and 
Practice 8.8 (2017): 479–491.
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• promoting the coordinated development of technologies that are in a blocking relationship;
• removing obstacles to the sale of the licensee’s product.27 
However, licensing agreements also often limit competition and therefore they are not always 
accepted by competition law as such. The EU TFEU Article 101 (the so called “cartel rule”) states 
that all agreements that have an adverse effect on competition between member states are void. 
Furthermore, TFEU Article 101(3) exempts competition law constraints from the prohibition in 
Article 101(1) for agreements that, despite containing anticompetitive elements, have overall pro-
competitive effects.
In future cases, courts and competition authorities will most likely rely on the basic principles in the EU 
Technology Transfer block exemption Regulation.28 This exempts a number of important restrictions 
regarding access to markets and consumers (within the EU) and it is directly applicable to agreements 
concerning, inter alia, patents and know-how. Defining the relevant market is also central for the 
application of Article 101. The Regulation thus includes the following market definitions in Article 1:
(j) “relevant product market” means the market for the contract products and their substitutes, 
that is to say all those products which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the 
buyer, by reason of the products’ characteristics, their prices and their intended use;
(k) “relevant technology market” means the market for the licensed technology rights and their 
substitutes, that is to say all those technology rights which are regarded as interchangeable or 
substitutable by the licensee, by reason of the technology rights’ characteristics, the royalties 
payable in respect of those rights and their intended use;
As mentioned before, defining the relevant product and technology markets is inherently complicated 
in the big data context and there are many reasons for this. This is inter alia demonstrated by the 
difficulties in assessing which technologies (products) may be substitutes.
Considering the volume of data, for example, simply having more data than anyone else does not 
necessarily protect a company from competition.29 Similar complexities occur when assessing 
the nature and relevance of the data: expected anticompetitive outcomes assume to a significant 
degree that all data are competitively useful, and that most data are unique and without reasonable 
substitutes. This disregards the counterfactual reality that in most cases the data are not essential to 
competing or there exist reasonable substitutes such that the way in which the owner or controller 
may choose to leverage those data should not raise a significant competition issue.30 
27  Based on “Communication from the Commission: Guidelines on the Application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to Technology Transfer Agreements,” OJ C 89, 28 March 2014, 3–50, point 17; and 
“Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property: Issued by the US Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission,” 12 January 2017, point 2.3.
28  Commission Regulation (EU) No. 316/2014 of 21 March 2014 on the Application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements (Text with EEA Relevance), OJ L 93, 
28 March 2014, 17–23.
29  For an excellent and very detailed discussion of these issues, see G. Sivinski, A. Okuliar, and L. Kjolbye, “Is Big Data a Big 
Deal? A Competition Law Approach to Big Data,” European Competition Journal 13.2–3 (2017): 119–227.
30  Ibid.
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4. Conclusions
In summing up, competition law in the EU is omnipresent and potentially very important for companies 
that rely on big data to control large market shares. For such companies, competition law needs to be taken 
into account in decisions on mergers and in instances of refusal to license. Even for companies without 
much market power, licensing agreements that contain provisions on territorial limitations would often 
need to take competition law concerns into account. Seen from a regulatory perspective, competition 
law is characterised by providing for general mechanisms, which apply ex post. Furthermore, competition 
law intervention always has to be triggered by specific market behaviour that deviates from the generally 
acceptable baseline. For “big data,” the scope and potential of competition law’s provisions are very hard 
to judge. Defining the relevant market in fast-moving technologies is inherently difficult. In addition, 
assessing market behaviour and drawing the line between wanted and unwanted practices in newly 
developed or developing markets where no firm norms of behaviour have yet crystallised is a daring task. 
Here competition authorities will be sailing between the Scylla of the costs of over-enforcement (e.g. no 
economy-of-scale advantages) and the Charybdis of under-enforcing (e.g. market foreclosure).
In light of these complexities and the relevance of big data in the digitalised health and life sciences, we 
regard it is as imperative that the legal issues raised in relation to big data and artificial intelligence are 
given the highest priority by the European Commission. Hence, we are glad that the European Commission 
now appears to be devoting considerable effort and resources to addressing the competition aspects of big 
data and privacy in order to test whether its jurisdictional criteria are still adequate to tackle all the issues 
entailed by big data and AI. As we have demonstrated, the growing relevance of big data issues is not limited 
to applications in the information technology sector. Many issues that have so far been predominantly 
debated in that sector are now rapidly extending to other important technological fields, such as the 
increasingly data-driven healthcare and life sciences. This concern includes problem areas that could not be 
addressed in this chapter, such as the “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) licensing debates 
about standard-essential IPRs, patent pools, and clearing houses, which are slowly becoming relevant even 
in the health and life sciences.31 
As the importance of big data increases in all areas of society and the economy, and as the aspiration of 
free data-sharing encounters harsh business realities, it can be expected that data-related questions will 
be disputed more frequently in future European Commission cases. After all, many wars have been fought 
over gold, diamonds, and oil. It is also clear that if regulators want to avoid a data- and AI-driven economy 
in individual countries and internationally that is completely controlled by a few giants, they will need to 
step up to the game now.32  
31  One example is MPEG LA’s initiative in December 2016 to introduce a licensing model for CRISPR gene-editing technology, 
which clearly shows that key stakeholders involved in one-stop licensing in the information and communications 
technology sector believe in applying their model and experience within synthetic biology and data-driven systems biology. 
This development needs to be put in a broader perspective, evaluating how this initiative fits within the unique culture of 
the systems biology and synthetic biology communities. For further information, see Business Wire, “MPEG LA Initiative 
to Address CRISPR Licensing: One-Stop Access Will Accelerate Advances in New Medicines, Organ Transplants and 
Agriculture,” 6 December 2016, http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20161206006182/en/MPEG-LA-Initiative 
-Address-CRISPR-Licensing; cf. MPEG LA, “Terms and Procedures for CRISPR-Cas9 Patent Submissions,” http://www.
mpegla.com/main/pid/CRISPR/Terms.aspx.
32  Cf. The Economist, “The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data,” 6 May 2017, https://www.economist.
com/news/leaders/21721656-data-economy-demands-new-approach-antitrust-rules-worlds-most-valuable-resource; 
see also The Economist, “The Battle in AI: Artificial Intelligence Looks Tailor-Made for Incumbent Tech Giants. Is That 
a Worry?” 7 December 2017, https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21732111-artificial-intelligence-looks-tailor-
made-incumbent-tech-giants-worry-battle?frsc=dg%7Ce.
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1. Introduction
Economic studies of technological change have long exploited patents as indicators of innovation 
activity. As explained by Griliches’ classic survey,1 patent data are easily available, cover many 
countries, and are rich in technical information, thanks to their fine classification. The United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and, from the 1980s, the European Patent Office (EPO) 
are the most heavily used data sources, with the NBER Patent and Citations Data File2 and EPO’s 
Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) being the main consolidated open access patent 
data repositories (the latter being based on the DOCDB database, which assembles all the prior art 
information used by EPO examiners). These datasets provide researchers with all the bibliographical 
information found on patent application documents, including the claimed invention’s characteristics, 
the names and address of the entity or entities requesting intellectual property (IP) protection, and 
the inventors responsible for its conception and reduction to practice.
Inventors are an important class of knowledge workers, especially in sectors where research and 
development (R&D) is a key innovation input. Innovation scholars’ interest in their activity derives 
from the relationship of human and social capital with technical and scientific discovery. Besides 
examining scientists’ and engineers’ productivity, researchers have explored the role of spatial 
and social distance between inventors for the diffusion of knowledge, high-skilled immigration 
phenomena, and the impact of IP rights on scientific progress. Many of these studies have jointly 
exploited inventor information and data on citations of prior art or non-patent literature, mostly 
declared by applicants or inserted in search reports by patent examiners. While carrying a lot of 
statistical noise,3 they can provide a sketch of the knowledge debt running from citing to cited 
inventors, also offering a measure of patents’ relative quality and value.4 
Properly using inventor data exposes researchers to multiple technical challenges. Two chief concerns 
are the correct geolocalisation of inventors and patent applicants, and their unique identification 
across different patent applications and over time.
In what follows we provide an overview of economic research on inventors, touching upon the main 
findings and technical issues highlighted by the scholarly community over the past decades. We then 
focus on a special topic, namely the study of inventorship as an attribution right.
2. Inventors and Economics Research
2.1 Geographical Studies: Co-location, Inventors’ Networks, and International Mobility
The information on inventors (and applicants) contained in patent databases has allowed researchers 
to geolocalise inventive activity in an increasingly sophisticated way. A broad line of research has 
1  Z. Griliches, “Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature 28 (1990): 1661–1707.
2  B.H. Hall, A.B. Jaffe, and M. Trajtenberg, “The NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological 
Tools,” NBER Working Paper No. 8498 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001).
3  J.M. Kuhn, K. Younge, and A. Marco, “Patent Citations Reexamined: New Data and Methods,” 2017, http://dx.doi.
org/10.2139/ssrn.2714954.
4  A.B. Jaffe and G. De Rassenfosse, “Patent Citation Data in Social Science Research: Overview and Best Practices,” Journal 
of the Association for Information Science and Technology 68.6 (2017): 1360–1374; and P. Moser, J. Ohmstedt, and P.W. 
Rhode, “Patent Citations: An Analysis of Quality Differences and Citing Practices in Hybrid Corn,” Management Science 
64.4 (2017): 1926–1940.
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investigated knowledge production’s spatial differences, starting from Jaffe’s seminal contribution.5 
A major theme has been the assessment of geographical localisation of knowledge flows. Challenging 
Paul Krugman’s statement on their invisibility,6 Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson exploited patent 
citations as “paper trails” of knowledge flows and introduced the first test to assess the strength 
of inventors’ or applicants’ co-location for determining knowledge spillovers (called the JTH test 
after the co-authors).7 The JTH test consists in taking a sample of pairs of citing patents and the 
patents they cited (excluding self-citations at the firm level) and comparing them with a control 
sample composed of patents with the same application year and technological field as the citing 
ones, but with no citation links to the patents the latter cited. To the extent to which the rate of co-
location (at the city or state level) of the inventors of the cited–citing pairs is higher than that of the 
inventors of the cited–control pairs, the JTH test is indicative of the tendency of cross-firm citations 
to concentrate in space beyond what one would expect by simply looking at the geographical 
distribution of patents based on technology.
After taking into account the methodological reservations raised by Thompson and Fox-Kean8 
and Thomson,9 the JTH test has become the basis of the patent-based geography of innovation 
literature. Follow-up research has concentrated on disentangling how different dimensions of 
geographical distance affect knowledge diffusion, and on questioning the original interpretation 
of their evidence by Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson in 1993. Concerning distance, Jaffe et 
al. treated it as a binary variable, simply focusing on whether patent citations occur mostly 
within states or metropolitan areas, irrespective of the relative geolocalised position of the 
patents. Murata et al. go beyond this limitation by developing a physical distance-based test 
able to capture cross-boundary, spatially close knowledge spillovers.10 They find that simple, 
continuous geographical distance also matters, even when building the control sample at a finer 
technological aggregation. At the same time, Singh and Marx show that physical distance and 
administrative borders play independent roles as obstacles to knowledge diffusion,11 both of 
them being significant when inserted in an exercise à la Jaffe et al. Belenzon and Schankerman, 
who concentrate their attention on university–industry knowledge spillovers, reach similar 
5  Specifically, Jaffe modelled the spatial distribution of corporate patents across states of the United States of America 
and broad technological areas as a function of the states’ public and private R&D expenditure, providing evidence of the 
existence of geographically mediated spillovers from university research to commercial innovation; see A.B. Jaffe, “Real 
Effects of Academic Research,” American Economic Review 79.5 (1989): 957–970.
6  “Knowledge flows ... are invisible; they leave no paper trail by which they may be measured and tracked, and there is nothing 
to prevent the theorist from assuming anything about them that she likes... So while I am sure that true technological 
spillovers play an important role in the localization of some industries, one should not assume that this is the typical 
reason—even in the high technology industries themselves”—P. Krugman, Geography and Trade (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1991), 53–54.
7  A.B. Jaffe, M. Trajtenberg, and R. Henderson, “Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent 
Citations,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (1993): 577–598.
8  P. Thompson and M. Fox-Kean, “Patent Citations and the Geography of Knowledge Spillovers: A Reassessment,” American 
Economic Review 95.1 (2005): 450–460.
9  P. Thompson, “Patent Citations and the Geography of Knowledge Spillovers: Evidence from Inventor- and Examiner-Added 
Citations,” Review of Economics and Statistics 88 (2006): 383–38
10  Y. Murata, R. Nakajima, R. Okamoto, and R. Tamura, “Localized Knowledge Spillovers and Patent Citations: A Distance-
Based Approach,” Review of Economics and Statistics 96.5 (2014): 967–985.
11  J. Singh and M. Marx, “Geographic Constraints on Knowledge Spillovers: Political Borders vs. Spatial Proximity,” 
Management Science 59 (2013): 2056–2078.
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conclusions, showing that citations to patents filed by US universities at the USPTO decline 
sharply with distance from the universities and are strongly constrained by state borders.12 
An important extension has been provided by studies considering the role of social distance 
between inventors, in addition to that of spatial distance. Agrawal et al. focus on socially 
mediated knowledge flows by looking at inventors who move across US cities.13 They demonstrate 
how patents by inventors in the cities they reach after moving are disproportionally cited by 
new patents by inventors still residing in their pre-move locations; this is interpreted as the 
effect of persistent social ties held by the inventors across cities. Breschi and Lissoni show that 
the inventors’ inter-firm mobility occurs largely within the same locations, and many citations 
occurring between companies are in fact personal self-citations by mobile inventors.14 The same 
inventors, by joining different teams, also end up building a localised collaboration network that 
largely explains the observed spatial patterns of citation flows (social distance between any two 
inventors is measured by the number of collaborative ties that separate them). These findings 
are confirmed by Miguélez and Moreno, who study the determinants of cross-regional mobility 
of inventors of EPO applications for a sample of European countries.15 By tracking cross-regional 
movements of inventors, the authors find both descriptive and analytical evidence on the critical 
role of spatial distance and country borders in hampering the mobility of this specific class of 
knowledge workers.
A further development deals with ethnical distance and its influence on knowledge diffusion 
along immigrant inventors’ networks within host countries and across national borders. Agrawal 
et al. analyse patent citations and their probability of taking place disproportionally among 
individuals linked by common ethnic origins.16 Looking only at inventors with Indian names in 
the United States and Canada, they find evidence of such a co-ethnic effect. Interestingly, co-
location is also found to predict patent citations, but with a remarkably lower marginal effect 
for inventors sharing the same ethnicity. Finally, co-ethnicity and co-location appear to be 
substitute determinants of the probability of observing citation links between patents. Breschi 
et al. extend this type of analysis, including other nationality groups of United States-resident 
foreign inventors (China, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, and the Republic of Korea for 
Asia; and France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the Russian Federation for Europe), and controlling 
for path lengths within their social networks.17 Co-ethnicity is found to be a significant predictor 
of knowledge flows, although only for Asian and Russian inventors and only for great social 
distances in the network, possibly compensating for the lack of other professional links.
12  S. Belenzon and M. Schankerman, “Spreading the Word: Geography, Policy, and Knowledge Spillovers,” Review of Economics 
and Statistics 95.3 (2013): 884–903.
13  A. Agrawal, I. Cockburn, and J. McHale, “Gone but Not Forgotten: Knowledge Flows, Labor Mobility, and Enduring Social 
Relationships,” Journal of Economic Geography 6.5 (2006): 571–591.
14  S. Breschi and F. Lissoni, “Mobility of Skilled Workers and Co-Invention Networks: An Anatomy of Localized Knowledge 
Spillovers,” Journal of Economic Geography 9.4 (2009): 439–468.
15  E. Miguélez and R. Moreno, “What Attracts Knowledge Workers? The Role of Space and Social Networks,” Journal of 
Regional Science 54.1 (2014): 33–60.
16  A. Agrawal, D. Kapur, and J. McHale, “How Do Spatial and Social Proximity Influence Knowledge Flows? Evidence from 
Patent Data,” Journal of Urban Economics 64.2 (2008): 258–269.
17  S. Breschi, F. Lissoni, and E. Miguélez, “Foreign Inventors in the US: Testing for Diaspora and Brain Gain Effects,” Journal of 
Economic Geography 17.5 (2017): 1009–1038.
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Inventor data have also been exploited to study the impact of high-skilled immigrants on 
their host countries’ innovation systems.18 A salient example is offered by Kerr and Lincoln, 
who employ USPTO data to test whether variations in US H-1B visa admissions correspond 
to variations in the innovation rates in cities whose labour market are heavily dependent on 
holders of such visa.19  They estimate that a 10 percent surge in the H-1B population increases 
Indian and Chinese invention (proxied by patent applications) by 1–4 percent, with roughly no 
negative impact on locals (that is, limited crowding-out effects). Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 
show how immigrant inventors account for a disproportionate share of scientists and engineers 
listed on US patents, and how increases in the population of foreign-born college graduates 
considerably boost patents per capita at the state level.20 
2.2 Intellectual Property Rights in Science: Academic Inventors and “Anti-commons” 
Effects
A second strand of economics literature employing inventor data has dealt with the role of formal 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) in science. Following the increased proclivity of universities 
and public research centres to seek patent protection to commercialise their scientific output,21 
researchers have investigated the effect of academic patenting on scientists’ performance and 
universities’ knowledge production processes. Most of the studies link inventor records with 
academic researchers’ profiles and publication histories, testing the legitimacy of worries about 
IPRs’ potential negative influence on science, such as the diversion of scholars’ efforts from 
basic to “more applied” research, and alleged “anti-commons” effects,22 hindering cumulative 
scientific discovery.
Agrawal and Henderson present one of the first enquiries,23 focusing on MIT’s Department of 
Mechanical and Electrical Engineering. Relating professors’ publication output and citations 
received to their corresponding patents, they highlight how patent counts do not predict higher 
publication propensity, but they positively influence the amount of citations received by the 
articles. They interpret these findings as patents signalling higher research impact. Azoulay et 
al. employ a longitudinal database on US-based researchers and provide a slightly different 
picture, finding patenting activity to positively influence the number of scientific publications 
while weakly impacting their quality, as measured by the journals’ impact factor.24 Azoulay 
18  A comprehensive overview of studies dealing with migration and innovation is offered by F. Lissoni, “International Migration 
and Innovation Diffusion: an Eclectic Survey,” Regional Studies 53.5 (2018): 702–714.
19  W.R. Kerr and W.F. Lincoln, “The Supply Side of Innovation: H-1B Visa Reforms and US Ethnic Invention,” Journal of Labor 
Economics 28.3 (2010): 473–508.
20  J. Hunt and M. Gauthier-Loiselle, “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?” American Economic Journal: 
Macroeconomics 2.2 (2010): 31–56.
21  A.B. Jaffe and J. Lerner, “Reinventing Public R&D: Patent Policy and the Commercialization of National Laboratory 
Technologies,” RAND Journal of Economics 32.1 (2001): 167–198; and J.G. Thursby and M.C. Thursby, “Who Is Selling the 
Ivory Tower? Sources of Growth in University Licensing,” Management Science 48.1 (2002): 90–104.
22  P. Davıd, “Will Building ‘Good Fences’ Really Make ‘Good Neighbors’ in Science?” SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 00-33 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, 2001).
23  A. Agrawal and R. Henderson, “Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transfer from MIT,” Management Science 
48.1 (2002): 44–60.
24  P. Azoulay, W. Ding, and T. Stuart, “The Impact of Academic Patenting on the Rate, Quality and Direction of (Public) 
Research Output,” Journal of Industrial Economics 57.4 (2009): 637–676.
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et al. further exploit the same data source, showing how patenting events are preceded by 
publication surges, emphasising shocks in scientific opportunities as the main drivers of academic 
patenting.25 Fabrizio and Di Minin find similar results for a sample of US researchers over a 20-
year time frame. But while reporting increased publication rates for academic inventors, they 
also emphasise how the citations received by the articles fall for individuals reporting more than 
one patent application, suggesting a negative correlation between scientific output quality and 
“serial” patent activity.26 Breschi et al. examine the Italian experience.27 Their analyses point to 
a productivity gap between patenting and non-patenting scholars, with the former reporting 
higher publication rates and more cited papers, which further increase after the patenting 
event. The latter effect lasts longer for serial academic inventors—that is, scholars reporting 
more than one patent. Overall, none of the cited studies seems to find evidence of the recent 
increase in academic patenting affecting negatively scientific publishing at the individual level, 
but, quite the contrary, they often find a positive effect.
Murray and Stern explore instead systemic effects, namely the possibility that IPRs on science-
based inventions stand in the way of cumulative research.28 They do so by comparing articles 
from a leading scientific outlet (Nature Biotechnology) and distinguishing between those that 
are associated with a USPTO patent grant and those that are not. Publications related to IPRs 
are found to receive more citations than their counterparts. Interestingly, the intensity of 
citations modestly decreases after the connected patent is published,29 which suggests the 
potential presence of an “anti-commons” effect (scientists working on topics close to the 
invention covered by the patent change research direction when they discover the extent of 
proprietary results). Nevertheless, the small quantitative effect and the possible “measurement 
inefficiencies” of the citations prevent the authors from strongly claiming the existence of a 
negative influence of IPRs on cumulative scientific efforts.
2.3 Inventors and Labour Market Outcomes
The latest contributions to economic research on inventors come from studies linking patent/
inventor records with micro-level information on earnings, employment, or educational 
outcomes gathered from the registers of administrative agencies (e.g. social security 
administration, national fiscal authorities). The resulting databases often encompass full 
populations, reaching high degrees of detail on many individual dimensions (e.g. date of 
birth, gender, addresses), crucial information for studies whose identification strategies 
control for selection on observable characteristics. The issues investigated deal with 
inventors’ social extraction, educational background, and income trajectories, classic topics 
25  P. Azoulay, W. Ding, and T. Stuart, “The Determinants of Faculty Patenting Behavior: Demographics or Opportunities?” 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 63.4 (2007): 599–623.
26  K. Fabrizio and A. Di Minin, “Commercializing the Laboratory: Faculty Patenting and the Open Science Environment,” 
Research Policy 37.5 (2008): 914–931.
27  S. Breschi, F. Lissoni, and F. Montobbio, “The Scientific Productivity of Academic Inventors: New Evidence from Italian 
Data,” Economics of Innovation and New Technology 16.2 (2007): 101–118; and S. Breschi, F. Lissoni, and F. Montobbio, 
“University Patenting and Scientific Productivity: A Quantitative Study of Italian Academic Inventors,” European 
Management Review 5.2 (2008): 91–109.
28  F. Murray and S. Stern, “Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical 
Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 63.4 (2007): 648–687.
29  The authors use only USPTO patents granted before 2001, when the granting and publication dates coincided.
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of research agendas in labour economics, one of the first fields to mine administrative 
agencies’ datasets.30 
In the United States, Bell et al. and Jaravel et al. link USPTO patent data with tax records containing 
information on inventors’ residences, employment history and income. Bell et al. deal with inventors’ 
life cycles, finding that children born to high-income parents are much more likely to become 
inventors than children with a low-income family background.31 Jaravel et al. analyse inventors’ team 
dynamics, assessing inventors’ earnings and patenting quality losses after the premature death of 
a co-inventor. Causal estimates of the effect of such an end to a collaboration point to a large and 
long-lasting decline in earnings (−3.8 percent after eight years), total earnings (−4 percent after eight 
years), and patent citations received (−15 percent after eight years).32 In Germany, Dorner et al. link 
EPO patent data with the Integrated Employment Biographies database,33 a source of individuals’ 
employment histories. They study the effects of social ties on inventors’ relocation from eastern 
to western Germany after the reunification of the country, finding western German regions with 
stronger historically determined ties across the border attracting more inventors from eastern 
Germany, but of lesser quality (more productive inventors found their way to core western German 
regions regardless of pre-existing social ties). In Finland, Toivanen and Väänänen and Aghion et al. 
link EPO patent data with the Finnish longitudinal employer/employee database (administrative 
data on individuals’ labour market status and salaries), the Finnish population census (information 
on parents’ education and income), and Finnish Defence Force data on IQ scores (Aghion et al. 
only). Toivanen and Väänänen study the relationship between engineering education and inventive 
output, highlighting a positive and significant effect of a university engineering degree on individuals’ 
propensity to patent.34 Aghion et al. look at both the probability of becoming an inventor and the 
economic returns to patenting an invention.35 They report on how the likelihood of becoming an 
inventor is highly correlated with parental income—although the correlation is largely driven by 
parents’ education and children’s IQ test scores—and how patenting significantly increases the 
annual wage rate of an inventor over a prolonged period afterwards, with co-workers in the same 
firm also benefiting from the patented invention in terms of earnings. Jung and Ejermo36 and Zheng 
30  O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, “Using the Longitudinal Structure of Earnings to Estimate the Effect of Training Programs,” 
Review of Economics and Statistics 67.4 (1985): 648–660; J.D. Angrist, “Lifetime Earnings and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery: 
Evidence from Social Security Administrative Records,” American Economic Review 80.3 (1990): 313–336; J.D. Angrist, 
“Estimating the Labor Market Impact of Voluntary Military Service Using Social Security Data on Military Applicants,” 
Econometrica 66.2 (1998): 249–288; and L.F. Katz and B.D. Meyer, “Unemployment Insurance, Recall Expectations, and 
Unemployment Outcomes,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 105.4 (1990): 973–1002.
31  Specifically, children whose parents are in the top 1 percent of the income distribution are found to be 10 times as likely 
to become inventors as children from below-median income families; see A. Bell, R. Chetty, X. Jaravel, N. Petkova, and J. 
Van Reenen, “Who Becomes an Inventor in America? The Importance of Exposure to Innovation,” NBER Working Paper No. 
24062 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016).
32  X. Jaravel, N. Petkova and A. Bell, “Team-Specific Capital and Innovation,” American Economic Review 108.4–5 (2018): 
1034–1073.
33  M. Dorner, D. Harhoff, T. Hinz, K. Hoisl, and S. Bender, “Social Ties for Labor Market Access: Lessons from the Migration of 
East German Inventors,” IAB–Discussion Paper 41/2016 (Nuremberg: Institute for Employment Research, 2016).
34  O. Toivanen and L. Väänänen, “Education and Invention,” Review of Economics and Statistics 98.2 (2016): 382–396.
35  P. Aghion, U. Akcigit, A. Hyytinen, and O. Toivanen, “The Social Origins of Inventors,” NBER Working Paper No. 24110 
(Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017).
36  T. Jung and O. Ejermo, “Demographic Patterns and Trends in Patenting: Gender, Age, and Education of Inventors,” 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 86 (2014): 110–124.
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and Ejermo37 offer the Swedish case, matching patent data with demographic information and the 
Swedish census. They document educational and demographic trends among Swedish inventors, 
and analyse differences in inventive performance between native and immigrant inventors. One last 
example involves Italy, where Depalo and Di Addario link EPO patent data with employee/employer 
administrative records from the Italian Social Security Institute (Istituto Nazionale Previdenza 
Sociale), resulting in a longitudinal dataset covering the full working history of Italian patenting firms’ 
employees.38 They study inventors’ economic returns to patenting, providing evidence of an increase 
in wages before and during the patenting process, with eventually granted inventions yielding higher 
gains.
3. Data Treatment, Technical Issues, and Emerging Legal 
Complications
Applied econometrics research employing inventor statistics requires a thorough treatment of the 
available data. The main technical issues to be tackled are geolocalisation and disambiguation. 
Ethnicity assignment of individuals constitutes an additional challenge for studies requiring such 
information. This chapter briefly overviews each issue, concluding with additional remarks on legal 
complications emerging from data cleansing and harmonisation procedures.
3.1 Geolocalisation
The disclosure of addresses of individuals and entities on patent application documents allows the 
geolocalisation of the inventors and applicants behind each patent request. Besides being crucial 
information for any study concerned with the geography of inventive activities, addresses constitute 
a pivotal attribute of any disambiguation algorithm (see Section 3.2). Unfortunately, the raw 
information provided by patent data repositories is not seamlessly integrated into researchers’ final 
analyses, mostly due to missing information and data quality issues. These problems arise from the 
distinct application requirements and data diffusion practices of each national or international IP 
authority. For instance, USPTO patents often do not report the full addresses of inventors, whose 
geolocalisation can then take place only at the city or national level.39 Similarly, a few authorities 
that transmit their data to EPO for inclusion in the DODCB database do not attach the inventors’ 
full addresses, which results in missing observations in PATSTAT. Figure 1 provides an overview of the 
availability of inventors’ addresses according to the IP office where the associated patent application 
was filed, as evidenced by the latest version of PATSTAT database (Version 2017b). Of the 150 million 
inventor records available, around 22 percent are associated with patents requested at the State 
Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic of China, 18 percent at the Japan Patent Office, 
18 percent at the USPTO, and 6 percent at the EPO. The USPTO and EPO have the best coverage, 
37  Y. Zheng and O. Ejermo, “How Do the Foreign-Born Perform in Inventive Activity? Evidence from Sweden,” Journal of 
Population Economics 28.3 (2015): 659–695.
38  D. Depalo and S. Di Addario, “Shedding Light on Inventors’ Returns to Patents,” Development Working Papers No. 375 
(Milano: Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano, University of Milan, 2014).
39  Morrison et al. document how less than 5 percent of USPTO patent application records offer inventors’ addresses with 
full street information, in contrast to EPO and Patent Cooperation Treaty application data, which include high-resolution 
addresses (street number, street, postcode) for a large portion of their records; G. Morrison, M. Riccaboni, and F. Pammolli, 
“Disambiguation of Patent Inventors and Assignees Using High-Resolution Geolocation Data,” Scientific Data 4 (2017), 
Online, Article 170064.
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reporting at least a portion of inventors’ addresses for 71 percent and 86 percent of their records 
respectively. Only a tiny fraction of records gathered from applications filed in China and Japan offer 
the same information (0.1 percent and 0.3 percent respectively), which is in line with poor track 
records of most other major national patent offices. Inventors’ address data also vary in terms of 
data quality across application authorities.
A feasible methodology to tackle issues of missing information and address quality is to consider 
patent families.40 A large proportion of them exhibit the same team size and often the same inventors 
across patent applications covering the same invention in different IP jurisdictions. It is thus possible 
to retrieve inventors’ addresses from the applications with available geolocalisation references and 
match them with their corresponding records within the same patent family.
An additional problem arises when applications do not report the real residence of the inventors, 
due to applicant-specific patenting procedures. Ferrucci and Lissoni provide evidence in this regard 
40 “A patent family is a set of patents taken in various countries to protect a single invention” (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development). This feature stems from the “territorial nature of patent protection”; C. Martinez, “Patent 
Families: When Do Different Definitions Really Matter?” Scientometrics 86.1 (2011): 39–63. If an applicant wants to protect 
an invention in different countries, a request has to be filed at the intellectual property office of each country targeted. 
The quest for international patent protection is eased by international treaties allowing IP protection to be requested in 
multiple countries with a single application, e.g. PCT (http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/registration/pct/) and European 
Patent Convention (http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/epc.html).
Figure 1. Inventors’ address coverage by main intellectual property (IP) authority
Note: Inventor records correspond to individuals (natural persons) listed on patent applications. 
Source: European Patent Office (EPO) Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT), Version 2017b.
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
S
h
a
re
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
in
v
e
n
to
r 
re
co
rd
s 
(i
n
v
e
n
to
rs
h
ip
)
Share with address: ~0.1%
Share with address: ~0.3%
Share with address: ~71%
Share with address: ~86%
Without address
With address
IP office (country) of the application listing the Inventor
Ch
in
a
Ja
pa
n
US
PT
O
EP
O
G
er
m
an
y
Ca
na
da
Au
st
ra
lia
Ta
iw
an
Fr
an
ce
Ru
ss
ia
n 
Fe
de
ra
tio
n
Re
pu
bl
ic 
of
 K
or
ea
141Global Perspectives and Challenges for the Intellectual Property System  
for patents applied for through the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) system.41 They show how a 
proportion of their sample’s foreign-defined inventors were connected to applicants’ corporate 
addresses (e.g. a firm’s headquarters, R&D centre, or subsidiary) or, in a few cases, that of the law firm 
taking care of the patent application. Figure 2 reveals how accounting for flawed address information 
changes the magnitude of foreign inventors’ patenting activity in the United States.
3.2 Disambiguation
Identification of inventors and applicants is another chief concern. Patent databases contain 
many entries, often encompassing millions of observations. It is therefore common to encounter 
homonymy cases, misspelled names, or missing information. This prevents the unique identification 
of inventors or applicants, since intellectual property authorities do not attribute distinctive codes 
to either of them. The risk of assigning the same identification code to different entities (i.e. type 
I errors or false positives) or treating as different two entities that are in fact identical (i.e. type II 
errors or false negatives) is high, biasing any analysis not properly addressing the issue.
41  E. Ferrucci and F. Lissoni, “Foreign Inventors in the US and EU15: Diversity and Productivity”, paper presented at 
the GeoInno2018 Conference, Barcelona, 31 January–2 February 2018, https://ecm.univ-rennes1.fr/nuxeo/site/
esupversions/5bcf50f1-5ba8-44dd-afdd-355e7e9f78a9?inline.
Figure 2. United States main immigrant inventors groups’ patenting activity (1990–2010)
Notes: Yearly count of Patent Cooperation Treaty patent applications listing United States-resident foreign inventors. Dashed 
lines do not account for inventors’ flawed addresses. Solid lines exclude inventors whose address coincide with applicant’s 
address. Priority years refer to the earliest filing date among patents in the same simple family,
Source: E. Ferrucci and F. Lissoni, “Foreign Inventors in the US and EU15: Diversity and Productivity,” paper presented 
at the GeoInno2018 Conference, Barcelona, 31 January–2 February 2018, https://ecm.univ-rennes1.fr/nuxeo/site/
esupversions/5bcf50f1-5ba8-44dd-afdd-355e7e9f78a9?inline
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Patent priority year
In
v
e
n
to
rs
China
India
Canada
UK
Germany
China_original
India_original
Canada_original
UK_original
Germany_original
 142 Intellectual Property and Digital Trade in the Age of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data
Concerning inventor data, researchers have advanced multiple disambiguation techniques in 
recent years. The most common ones usually involve comparing similar entries (i.e. applications 
listing inventors with the same or close names) and using additional information to estimate the 
probability that those records relate to the same individual. Often, they can be described as a three-
step process:42 
• Cleaning and parsing: the relevant text strings (i.e. those containing information on name, 
surname, and address of the inventor) are purged of typographical errors, while all characters 
are converted to a standard character set. If necessary, any relevant string is parsed into several 
substrings, according to various criteria (punctuation, blank spaces, etc.). Typically, the string 
containing the inventor’s complete name is parsed into name, surname, and title (if any). The 
address is parsed too.
• Matching: the algorithm selects pairs of inventors who are likely candidates to be the same person, 
due to homonymy or similarity of their names.
• Filtering: the selected pairs are filtered according to additional information retrieved either from 
the patent documentation or from external sources. Some typical information from within the 
patent documentation is the address (e.g. namesakes sharing the same address are believed to be 
the same person) or some characteristics of the patent. The latter include the patent applicant’s 
name (e.g. homonyms whose patents are owned by the same company may be presumed to be 
the same person) or its technological contents (as derived from the patent classification system or 
patent citations).
Alongside early attempts within specific research projects,43 Trajtenberg et al. propose one of the 
first efforts to explicitly introduce a consolidated disambiguation methodology.44 Based on the NBER 
Patent and Citations Data File,45 they uniquely identify roughly 1.6 million inventors worldwide, by 
pairing similar inventor name entries via a simple-string-match algorithm and then filtering the results 
through similarity scores based on personal or patent characteristics. The results are benchmarked 
against a manually assembled sample of uniquely identified inventors. A potential pitfall of this 
approach concerns the inevitably arbitrary design of thresholds to be met by overall and characteristic-
related scores for the matches’ validation. Pezzoni et al. counter this issue by means of simulation 
analysis. They upgrade the “Massacrator©” algorithm46 and execute a Monte Carlo simulation against 
a training dataset, so as to calibrate both the weights assigned to the filtering criteria and the similarity 
42  Raffo and Lhuillery test and compare different technical approaches available at each stage of disambiguation processes, using a 
sample of inventors listed on EPO’s PATSTAT database of patent applications. They first present performance scores of individual 
and combined methodologies in terms of precision, recall, and the balance between the two. They also offer an overview of the 
biases suffered by econometric inferences that depend on particular matching and filtering algorithms. J. Raffo and S. Lhuillery, 
“How to Play the ‘Names Game’: Patent Retrieval Comparing Different Heuristics,” Research Policy 38.10 (2009): 1617–1627.
43  J. Singh, “Collaborative Networks as Determinants of Knowledge Diffusion Patterns. Management Science, 51.5 (2005): 
756–770; and L. Fleming, C. King, and A.I. Juda, “Small Worlds and Regional Innovation,” Organization Science 18.6 (2007): 
938–954.
44 M. Trajtenberg, M., G. Shiff, and R. Melamed, “The ‘Names Game’: Harnessing Inventors’ Patent Data for Economic 
Research,” No. w12479 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006).
45  B.H. Hall, A.B. Jaffe, and M. Trajtenberg, “The NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological 
Tools,” NBER Working Paper No. 8498 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001).
46  M. Pezzoni, F. Lissoni, and G. Tarasconi, “How to Kill Inventors: Testing the Massacrator© Algorithm for Inventor 
Disambiguation,” Scientometrics 101.1 (2014): 477–504.
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threshold. Li et al.47 provide an alternative technique, building on the Author-ity project’s Bayesian-
classifier approach developed by Torvik et al.48 and Torvik and Smalheiser.49 Through a semi-supervised 
classification algorithm with an iterative blocking scheme, they avoid the assignment of ad hoc 
filtering weights and other forms of manual optimisation of the disambiguation procedure. More 
recently, Morrison et al.50 have presented a geolocation-based algorithm that exploits the EPO and 
PCT databases’ high-resolution address information for a simple-string-match procedure, yielding 
the disambiguation of inventors (and assignees) on about 3.6 million patents found in the EPO, PCT, 
and USPTO registers.
Scholar-led disambiguation efforts have recently been included in wider institutional projects 
concerning patent data. An example is the PatentsView initiative supported by the USPTO, aimed 
at creating an analytical platform for patent data investigation. Its database employs a newly 
developed disambiguation algorithm,51 based on a hierarchical co-reference approach and blocking/
canopy techniques to achieve higher precision than similar pairwise comparison methods.
3.3 Ethnicity/Nationality Assignment
Migration-and-innovation studies crucially depend on assigning nationality or ethnicity information 
to inventors. This is not a trivial task, since patent records issued by most IP authorities do not include 
information on inventors’ nationality or place of birth.
A partial exception is provided by the WIPO-PCT dataset, assembled by the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) for all the inventors listed on applications following the PCT 
procedure.52 The database exploits two legal technicalities: first, the PCT procedure requirement 
for applicants to declare their nationality; second, a peculiarity of the US patent law, which until 
2011 admitted only physical people as patent applicants. As a result, patents filed or extended to 
the USPTO according to the PCT procedure report the nationality of inventors. Unfortunately, the 
nationality information does not reveal immigrant inventors who have become citizens of the host 
countries, thereby underestimating migration figures. In addition, the data stop in 2011 and, for 
earlier years (especially before the mid-1990s), are limited by the limited number of PCT member 
countries.
In order to obviate these limitations, researchers have thus experimented with name analysis 
algorithms, mostly based on public name-ethnicity directories. A pioneering strategy in this 
47  G.C. Li et al., “Disambiguation and Co-authorship Networks of the US Patent Database (1975–2010),” Research Policy 43.6 
(2014): 941–955.
48 V.I. Torvik, M. Weeber, D.R. Swanson, and N.R. Smalheiser, “A Probabilistic Similarity Metric for Medline Records: A Model 
for Author Name Disambiguation,” Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 56 (2005): 140–
158.
49  The Author-ity project achieved a full disambiguation of the PubMed database, a bibliographic repository of the biomedical 
scientific literature; V.I. Torvik and R. Smalheiser “Author Name Disambiguation in Medline,” ACM Transactions in 
Knowledge Discovery from Data 3.3 (2009): 1–30.
50  G. Morrison, M. Riccaboni, and F. Pammolli, “Disambiguation of Patent Inventors and Assignees Using High-Resolution 
Geolocation Data,” Scientific Data 4 (2017), Online, Article 170064.
51  N. Monath and A. Mccallum, “Discriminative Hierarchical Coreference for Inventor Disambiguation,” Presentation, 
PatentsView Inventor Disambiguation Technical Workshop, USPTO, 2015.
52  E. Miguélez and C. Fink, “Measuring the International Mobility of Inventors: A New Database,” WIPO Economic Research 
Working Papers No. 8 (Geneva: World Intellectual Property Organization, 2013).
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direction is provided by Kerr, who combines inventor data (name and surname) from the USPTO 
with the Melissa ethnic-name database,53 a commercial repository of names and surnames of United 
States residents, classified by likely country of origin. More recently, Breschi et al. have built on the 
same approach by experimenting with the IBM-GNR system, a commercial product that associates 
a list of names and surnames to a likely country of origin.54 Nathan exploits instead ONOMAP name 
classification software,55 a naming-network clustering algorithm that assigns likely ethnic groups 
and other characteristics (e.g. linguistic group) to name–surname combinations.56 
3.4 Emerging Legal Complications
A side effect of researchers’ data cleansing and harmonisation procedures is the identification of 
potential legal complications, as evidenced by discrepancies or specific patterns among the patent 
application documents examined. One case relates to the quality of inventor information found on 
patent application documents. As explained in Section 3.1, some patent applications may report 
clearly erroneous addresses for a subset of inventors, providing corporate addresses instead of the 
inventors’ personal addresses.57 This leads to doubt over the applicants’ patenting procedures and 
the accuracy of the disclosed information. What is the extent of incorrect information on inventors? 
Does it happen by chance, perhaps due to time constraints or sloppy application practices, or is 
it a consequence of companies’ policies in terms of information diffusion about their employees? 
Are there underlying strategic motivations not to disclose inventors’ real addresses or purposely list 
incorrect addresses?
Another interesting example has to do with discrepancies between number of authors and inventors 
in “patent/publication pairs,” namely pairs of scientific publications and patents describing the same 
invention. Both authorship and inventorship are key “attribution rights,” namely moral rights upon 
which individuals may build their professional reputation and careers. Lissoni et al. analyse a sample 
of related sets of patents and publications, showing how junior and female team members may 
give up inventorship to secure authorship of articles, even when entitled to both.58 Häussler and 
Sauermann exploit a survey on 2,000 life scientists.59 They document how inventorship is determined 
primarily by substantive contributions (e.g. conception of the idea) and positively associated with 
higher hierarchical positions within an organisation, in contrast to authorship, which is determined 
by project participation through technical and laboratory work, and is not influenced by individuals’ 
rank or status.
53  W.R. Kerr, “The Ethnic Composition of US Inventors,” HBS Working Paper Series No. 08-006 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Business School, 2008).
54  S. Breschi, F. Lissoni, and G. Tarasconi, “Inventor Data for Research on Migration and Innovation,” in E. Miguélez and C. Fink 
(eds), The International Mobility of Talent and Innovation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
55  M. Nathan, “Same Difference? Minority Ethnic Inventors, Diversity and Innovation in the UK,” Journal of Economic 
Geography 15.1 (2015): 129–168.
56  P. Mateos, Names, Ethnicity, and Populations: Tracing Identity in Space (Heidelberg: Springer, 2014).
57  E. Ferrucci and F. Lissoni, “Foreign Inventors in the US and EU15: Diversity and Productivity”, paper presented at 
the GeoInno2018 Conference, Barcelona, 31 January–2 February 2018, https://ecm.univ-rennes1.fr/nuxeo/site/
esupversions/5bcf50f1-5ba8-44dd-afdd-355e7e9f78a9?inline.
58  F. Lissoni, F. Montobbio, and L. Zirulia, “Inventorship and Authorship as Attribution Rights: An Enquiry into the Economics 
of Scientific Credit,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 95 (2013): 49–69.
59  C. Häussler and H. Sauermann, “Credit Where Credit Is Due? The Impact of Project Contributions and Social Factors on 
Authorship and Inventorship,” Research Policy 42.3 (2013): 688–703.
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4. Research Questions: Inventorship Misallocation and 
Disclosure
The wide availability of information on inventors, their fields of work, and their geolocalisation has 
allowed economic research to advance our knowledge on multiple aspects of the technological 
discovery process. Nevertheless, simple lists of individuals associated with a request for patent 
protection are mere hints of the complex dynamics underlying an invention’s development. As partly 
evidenced above, a particularly pressing issue involves joint inventorship and the definition of the 
relative contribution of each scientist or engineer to the invention protected by a patent. Is it 
possible to discern the role each individual listed as inventor played in the invention’s conception?
Referring to legal definitions of co-inventorship might constitute a valid option if it were not for 
the nuanced and unclear characterisations often provided by national and international patent 
legislation. In the United States, notions of joint inventorship have been defined as some of 
“the muddiest concept(s) in the muddy metaphysics of patent law.”60 Specifically, the US co-
inventorship doctrine specifies how an individual can gain inventorship rights by contributing 
only to a single claim on a patent application.61 In this case, an important question deals with 
the identification of the specific claim allowing an individual to be considered as inventor: which 
claim is it? In other words, which component of the invention can be associated with that specific 
inventor’s ingenuity?
The controversial legal definition of co-inventorship, and the consequent unclear inventorship 
assignment at the patent application stage, limits possible ex post correction with respect to the 
true contribution of each individual listed. This might hide bargaining practices among research 
team members, to the potential detriment of professionals holding less powerful positions within 
an organisation (see Section 3.4). In addition to individual unfair losses or gains in terms of rights 
over an invention, inaccurate inventorship assignment offers a biased signal to third parties, such 
as evaluators, prospective employers, and investors, misled by incorrect information conveyed by 
patent indicators.
Listing inventors on a patent application might also carry a strategic element, particularly for private 
enterprises62 with a competitive advantage associated to their R&D capabilities. Over two decades of 
socioeconomic research has established the impossibility of full knowledge codification. The importance 
of knowledge’s tacit dimension, which “can be passed on only by example from master to apprentice,”63 
60  W.F. Fasse, “The Muddy Metaphysics of Joint Inventorship: Cleaning Up after the 1984 Amendments to 35 USC § 116,” 
Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 5 (1992): 153–208; C.L. Fisk, “Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of 
Attribution,” Georgetown Law Journal 95 (2006): 49–117; and E.R. Cohen, “Clear as Mud: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Developing Law of Joint Inventorship in the Federal Circuit,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 28 (2013): 383–415.
61  “The contributor of any disclosed means of a means-plus-function claim element is a joint inventor as to that claim, unless 
one asserting sole inventorship can show that the contribution of that means was simply a reduction to practice of the sole 
inventor’s broader concept”; Ethicon Inc. v. United States Surgical Corporation, 135 F.3d 1456, 1460-63, 45 USPQ2d 1545, 
1548-1551 (Federal Circuit, 1998).
62  While the inventors listed on a patent document are in principle the effective owners of the underlying invention—being 
responsible for the enforcement of their rights over it in case of alleged infringement by third parties—individuals working 
for a particular organization often share or give up these privileges in their employment contracts to the benefit of the 
employers.
63  M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1958).
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makes on-site interactions and face-to-face contacts crucial for the complete transmission of technical 
know-how.64 Scientists’ and engineers’ mobility between firms thus constitutes a major mechanism 
for knowledge diffusion, but also a threat to high-tech companies, watching their most valuable assets 
taking their know-how to competitors.65 Inventors’ disclosure through patent applications clarifies the 
targets of rival firms’ poaching practices, particularly in the case of highly specialised professionals, 
leaders of niche fields counting only a handful of experts around the world. These considerations 
generate precise questions about companies’ practices in patenting and disclosing inventors: are 
companies wary of disclosing their inventors? What rules do they follow in assigning inventorship?
5. Conclusions
Economic research on patent inventors has co-evolved with data availability. On the one hand, it has 
exploited the increasing amount of data made available to social scientists by IP authorities; on the 
other hand, it has greatly contributed to steering the data diffusion process, both by soliciting more 
information and by pioneering new methods for treating and validating it. In doing so, it has raised 
some substantive issues on the quality of inventor information as reported by patent applicants, 
deserving the attention of both IP authorities and legal scholars. The former ought to decide whether 
to enforce more transparency, at the very least for administrative purposes. The latter may wish to 
open up a reflection on the legal requirements for defining inventorship, and on the extent to which 
disclosing information on inventor ought to be considered part of the applicant’s general disclosure 
duty. The reflection appears to accord with the well-established evidence on knowledge tacitness (to 
which economic research on patent inventors has largely contributed), and the consequent need for 
inventor mobility for knowledge diffusion, above and beyond the free access to patent documentation. 
Is it consistent to require full disclosure of the invention and then hide or muddle information on 
inventors, or provide it in the absence of a clear definition of inventorship? Does the lack of accuracy 
of inventor information aggravate information asymmetry in the labour market for R&D workers, 
thus making it less efficient? Does it reintroduce secrecy, by making the holders of important pieces 
of technical knowledge practically unreachable? These questions may sound unfamiliar to European 
scholars, where the first-to-file granting principle has kept inventors in the shade of applicants, but they 
may resonate with a US research tradition that, albeit limited, has always dealt with the issue of the 
identity of inventors.66 They will become more important in the future, when computer-implemented 
inventions will question the need for any physical person to be identified as inventor, as well as inventor-
related concepts such as those contained in the notion of non-obviousness.67 
64  R. Cowan, P.A. David, and D. Foray, “The Explicit Economics of Knowledge Codification and Tacitness,” Industrial and 
Corporate Change 9.2 (2000): 211–253; S. Breschi and F. Lissoni, “Knowledge Spillovers and Local Innovation Systems: A 
Critical Survey,” Industrial and Corporate Change 10 (2001): 975–1005; and M. Storper and A. Venables, “Buzz: Face-to-Face 
Contact and the Urban Economy,” Journal of Economic Geography 4.4 (2004): 351–370.
65  Collateral evidence on the value of highly skilled labour has been given by recent disputes over “post-employment covenants 
not to compete,” the so-called “non-compete agreements.” These have been proven to efficiently prevent workers’ mobility 
across firms; see M. Marx, D. Strumsky, and L. Fleming, “Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment,” 
Management Science 55.6 (2009): 875–889. They have been found to be illegally established among incumbents in 
jurisdictions preventing their application, e.g. Silicon Valley’s “no-poaching case,” High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation, 
U.S. District Court, North. Distr. of California 11-cv-2509, http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/lhk/hightechemployee.
66  S.M. O’Connor, “Hired to Invent vs. Work Made for Hire: Resolving the Inconsistency among Rights of Corporate 
Personhood, Authorship, and Inventorship,” Seattle University Law Review 35 (2011): 1227–1246.
67  R. Abbott, “Autonomous Machines and Their Inventions,” Mitteilungen der deutschen Patentanwälte (2017): 429–437; R. 
Abbott, “Everything is Obvious,” UCLA Law Review, 2017, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3056915.
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The emergence of these research questions reveals how economic research on inventors has travelled 
all the way from making instrumental use of inventor data in investigating economics-specific topics 
(such as the geography of innovation), to focusing and contributing to IP-specific topics. Along this 
path, it has crossed and cast light on issues such as the role of IP in science and the relationship 
between scientific publishing and patenting. The time has come for research on inventors to figure 
more prominently in the research agenda of IP scholars from both law and economics.
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1. Introduction*
The world is changing rapidly and we are facing the fourth industrial revolution, connecting billions 
of people and innumerable machines around the globe. The magnitudes are increasing by multiples 
every day, changing our ways of living and working, and our relationships to one another.
While, during the past 250 years, industries 1.0–3.0 led us from the first practical steam engines 
through elevated conveyer belts for mass production to electronics and software-based controls 
enabling automated production, industry 4.0 is revolutionising the industrial markets with digital 
technologies that are driving innovation with tremendous speed. By 2025, disruptive technologies 
such as the Internet of Things, mobile internet, automation of knowledge work, cloud technology, 
and advanced robotics—to name just a few—will have a substantial impact on every country, 
industry, and society.
One of the many results is the massive generation, transfer, storage, processing, and analysing 
of structured and unstructured data and the creation of big data. Hence, the amount of data is 
exploding on a daily basis. While less than 10 zettabytes of data were created in 2015, according 
to the market intelligence company IDC, expectations go as high as 180 zettabytes of data (or 180 
trillion gigabytes) in 2025. At the start of 2017, it was predicted that by the end of the year, revenue 
growth from digital technology-based products would double that of the remaining product/service 
portfolio for a third of Fortune 500 companies.1 
Beside data volume and velocity, data variety will become one of the most important value drivers 
adding valuable content to the so-called big data collected from human beings and machines. The 
big data market is expected to grow worldwide from US$ 33.5 billion in revenue for 2017 to US$ 88.5 
billion in 2025.2 Hence, investment by software, content, and database providers in the development 
of products and services such as software, databases, and platforms for generating, processing, and 
storing big data will continuously increase. The product and system industries and markets have also 
recognised the value of big data and its role in the creation of new products and services, as well as 
improvements in existing ones.
2. ABB and Digitalisation
ABB is a global leader in power and automation technologies, operating in more than 100 countries. 
It provides a wide range of industry-leading solutions to its customers in various markets, which 
are increasingly developed based on the collection and processing of relevant data on a common 
technology platform. This platform is a set of reusable technical components and will allow ABB’s 
solutions to be deployed on the premises, in the cloud, and between clouds. The economic impact 
 
 
 
 
1  Gil Press, “6 Predictions for the $203 Billion Big Data Analytics Market,” Forbes, 20 January 2017, https://www.forbes.com/
sites/gilpress/2017/01/20/6-predictions-for-the-203-billion-big-data-analytics-market/#9c4845820838.
2  “Forecast of Big Data Market Size, Based on Revenue, from 2011 to 2026,” Statista, https://www.statista.com/
statistics/254266/global-big-data-market-forecast/.
* The views and opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy 
or position of the ABB group or any single ABB entity. Examples created, analyses performed, and assumptions within this 
chapter are made by the author and are not reflective of the ABB Group or any single ABB entity. All information used in 
this chapter is publicly available information.
 152 Intellectual Property and Digital Trade in the Age of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data
occurs in terms of improvements in productivity or cost reductions. The value will increasingly 
move from physical products to those enabled by digital technologies (software and connectivity). 
ABB is a key player in many of these markets, such as the Internet of Things (power grids, industrial 
automation), cloud technologies (using cloud software and supplying data-centre electrical 
equipment), the electrification of transportation, advanced oil and gas exploration, and supplying 
inverters and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems for renewable energy (for 
example, ABB’s microgrid systems). ABB Ability™ refers to both a set of industry digital solutions and 
the platform they are built on. ABB is building the platform from the top industry technologies, such 
as Microsoft’s Azure cloud services, IBM Watson’s machine learning and artificial intelligence, and 
SAP HANA’s big-data query tools, which in various ways collect, store, and process big data.3 These 
innovative technologies require continuing investment and partnerships with the relevant players in 
the market. Figure 1 shows a simplified example of possible data flows and processing to and from 
the customer, and involving ABB, with the question at the centre of who owns the data.
3  ABB, “ABB and Microsoft Partner to Drive Digital Industrial Transformation,” press release, 4 October 2016, http://new.
abb.com/news/detail/245/abb-and-microsoft-partner-to-drive-digital-industrial-transformation; and ABB, “ABB and IBM 
Partner in Industrial Artificial Intelligence Solutions,” press release, 25 April 2017, http://new.abb.com/news/detail/1411/
ABB-and-IBM-partner-in-industrial-artificial-intelligence-solutions.
Figure 1.Simplified example of possible data flows and processing,  
and the ownership question at its centre
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Figure 1 shows just one example of many possible data flows and processes. Whether through this or 
any other structuring, it becomes clear that various stakeholders with different tasks participate in 
the overall setup. There is one interest they all have in common: big data. And this common interest 
immediately raises the question: who owns the big data in such a data life cycle? Can big data be 
owned at all?
These questions trigger particular challenges to a company’s intellectual property management in 
a fast-changing technology environment. Legislation is not necessarily harmonised and might be 
contradictory, possibly even competitive. What does the legal environment provide to enable a 
company to protect its investment in digital technologies based on big data?
3. Intellectual Property Rights and Data Ownership in Europe
Due to the rapidly increasing value of the data market, investing companies are seeking legal 
mechanisms to protect and ensure ownership in (big) data. To start with, at present neither European 
Union (EU) nor national legislation directly regulates the ownership of big data in an adequate 
manner. Though there is much legislation, including criminal law, competition law, and data privacy 
protection, as well as case law, that has an impact on and provides indications for certain ownership-
like situations, the legislative environment remains inconsistent and cannot provide resilient 
solutions to secure the enormous investment by companies in the new big-data based technologies.
The nature of the industry relating to power and automation technologies, where companies like ABB 
are operating, means that the intellectual property rights landscape is possibly the most relevant 
framework for data ownership protection. Hence, the following will trigger some further thoughts 
on the incentives for companies to invest in data technologies in light of EU and national legislation 
in Europe relating to copyright, database rights, and trade secrets.
3.1 Copyright Protection
The most obvious intellectual property right to address data ownership seems to be copyright. While 
copyright protection is regulated by national law, the good news is that international treaties provide 
at least some harmonisation and protection.4 However, the impact of diverse national laws within 
Europe remains substantial since there is still no synchronised legal framework.
In any case the question arises as to whether big data in an ABB-like business in particular qualify 
for ownership under the general principles of copyright, irrespective of any national peculiarities. 
While in principle copyright legislation might provide some ownership protection to the author of 
(big) data in that it covers created works of different types, it does require in the first place that there 
is an author who created such data—that is, it requires intellectual and intentional human creation 
to accomplish the copyright-protected results. In the field of power and automation technologies, 
however, data are generated mostly (if not exclusively) by machines, apparatuses, gears, engines, 
motors, and systems—referred to in the following as device(s)—of various types that continuously 
but certainly not consciously produce data. Hence, the creative act of authorship is highly doubtful 
and mostly not recognised in European jurisdictions.
4  Berne Convention (1886), Universal Copyright Convention (1952), Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) (1994), World Copyright Treaty (1996), and Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society (2001).
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But aside from that, who could be considered to be the author and thus the owner? There are several 
players involved in the entire life cycles of data who could possibly claim such ownership rights. One 
of them is the owner of the device that produces the data. Such data result from specific operational 
patterns, representing how and when the device is used, and hence the device produces individual, 
user-related data leading back to the owner. It could be argued, however, that those data, though 
related to the use of the device, basically result from the technology that is incorporated into such 
devices, usually owned by the manufacturer. The data might be established as part of the know-how 
related to such technology. The manufacturer of the devices might therefore claim ownership of these 
data. In the case of the example shown in Figure 1, another stakeholder certainly would be the cloud 
and/or platform provider, since the data accumulate and create at least a new set of big data right there. 
Or possibly all of them together, especially when it comes to the creation of big data from different 
sources? And how can data ownership in the context of big data be proven if the generation of the data 
includes multiple sources? The answers to these questions are not a given and, if they are not clarified 
by legislation, it remains to be seen how case law will deal with these questions. In the absence of 
clear legislation, it might also be up to the individual parties—that is, device manufacturers, “users,” 
“customers,” and so on—to find bilateral agreements on how to handle the matter.
Another aspect relates to the requirement of originality under copyright protection. While it could 
protect many types of data, which would cover a wide range of artificially generated data, those data 
would need to be original. Originality is the differentiator from pure reproductions, repetitions, copies, 
and so on, and thus ensures protection of new or novel creations. This may become an issue, particularly 
when it comes to the creation of the same data from numerous similar devices. At least at the level of 
such data sources, originality might be problematic and needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
The requirement of originality also closes the circle with the question of authorship, as it is supposed to 
reflect the author’s personality in making free and creative choices in the work with the author’s own 
fingerprint. No need to mention that a machine fails on this condition.
It is not only eligibility for copyright as such that raises questions, but also the territoriality of 
legislation. This concerns the applicability of national law in European countries with different ranges 
of protection and the rather low level of harmonisation on an international minimum. Depending on 
their operational coverage, global companies like ABB need to deal with many different and divergent 
legislative regimes with diverse requirements and legal security. Given the need for data protection 
and the level of synchronisation of national laws at present, international companies are obliged to 
adjust their business models to safeguard nationally available protection, and so their investments in 
the digital world. Nevertheless, accumulation and consolidation of (big) data need to take place at 
some point, and somewhere, to develop and exploit the full value of (often locally generated) data. This 
will finally reshuffle again the potential business solutions for protection and ownership.
3.2 Database Protection
Since big data are usually collected, stored in, and possibly processed by databases, they might be 
protected within the scope of database protection. The European Database Directive addresses the 
legal protection of databases in any form,5 defining a database as “a collection of independent works, 
data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and individually accessible by 
5  Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 
Article 1.
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electronic or other means.” This results in the independent protection of databases by copyright and by 
sui generis right. So far, so good.
Database protection under copyright can in accordance with the Database Directive be achieved 
when the database is the result of the author’s own intellectual creation leading back to the general 
principle of originality under copyright law. In the context of database creation, originality may result 
(again) from the free selection and creative arrangement of the data to be stored in such databases. 
The prerequisite of originality, however, cannot be fulfilled where the collected data are continuously 
transmitted by devices to the databases without any human contribution. In other words, can an 
underlying algorithm managing the content and structure of a database by automatically generated 
data replace individual authorship and therewith create originality? Or should copyright be granted 
rather to the algorithms that create the databases because of their own original content instead of 
the data content as such?
Following the nature of copyright, intended to support human creativity in the arts and sciences, 
as well as the regulatory background of the Database Directive, databases automatically created 
by platforms generating continuously (and uncontrolled) data content cannot be protected by 
database protection based on copyright due to the lack of people (whether natural or legal) creating 
the databases.
As mentioned, the Database Directive also foresees a sui generis right “for the maker of a database 
which shows that there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either 
the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents to prevent extraction and/or re-utilization 
of the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the contents 
of that database.”6 The bad news is that the database protection sui generis requires substantial 
investment in the creation of the database as such. This investment is irrespective of the data that 
become the content of such databases. Hence, individual data as such are not fully protected.
3.3 Trade Secret Protection
Contrary to the copyright and database protections, trade secret protection focuses on the secrecy 
of commercially valuable information and data, including any kind of know-how developed and 
owned by the (natural or legal) person. The international legal framework can be found in the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement and the Trade Secrets Directive.7 
While the protection of trade secrets does not require any particular data types or originality, and 
hence also allows the protection of individual data for an unlimited time, the immanent trade secret 
condition of secrecy may create protection issues for companies like ABB that need to use these data. 
Issues may occur for two different aspects of secrecy: (1) the use of (big) data as such, if secret; and 
(2) the establishment and maintenance of trade secrets to achieve the desired protection.
In ABB’s industrial environment, large quantities of data are collected to develop products and 
services providing customers with greater uptime, speed, and yield, eliminating inefficient processes 
6  Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 
Article 7.
7  Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the Protection of Undisclosed 
Know-how and Business Information (Trade Secrets) against Their Unlawful Acquisition, Use and Disclosure.
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and redundant tasks, and ensuring accuracy, precision, and consistency. If these data are kept secret, 
then working with them and using them for the purposes of product and service development 
become quite challenging. And even if secrecy of the data at stake is a part of the business model, the 
necessary measures to ensure and prove secrecy are quite demanding for multinational enterprises 
operating and serving customers around the globe.
4. Additional Considerations
The digitalisation and data industry is rapidly changing the landscape of the relevant industry players. 
The capital-intensive hardware industry remains solid but is also a source of moderate innovation and 
growth. Often it is outsourced to low-cost countries to remain competitive. In turn, new players are 
entering the market of power and automation technologies covering the digital side of the industry. 
These new players are already experienced in similar technologies and extremely fast in adapting to 
change and innovation. While enterprises in the product and systems industries are in the process 
of adjusting their organisational structures, today’s suppliers of cloud services, databases, and 
software solutions are transforming into competitors in the same market, increasingly touching and 
overlapping with the product portfolio. Though there is the legal option to regulate data (and other 
intellectual property) ownership in the contracts, daily practice has shown that negotiations become 
more and more challenging, time-consuming, and costly. Both partners need to decide what they 
want to own, what they can own, and what they need to own, and will not hesitate to enforce their 
interests. The winner will be the one who can survive without the other.
5. Conclusion
There is diverse EU and European national legislation that impacts the ownership of (big) data. 
However, consistent and resilient solutions for data protection and ownership are missing. While 
intellectual property rights such as copyright, database protection, and trade secrets may provide 
certain benefits on a case-by-case basis, the legal environment remains insecure for companies 
investing huge amounts in the development of new technologies. In addition, the rapid growth of 
the digital market and the speed of technology development suggest the need for another review 
of the legal environment within the EU and in relation to other jurisdictions to ensure a return on 
investments and competitiveness in Europe.
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